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l. 
I N T R 0 0 U C T I 0 N 
==~=~;================= 
Since the late ' fifties the ter~ structure of interest rates has attracted 
considerable attention from both theoretical and empirical economists. While 
potentially a very fruitful area for the application of the traditional methods 
of economic enquiry, the term structure has proved itself to be a potent test-
ing ground for these tools , and consequently a wide range of sophisticated 
analytic devices have been introduced, Despite this , no general agreement has 
yet been r eached and a number of crucial questions remain unanswered . It is 
our task in this dissertation to extend the enquiry into the South African con-
text in an attempt to shed some light on the determination of the term structure 
of interest rates . 
Theoreticians have isolated a number of factors which oper ate in a complex 
pattern of inter- relationships to determine the rate of r eturn on financia l 
assets . Some of the more prominent of these are the risk of default in 
promised payment , the coupon or nominal r ate, the degree of marketability , call 
pro~isions, tax features , the degree of acceptability as collateral , converta-
bility and so on. In order to allow for systematic theoretical investigation 
of the pattern of returns on securities , economists have abstracted from these 
factors so that only term to maturity , or the life of the bond , remains as the 
determinant of the yield on such a security . In this way, the vario~s theor-
ies on the term structure are able to focus on the differences in yields on 
f inancial assets which are equal in every respect except for their term to 
maturity. Usually this i mplies an examination of the market for government 
bonds w~ the ceteris paribus clause i s generally relevant. 
Conventionally the value of a bond is believed to be determined by the inter-
action of four basic elements. Firstly, the face value of a bond or the prin-
cipal amount to be repa~d on the t ermination of the bond designated by F. 
Secondly, the nominal rate of interest or coupon , C, accruing to the investor . 
Thirdly, t he number of years to maturity denoted by n, . and finally, the inter-
nal rate of return i , or the annual net return known as the yield to maturity • 
. / 
This yield to maturity is therefore simply that discount r ate which makes the 
sum of the present values of all the coupons accruing as interest and the 
principal to be paid at maturity equal to the purchase price. 
2. 
p 
= c + c (I + i) (I + i)2 + C + F (I + i )n 
which can be transformed into a geometric progression and sim~lified to 
p = c 
i p 
( 
+ F 
(I + i)n 
Clearly, as n approximates infinity, so the equation nears the limit ~ , 
]; 
Therefore, for a consol or bond with n =CXJ which receives one rand annually, the 
I f we define market value equals the reciprocal of the market rate of interest , 
c 
the nominal yield as I, where I = F' and compare it to the market yield i , where 
i = ~' then several important relationships can be deduced . Firstly, when i equals 
c I , then ~ = F and the discounted value of the bond equals the face value, or P = F. 
]; 
When the nominal yield I exceeds i, ~ > F and P > F, and finally when i ::> I, ]; 
then~<: F, and the face value exceeds the discounted value or the bond sells 
]; 
below its par value . 
The relationship between the yield to maturity and the term to maturity of compar-
able financial obligati ons has customarily been depicted graphically by means of 
so-called yield curves . Years to maturity are measured along the abcissa and 
the vertical axis measures yield to maturity. Although in the real world only a 
' finite number of yields can be observed from the series of different maturities, 
a smooth and continuous yield curve is normally constructed by connecting all the 
separate observations , Sever al alternative smoothing techniques exist which vary 
in terms of both their accuracy and sophistication. Often the method employed 
can be of vital importance in an empirical investigation, for as we shall see in 
Chapter II, different results may be due only to the different methods 8mployed 
to fit the curve. In practi ce, the curves are usually based on yearly , quarterly 
or monthly data , and may be represented over a period of time by ways of a three 
dimensional chart . 
While an infinite diversity of shapes is possible , four general forms have been 
found to be predominant in reality, Yields may be lowest on short term 
securi ties and rise at a diminishing rate to produce what is known as an ascend-
ing yield curve. The opposite form may be apparent with yields highest in 
short range and decreasing until they level out, to form a descending curve. 
Yields on longs and shorts may be equal, causing a horizontal or flat yield 
curve. Finally, the least frequent form is known as the humped curve where 
the peak of the cur ve is found in the ear1y maturity range. 
are illustrated in the following diagram:-
These four types 
J. 
_/_-- ~ 
,' 
I __ / Humped curve 
Descendin t-curve 
Flat curve 
Ascending curve 
0 Years to r.laturity 
The theory of the term structure of interest rates concerns itself with the 
elucidation of these various relationships between yields on different matur-
ities, where term to maturity is the only differentiating factor. The level 
of the rate structure is assumed to be exogenously determined by the general 
equilibrium of the system. 
A number of theories have been put forward to explain the term structure of 
interest rates. It is our concern in this thesis to examine the most import-
ant and widely known of these. The starting point will be the traditional or 
fundamental expectations Hypothesis which will form the basis of the discussion 
on the more modern approaches of New Expectations Theory, Malkiel's Alternative 
Reformulation of Expectations Theory, the Hicksian Liquidity Preferenc3 Hypo-
thesis, and Market Segmentation Theory. The next step will be an analysis 
of the empirical evidence available on the theories so as to gain insight into 
both the problems associated with the operationality of the hypotheses and their 
potential explanatory power in the South African context. In order to establish 
institutional and other features peculiar to South Africa which may have an im-
pact on the performance of the hypotheses in their application here , we shall 
then examine the institutional framework and interest rate determination in 
this country. The ultimate goal of the dissertation is r eached in Chapter IV 
when we apply empirical content to the theories. Our aim here is to establish 
which hypothesis, if any, is best able to explain the South African experience 
and to this end we employ econometric and other quantitative methods. To 
-' facilitate comparability a specific time period has been chosen, namely from 
1964 to 1974. This particular set of dates has been singled out for no other 
reason than the availability of consistent time series data. 
·I 
I 
4, 
In sum then, our cim is to test the major theories =n the term structure 
of interest rates against t~e Sauth African data in order to determine 
whether meaningful conclusions can be drawn on the relevance of the theory 
to the South African experience~ 
It may be useful at this stage to very briefly anticipate some of the major 
conclusions of this dissertation. After a systematic evaluation of the 
theories on the term structure in Chapter I, we concluded that no a priori 
deductions were possible without specific reference to the empirical evidence, 
It emerged f rom the empirical review of Chapter II that only the ~lalkiel 
Hypothesis was favourably, if scantily, supported, while the traditional theory 
performed badly and the remaining three hypotheses produced indifferent results. 
Chapter III established that although the South African financial sector is 
relatively well developed and possesses a not insignificant degree of flexi-
bility, it is nonetheless subject to powerful legislative constraints. We 
further concluded that while specific interest rates are determined via a 
complex interplay of economic, institutional and legal factors and that the 
market is rather rigidly controlled, it is apparent that generally market 
forces do seem predominant in the sense of movements in controlled rates 
approximating those of more freely determined interest rates. Chapter IV 
exposed the enormous difficulties inherent in testing the various theories. 
The experience of overseas investigators was confirned insofar as it was found 
that no model could completely explain the South African yield structure. 
It did emerge , however, that the theory espoused by Malkiel performed well 
in the circumstances. 
,/ 
5. 
CH.4.PTER I 
THEORES OF Tl-£ TER:.~ STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES 
1 .0 INTRODUCTION 
Our concern in the present chapter lies in initially evaluating the various 
theories purporting to explain the term structure of interest rates. After 
briefly surveying the development of theories on the rate structure , the 
discussion moves on to the ntraditional" expectations theory which is examined 
in some detail , for it will form the basis of our deliberations . The other , 
more modern theories are then arranged in accordance with their similarity to 
the orthodox approach. Essentially this implies a classification based on 
risk aversion, the traditional view being that investors are indifferent to 
maturity . \'/e conclude the chapter by making certain generalisations on the 
various hypotheses. 
1.1 Historical Overview 
Until the late 1920's it was customary amongst economic theoreticians to talk 
of nthe r ate of interest". Despite the recognition that this involved a 
drastic simplification of the real world it was not considered a weakness , since 
the complex of interest rates on different maturities was believed to move sim-
ultaneously. Furthermore, it was proposed t hat the "family" of interest rates 
characteristically possessed a tendency toward the equalisation of different 
rates . 
However, specific attempts to reduce the rate of interest to a structural com-
posite of interest rates dates back long before the era of the ' twenties. 
J . B. Say's1 publication in 1853 represents the earliest theoretical endeavour 
aimed -at explaining the term structure of interest rates . Some thirty years 
later Henry Sidgwick2 made a similar attempt. Nonetheless, both works received 
scant attention from the mainstream of economic analysis on the theory of interest. 
Towardsthe .end of the 1920 ' s however, there appeared several important works 
..' 
dealing with the term structure of interest rates. Karin Koch3 pointed out 
the significance of the behaviour of the rate structure for monetary policy/ 
1 • 
2. 
3 . 
Say, J . B. 
Sidgwick , 
Koch, K. 
Treatise on Political Economy, Lippincot , Philadelphia, 1853. 
H. Principles of Political Economy, Macmillan , London, 1882 
A Study of Interest Rates , Macmillan , London, 1929 
6 . 
and analysed in de~th institutional and theoretical considerations affecting 
the str ucture of rates . Irwing Fisher4 developed the relationship between 
short- ter m and long- term rates of interest under conditions of perfect fore-
sight5 , which heralded the beginni0gs of an expectationally based expianation 
of the term structure of interest rates . Fisher ' s work later became crystal-
lised in the theorising of both Friederich Lutz6 and Sir John Hicks7 , who , 
writing independently , formulated what has become known as Expectations Theory 
or simply , the Hicks- Lutz Theory. It. has been suggested that in some r espects 
i t is not correct to group the Hicks and Lutz approaches together since they 
assess expected rates of interest differently , and the Hicksian theory becomes 
a 
eventually the Liquidity Preference or Risk Premium Theory of the term structure . 
Two more modern variants of the traditional theory have been developed since 
1960 by Meiselman9 vis- a- vis his Error-learning Model , and by Burton Malkiel1 
using his "mathematics of bond prices". 
2 Sir Ralph Hawtrey had earl ier opened up a new perspective on the r ate structure . 
Fundamentally, he argued that changes in short- term rates caused by the central 
bank , had little effect upon long- term rates . This represented a unique line 
of thought significant ly different from that underlying expectations theory3 
Seizing upon Hawtrey's central theme , Culbertson4 refined it into what has 
become known as Hedging Pressure or Market Segmentation Theory which today 
exemplifies the centre of opposition amongst theoreticians to theories based 
on expectations . 
4. Fisher , I. The Theory of Interest, Macmillan , 1'\!'lw York, 1930. See 
pp 313-14 and Chapter ix especially pp 209-210 on these points . 
5. However , Fisher was very explicit about his abstraction from institutional 
factors and the consequent inapplicability of any precise theoretical 
formulation . 
·6. Lutz , F. A. "The St-ructure of Interest Rates" Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
November, 1940 , p . 36. 
7. Hicks , J .R. Value and Capital, Clarendon Press , London , 1939, pp l44f. 
B. This view has been expressed by, among others , D. G. Luckett "Professor Lutz 
and the Structure of·Interest Rates" Quarterly Journal of Economics , Feb . lS59, 
pp l3lf and Ford , J .L. and Stark , T. Long and Short- Term Interest Rates , 
Blackwells , Oxford , 196?. 
9 . Meiselman, D. The Term Structure of Interest Rates., Prentice- Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs , 1962 . 
l. Malkiel , B .G. The Term Structure of Interest Rates: Expectations and 
Behaviour Patterns , Princeton University Press , Princeton , 1966. 
2. Hawtrey, R. A Century of Bank Rates , Oxford University Press , Londo~ 193o, 
pp 184- 95 . 
3. Kessel, R. The Cyclical Behaviour of the Term Structure of Interest Rates 
National Bureau of Economic Research , Ne'll York , 1965 , p ll points out that 
Hawtrey was the first to formulate a segmented markets theory , long before 
Culbertson. 
4, Culbertson , J .~.1. "The Term Structure of Interest Rates" Quarterly Journal :)f 
Economics , Nov . 1957 pp 485- 51?. 
7. 
1.2 The Traditional Expectations Theory 
Amongst professional economists, the traditional expectations theory 
represents by far the most widely accepted explanation of the term structure 
of interest rates. Predictably, it has formed the methodological basis for 
almost all the dissussion centering on the question of the rate structure. 
The theory rests primarily on three assumptions, detailed at the outset of 
Lutz's classic papar5 
11 (i) everybody concerned knows what the future short- term interest 
rates will be i.e. there is accurate forecasting in the market; 
(ii) there are no costs of investment, either for landers or 
borrowers; 
(iii) there is complete shiftability for lenders as well as for 
borrowers . The lender who wants to invest , for say , ten 
years is equally well prepared to buy a ten-year bond or 
to lend on a one- year contract and to r e- lend ten times . 
Similarly , a lender who wants to invest for only one _year 
is in principle prepared to buy a ten- year bond or a bond 
of any other maturity and sell it again after the first year. 
The same shiftability is assumed for the borrower. 11 
Given profit maximisation , these assumptions will ensure that each in vestor 
will arrange his security portfolio in such a way as to maximise his return 
for the period in which his funds are available . In addition , we will show 
that these circumstances lead to a unique s et of equilibrium r elationships 
between securities of different maturity . 
The funda~ental notions underlying the expectational theory of the term 
structure follow from the fact that these assumptions are sufficient to 
equalise the expected ho~ding per iod yield6 on an investment in any combination 
of maturities. For example , an investor wishing to have a holding or invest-
ment period of one unit length will get the same return regardless of whether 
he places his resources in an asset of one unit length to maturity, or one which 
has two unit lengths to maturity . 
as the Equalisation Theorem. 
5. Lutz, F.A . oo.cit; P.37 
. I 
Formally , this proposition has become known 
6. Ibid , p . 40 , Lutz provides a definitional equation for tha holding-
pe~iod yield as follows :-
holding period yield =coupon interest+ caoital gain (loss) 
purchase price 
8. 
The rational for the equalisation of holding period yields can be shown in 
many ways. The crucial point is, though, that unde~ the assumptions made 
above, the only variable that influences the investment behaviour of the 
market is t he expected yields of an investment in any maturity range. 
Because expectations are uniform for all market participants, we can describe 
the modus operandi of the market in the following way. Assume that we begin 
in a situation where yield differentials exist between securities of varying 
maturity . Thus, for instance , an investor with a long holding period would 
not invest in longs if he expected a higher yield from purchasing a successive 
array of short- term securities . Since he operates under the postulate of 
rational economic behaviour , he would obviously desire that combination of 
securities which would ensure the larg2st expected holding period yield. It 
follows then, that by attempting to maximise holding period returns, the market 
as a whole through the process of arbitrage, would act to eliminate any differen-
tials in yields . Consequently, long rates must be an average of present and 
expected (future) short- term rates of interest, which is no more than a statement 
of the Equalisation Theorem. 
The term structure i s conceptually viewed as determined in the market for loans 
of different maturities . It is seen as useful to deal with this market as 
analogous to the commodity futures market , an analogy first used by Hicks in 
his analysis of interest rates in Value and Capital7 • The rate structure at 
any point in time is argued to contain an implicit set of forward or "futures" 
interest rates. The rate of interes t for a two-year loan therefore , is conceived 
as being compounded out of the "spot" rate for loans of one-year, and the expected 
11 forward11 rate of interest for one year loans to be executed at the beginning of 
the second year. 
8 In formalising the theory , we can write t he " long" or two- year rate as tR2, the 
"spot" or current one- year "short 11 rate as tR1, and the "futures
11 one- year short 
rate as t+1r 1• If a lender purchases a two-year bond, at the end of his 
holding period the inves~ment will be worth (1 + tR2)2 • Had he invested in 
two successive one-year loans instead , the result would be given as (1 + tR1) 
(1 + t +1r 1) • Since we have established from the Equalisation Theorem that/ 
. / 
7. See Hicks, J .R. op. cit; Chapters 11 to 13. For example, on p . l46 Hicks 
states, " · · · these • • • are strictly analogous to the futures prices we 
discussed in the last Chapter, and are determined in almost exactly the 
same way . " 
8. We utilise the notation developed by Meiselman , D. op, cit; p.l9 . Capital 
R's represent actual market yields, while lower case r's indicate expected 
interest. The prescripts represent the time period at l'lhich the rates are 
applicable, and the subscripts stand for the maturity of the bonds . 
9, 
in ec,uilibrium both investment strategies must be eyual in terms of their 
holding period yields, we can write; 
( 1 + t R2) (1.2.1 ) 
If we generalise this relationship to the whole spectrum of long-term and 
short- term rates , we get; 
(1 + t R ) = ~1 + t R1) (1 + t+l r 1) (1 + t+n-1 r1D n 
(1 R ) E1 + t R1) ( 1 + r1) .. .. (-1 r1D 
1;'n· 
+ t = t+1 + (1.2.2) n t+n- 1 
(1 + t R ) = n ~ 1 + t R n- 1 ) n- 1 ~ 1fn ( 1 + t+n- 1 r 1) · (1.2 . 3) 
where r 2 , r 3 •• • ••• , rn are the implicit forward rates at the beginning of 
period 1 for one period: loans dur ing the periods 2,3 , •• •.• , n respectively. 
These "short- term 11 forward rates, which can be calculated from t he observed 
term structure R1, R1, • • ••• , An represent the current market rates for one 
period in each of the future periods 2,3 , • •••• , n when all payments are made 
at the end of the loan . 9 Conversely , each observed "long- term" rate R2 , R3 , 
••• • , R can be calculated from the current one period rate and the relevant 
n 
number of successive forward one period rates . In this way , the system of 
market rates for \:/arious mat uri ties can be reduced to a funct ion of ti 1e current 
short rate and a series of relevant forward short rates . 
It should be stressed, however , t hat this relationship does not express a 
statement of economic behaviour . Rather it is, as Meiselman has pointed out , 
only a tautology . He goes on in the same breath ; 
"The relationshi p between a given term structure of rates and 
the implied forward short- term r ates is analogous to the well-
known relationship' between average and marginal quantities. 
Any long-term rate is an average of forward rates spanning 
the same period, and forward rates are measures of the incre-
mental costs or returns ." 1 ... 
9. We assume that all funds are retained in the investment until maturity , i.e. 
the coupon carried by the bond is zero . Lutz, F.A . op . cit; p. 37 , 
rationalises this method of using the arithmetic average rather than com-
pounding interest as fol lows : "The arithmetic average can , however, be used 
as a sufficiently c lose approximation for most purposes . " 
1. Meiselman , D. op. cit; p. 4 
• I 
10. 
The pure expectatio~s theory does produce a proposition about forward rates 
that is an assertion about economic behaviour. It maintains that the forward 
rates which can be derived from the term structure are unbiased estimates 
of expected interest rates. 
1.2.1 Implications of the Theory for the Term Structure 
The traditional or Hicks- Lutz variant of the expectations theory, as we have 
seen , produces a relatively straightforward and easily managed framework of 
analysis . It is to the implications of this analysis for the term structure 
that we now focus our attention . 
Equation (1 . 2.2) contains several well-established propositions concerning 
the rate structure. These can be s eparated into two distinct categories, 
namely; propositions dealing with the term structure of yields at a moment 
of time t , and those which concern the movement of rat.es over time. 
Consider firstly the rate structure at a moment of time t . 
The following four propositions can be derived:-
(l) If the market expects short rates to use monotonically in future , 
then at t the rate on longs will exceed that on shorts , i . e . tl1e 
the yield curve will slope continuously upward to the right . 
(2) If the market expects short rates to fall monotonically in future, 
then at time t the short rate will exceed the long rate i . e . the 
yield curve will be continuously downward sloping to the right. 
(3) If the mar ket expects that the current spot rate will equal all 
future short rates, then the yield curve will be horizontal since 
expectations are qtatic. 
(4) If the market holds divergent expectations of future short rates, 
then almost any yield curve is passible. 
this out :2 
Lutz himself has pointed 
"In principle , with sufficiently differentiated expectations, any 
structure of interest rates is possible . The rates might / 
2 . Lutz, F . A. The Theory of Interest, 0. Reidel Publishing Company, 
Amsterdam , 1952 , Chapter l?, p . 213 . 
ll. 
initially rise with term to maturity and then fall from 
a certain maturity on , or vice versa, or they might fi r st 
rise, then fall , then rise again , and so on." 
Three propositions dealing with the movement of rates over time may be 
deduced from equation (1.2.2). 
(l) Long-term rates will be less volatile than short rates . This 
follows from the fact that all future changes in the short rate 
are already reflected in the long rate . Therefore , with the 
passage of time , changes in the short rate affect the long rate 
only to the extent that the average of short rates is altered. 3 
(2) When the market expects all short rates will be higher in the 
future than they are in the present period , long rates will rise 
i.e. any given long rate YQll be higher than t that it was at t-1. 
(3) Conversely, when the market expects that all short rates will be 
lower in the future than they are at present, any given lorig rate 
will be lower at t than it was at t - 1. 
It should be stressed , though, that this by no means exhausts the deductions 
that can be made from the traditional expectations theory . 
4 for instance, has argued : 
J .W . Con.;.rd , 
" In the first place , since this theory does not describe how 
expectations are formed , there is room for any influence that 
may change them to alter t he value of any or all future short 
rates , and hence produce a wholly new term structure . Thus, 
it is possible to make any pattern of change in the structure 
of rates compatible with the (expectational) theory by mer ely 
assuming the appropriate chang'es in the sets of expected short 
rates. " 
The Hicks- Lutz approach clearly offers ·a rich fund of ideas on the yield 
structure, and the prediction~ which follow from the approach have direct/ 
3 . This can be proved mathematically . See Lutz , ibid , p . 214 
4. Conard , J.W. An Introduction to the The~ry of Interest , University 
of California Press , Benkley , 1959, Chapter XIV , p.30l . 
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relevance to r eal- world situations . ~e shall see in the following chapter 
however, that this fund is somewhat illusory when it is tested against 
empirical data. 
1 . 2 . 2 Criticisms of Expectations Theory 
The traditional expectations theory has been subjected to a prolonged and 
vigorous attack by a variety of critics on a number of counts . 
Perhaps the most compelling assaults have come from those cynical of the 
5 basic behavioural postulates assumed by the theory. These largely concern 
the Lutzian assumption that all investors hold uniform expectations , and that 
it is expected (future ) short- term interest rates that determine the yield 
structure . 
D.G. Luckett has ar gued that the existence of diverse expectations may "warp" 
the term structure , and that then "the rate pattern is based on what everyone 
6 thinks everyone else thinks •• . long rates have no relevance to short rates ." 
However , as Meisel man and others have suggested , the existence of diverse 
expectations need pose no real threat provided that the market i s 'dominated 
by investors who hold the same expectations and who act on them. 
It is on the second count , though , that the attacks of critics have been much 
more telling . Luckett again spearheaded the assault on the assumption that 
expected (future) short- term rates govern the term structure . He petulantly 
sketches his reasoning : 
" We are thus treated to the spectacl e of an individual standing 
on the eve of World War I I, atomic bombs , the Cold War , the 
postwar inflations , the Employment Act of 1946, et hoc genus omne , 
trying to decide what short- term interest rates will be fifteen to 
7 twenty years in the future. " 
Joan Robinson in her famous article on the rate of interest proved to be an 
equally scathing opponent : 
··' 
5 . This method of evaluating theori es has, however, not met with universal 
acceptenace . Milton Friedman for one has come out strongly against such 
methodology in his Essays in Positive Economics , Chicago University Press, 
Chicago , 1965 . 
6 . Luckett, D. G. "Professor Lutz and the Structure of Interest Rates" 
Quarterly Journal of Economics , February , 1959, p.l39 . 
7 . Luckett , D.G. Ibid . p . l41 
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The view that the lo~~ rate can be determi ned solely from 
expectations about the shcr~ rate is untenable •.•. it certainly 
does not detach the rate of interest from dependence on its boot-
straps for, in such a wor:a , the only reason for a difference 
between long and short rates is the expectation of a change in the 
long rate ••.. In real life it would be perfectly rational for 
a man .. • • , to think that he knows exactly what the rates of interest 
will be every day from today till Kingdom Come ."8 
Robinson is questioning the pre~ise that investors form expectations of 
interest rates for indefinite periods ahead by implying that rational 
expectations can encompass only the near future . She argues that expect-
ations of the short rate do not solely determine the long rate , but inde-
pendent expectations concerning the long rate itself may also exist. 
This contenti on is reinforced by the assertion advanced by Luckett that 
while investors are not able to rationally formulate expectations much beyond 
the immediate short- term , neither do they believe themselves capable of this. 
Expectations therefore cannot be self- fulfilling nor can the well- known "as if" 
assumption be made . 9 
This line of criticism is clearly aimed at the very core of the expectations 
theory. For the theory to be meaningful in any way, investors must be able 
to predict short rates for a considerable number of years into the ft1ture . 
At present very few economists w:Juld accept the original Hicks- Lutz variant 
of expectations theory without some reservation . Depending on the nature of 
their criticisms, various "schools" of thought have developed emphasising one 
or another aspect of investor behaviour. •We shall systematically examine 
thei r points of departure from the " traditional" view beginning with the 
I 
theory nearest to t he Hicks-Lutz formulation , namely Meiselman ' s so- calle d 
New Expectations Theory. 
1 . 3 Meiselman ' s New Expectations Theory 
, / 
New Cxpectatiors Theory or the Error- learning Model put forward in 1962 by 
David Meiselman , should be viewed as constituting a brilliant defence of the/ 
8 . Robinson , Joan "The Rate of Interest" Econometrica, April, 1951 , 
p . l02. 
9 . It is often ju5tifiably argued in Economics that individuals behave 
"as if" they are aware of the variables at play in any given context . 
lt;., 
expectational explanation of the term. While believing expectations theory 
to be fundamentally sound and rejecting prior empirical tests of it, he 
accepted the criticism that some investors, because of risk aversion or other 
impediments to mobility , ~ay be rigidly committed to s pecific maturity ranges. 
But in aggregate, he argued , market excess demand schedules for securities of 
each maturity would still tend to be infinitely interest elastic. 
vein he contends:-
"As a matter of descriptive reality , individual transactors 
In this 
may still speculate or hedge on the basis of risk aversion, but 
speculators who are indifferent to uncertainty will bulk suffic-
iently large to determine market rates on the basis of their 
1 
mathematical expectations alone ." 
The New Expectations hypothesis, then, embodies an attempt both to debase 
earlier criticism and to provide operational content to Expectations Theory . 
2 Drawing upon the experience of Cagan , who successfully explained . the demand 
for money during hyperinflations using a model of price expectation formation , 
and the subsequent success with which Milton Friedman3 explained consumption 
behaviour with a model of permanent income , Meiselman proposed an hypothesis 
of how expectations are revised for interest rates. Like his predecessors , 
Meiselman posited that market expectations are revised according to the size 
of the error between what was anticipated and what actually occurred . 
The basic premise in any error- learning model is that the agents in the model 
learn from experience, and this information will automatically and mechanically 
be acted upon regardless of the circumstances surrounding the error in fore-
casting. To be specific; i f forecasts are too high , expectations will be 
revised downwards , or if they are too low , they are revised upwards. The 
market , therefore, cannot make any judgement that the circumstances which caused 
it to err at any given time were of an ephemeral nature, and having disappeared 
will leave other f orecasts correct. 
. / 
1. ~eiselman , D. op cit . p.lO 
2 . Cagan, P. "The Monetary Dy.namics of Hyperin.flation" , in Friedman , M. 
Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1956 . 
3 . Friedman , M. A Theory of the Consumption Function, Princeton University 
Press , Princeton , 1957. 
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Meiselman begins his analysis by assuming that forward rates are unbiased 
estimates of future spot rates, which implies that the yield structure is 
determined in accordance with equation (1 . 2 . 2). While this is true , Meisel-
man argues, predictions of forward rates need not necessarily be correct . 
Instead, expectations will constantly be revised via the error- learning process. 
The substantive assumptions underlying the model are essentially similar to 
those of the traditional theory . Securities of different maturities are 
assumed to be perfect substitutes , ths market is seen as dominated by investors 
attempting to maximise present value on the basis of their homogeneous expect-
ations , transactions costs are non-existent, and expected holding yields are 
assumed equal for all maturities . 
It is crucial to recognise that Meiselman is concerned with explaining not 
the level of interest rates but rather how expectations change over time . 
He argues: -
11 Instead, changes in , rather than levels of interest rates 
can be related to factors which systematically cause revisions 
of expectations • .••• • Recent research in a wide variety of 
behavioural contexts has indicated that hypotheses which assert 
that expectations tend to be related to past experience, often 
a weighted average of past experience, are consistent with tre 
data. Further , these hypotheses state that expectations tend to 
be systematically altered on the basis of new experience whenever 
unfolding events differ from what had been anticipated . 11 4 
Thus, although the Meiselman model belongs to the same family of adaptive 
expectations as the Cagan and Friedman models, he introduces a new feature 
which exploits the special fact of the market revealing its expectations in 
forward rates . He goes on :-
11The same view of expectations can be applied to expectations 
of interest rates . 
expectations 
In some respects the task of estimating 
is made easier because , according to the 
theory we seek to test, expectations are already impounded and 
5 discounted in the term structure. 11 
4. Meiselman , D. op cit, p.l8 
5 . Ibid , p.l9 
.LO, 
It follol':s then that the essence of ~ew Expectations Theory is to observe 
how these implied short rates change over time with the receipt of new 
information . 
The Hicksian view of the term str~cture as a series of unit period loans 
extending into the future is applied by Meiselman . Using equation (1.2 .2) 
he derives the forward rate on a one-year loan during the period t+ 1 to be : 
t + 1 r 1 ,t = 2 ( 1 + t R~ ~) 
c_ I L 
1 (1.3.1) 
Here t+1 rl,t is the yield on one-year securities that is expected at time t 
to prevail at t +1 . In analogous fashion, at time t investors can recall 
one- year rates in existence at t - 1, and derive the rate expected at t - 1 
t o exist at time t . The expected rate can then be compared to the actual 
rate on one- year loans at the beginning of period t . If actual rates are 
higher than had been contemplated , the market would systematically raise its 
expectations of future yields. This implies, in effect , the operation of an 
automatic error- learning mechanism i . e. forward short term rates change on the 
basis of errors made in forecasting the current short- term rate. ·This can be 
stated algebr aically in the form of a behavioural hypothesis 
t + n t + n r 1, t-l 
which , alternatively , can be written as : 
r t+n 1,t = 
\'Jhere Et is the forecasting error ( t R1 , t 
(1.3.2) 
(1.3 . 3) 
t r1 , t - 1), or the difference 
between actual and expected rates on one- year loans . Assuming the functional 
relationship to be at least approximately linear, Meiselman proposes the 
equation : 
r t+n 1 1t = (1.3 . 4) 
Because , in terms of expectati onal theory , the long rate is an average of the 
current spot rate and forward (expected)~short rates , Meiselman generalises 
equation (1 .3.2) and postulates tr.at changes in the long rate are also based 
on errors made in anticipating short-term rates: 
(1.3.5) 
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which can be transposed into the abbreviated form of (1 .3. 3) to produce: 
t R. t + n J, (1.3.6) 
where n = 0 ,1, 2 , 3 ..•• years anc j = 1 , 2 , 3 •.• ... years. 
On the "first difference" fom eq~ation (1.3.4) Meiselman hypothesises a priori 
two behavioural conditions like~y to hold; that is a= o , and secondly b) o, 
Both follow unambiguously from the core of the theory, 
A constant term a significantly different from zero wculd indicate that 
investors, even when their expectations proved correct, revise their expect-
ations either upward (if a) o) or downwards (if a ( o) . A constant term 
equal to zero, posited by Meiselman , means that investors leave their expect-
ations unrevised when the expectations of the previous period are realised . 
Since b) o, if and only if Et f o will expectations be revised, 
New Expectations Theory differs then in one fundamental respect from the 
traditional theory of Section 1 . 2 . It does not rely on the market correctly 
predicting future rates of interest. However, it does depend on yield curve 
data as well as the supposition that the implied forward one-year rates of 
interest are the ~arket ' s expected rates . 
In common with the traditional theory though , the Meiselman model can explain 
almost any conceivable shape of the yield curve because it explains changes in 
the rate structure and the determination of the level of interest rates . As 
L.G. Telser6 has pointed out:-
"Since Meiselman's model gives no information about the level of 
r ates , it is consistent with any shaped yield curve ." 
In particular, it is able to handle the observed greater volatility of short 
rates in much the same fashion as the older theory. Meiselman argues that 
since investors are likely to take their short- ter m forcasts more seriously 
than their long-term forecasts, they will revise the former to a greater 
degree when their expectations of the previous period pr ove to be incorrect. 
6. Telser, L.G.. "A Critique of some Recent Empirical Research on the 
Explanation of the Term Structure of Interest Rates" Journal of 
Political Economy , Dec. , 1967 p.553 
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call ' the interest rate' . " 1 
Obviously , speculators are seldom concerned with the underlying variables , 
but rather manage their portfolios on the basis of readily observable changes 
in security prices . 
1 . 4 Malkiel ' s Alternative Formulation of Expectations Theory 
The Malkiel theory should be viewed as an extension of the traditional 
explanation in much the same fashion as the Meiselman model . In essence, 
Malkiel accepts the overbearing impo~tance of expectations in determining the 
rate structure , and makes this his fundamental standpoint :-
"This study takes the position that the traditional expectational 
approach is , in principle , correct and of substantial i mportance 
in understanding the actual behaviour of market interest rates of 
securities with different terms to maturity." 2 
Acknowledging the relevance of the criticism advanced by Robinson and Luckett 
regarding the irrationality of a long planning horizon , Malkiel makes it quite 
explicit the.t the "reformulated" theory will be cast in terms of a short time 
horizon . 
"More:Jver , e. short planning period will be substituted 
for the long- run horizon implicit in the received analysis ." 3 
In his exposition , Malkiel introduces and elaborates what he calls " three 
building bl ocks" na:nely ; the mathematics of bond price movements , the 
assumption that investors hold a notion of a "normal" range of expected 
interest rates , and " expectations proper" or the belief by investors that 
a specific course of future interest rates is likely. 
Noting that economists have typically calibrated their e~planations of the 
rate structure in terms of bond yields , Malkiel argues for tGe introduction 
. I 
of bond prices per se since investors are much more likely to be responsive 
to readily observable movements in bond prices rather than yield differentials . 
1. Meiselman , D. op. cit, p.31 
2. Malkiel , B.G. op . cit , p . 50 
3, Ibid . p . 50 
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Four basic elements are proposed cS determinar:a of bond prices , the face 
value of the bond F, the coupon carried by the ~and C, the internal rate of 
return i , and the term to maturity N. By as~~ming that all securities 
carry the same coupon , and that the spot rate =~uals expected future short 
rates, Malkiel writes the equation:-
p 
= c + c + 
( 1 + i) (1 + i)2 
which , summed and simplified, reduces to : 
p 
= c 
i 
( 1 
t 
1 ) 
( 1 + i )n j + ~ ' 
c + 
( 1 + i Jn F (1 + i)!l (1.4.1) 
(1.4.2) 
Five theorems are deduced from equations (1 .4.:) .and (1.4.2). We shall not 
derive the mathematical proofs, but merely stc~e the theorems as succinctly 
as possible; 4 
Theorem I: bond prices move inversely to bon.: yields . 
Theorem II: for a given change in yield from the nominal yield, changes 
i n bond prices are greater , the longer the ter~ to maturity. 
Theorem III : the percentage price changes des~ribed in Theorem II increase 
at a diminishing rate as N increases. 
Theorem IV: price movements resulting from eq~al absolute.increases and 
decreases in yield are asymmetric i.e. a decrease in yields raises bond 
prices more than the same increase in yields lowers prices. 
Theorem V: the higher the coupon carried by the bond , the smaller will be 
the percentage price fluctuation for a given percentage change in yield, 
except for one- year securities and consols. 
The second "building block" employed by Malkiel constitutes the centre- piece 
of the theory. While the idea of normal interest r ates is not new, the 
formal use of such a range to explain the long-short spread certainly is . 
This, together with the postulated existence of a short planning period for 
i nvestors, allows Malkiel to deduce his term structure hypothesis. He 
clarifies his concept of a normal range: 
"This range will be defined in terms of the level rather 
than the structure of rates •••• As a first approxim-
ation the aggregate of individuals compromising the ' market ' 
will be assumed to believe that the historical level of interest 
5 
rates will prevail in future." 
4 • Ibid, p . 54 
5 . Ibid, p.59 
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Malkiel argues that given the existence of a normal range and the fact that 
investors seek to equalise the gain they obtain from investing in any of the 
available securities whose coupons are assumed to be equal , if interest rates 
are near the upper bound of the normal range "investors will have more to hop8 
than fear in terms of capital gains and losses"~ But if interest rates are 
near the lower bound of the normal r anJe , then in terms of probabilities , 
7 
"investors will have more to fear than hope". 
The former situation , where interest rates tend towards the upper limit , 
implies that longs are more attractive than shorts in terms of gain , since 
future rates are anticipated to fall . The resultant yield curve will , of 
course, have a descending shape . In the latter case , where interest r ates 
tend towards the lower limit of t he normal range , short loans will be valued 
hi gher than l ongs because the market believes that rates will rise in future. 
The yield curve will therefore be ascending . 
These two deductions about the shape of the yield curve , and hence about the 
rate structure at a point in time, follow partly from the application of bond 
price theorems . It can be shown, for instance ,· that as interest rates8 fall 
towards the lower limit of the normal range, with percentage and absolute 
changes equal f or longs and shorts , the prices on longs will fluctuate more 
than those on shorts i . e . Theorem IV. In these circumstances , a given invest-
ment in lpng bonds will produce a higher capital gain than an equivaL.mt invest-
ment in short s . 
Malkiel stresses that it is the choice of investors themselves to invest in 
one maturity range or another that determines the rate structure in the model. 
Plainly , the choic~ itself will depend on how speculators view the future course 
of interest rates. Malkiel approaches this by assuming that investors base 
their strategy on the likelihood of rates actually being at the lower or upper 
l i mit of the normal range. The probabi lity of either limit being attained is 
set at 0 , 5 1 which allows a specific rate structure to be predicted . 
Thus , the third building block, that of "expectations pro,perrr i s explicitl y 
introduced into the analysis , illustrating that expectations play a well-defined 
role within the notion of the normal r ange. 
6 . I bid , p . 65 
7 . 'IiJI"d 1 p • 65 
In the above argument , however , / 
8. Remember that by assumption Malkiel deals with the same rate of interest 
on longs as on shorts . 
4 xu PlQWB!4 lit( ;a a •;:we;;. a ,. at a uauA. .. % - x 'd" v ; .;;; .cs 
expectations proper played a neutral role. 3ut it is possible to argue, 
and ~.lalkiel does, that if the current rate approaches the upper limit, inves-
tors may still expect rates to rise. 
the result will be an ascending curve. 
Instead of a descending yield curve, 
Given the assumption of a short planning period for investors, the introduc-
tion of bond- price movements , and the concept of a normal range of interest 
rates, with or without the existence of expectations in the Malkiel sense, 
we have seen that deductions can be made concerning the term structure of 
interest rates. Since investors are assumed, as in the traditional theory, 
to maximise returns on their holding periods, a set of forward interest rates 
can be generated by the model. 
Taking the long rate R as a surrogate for the general level of interest rates, 
Malkiel's basic hypothesis on the term structure can be given by: 
Where 
limit 
(R - s)t = f tR Rln ) ) t 
( RNA ) 
S is the short rate, RNA the normal range 
of the normal range of the long rate R. 
(1.4.3) 
of R, and RL is the lower 
n 
Malkiel specified RNA: 
"We suggest further that investors form their expectations 
of the limits of the normal range a~ if they took the average 
of rates over some period in the immediate past and added a 
specific number of standard deviations to either side of the 
9 
average." 
He is thus able to write the upper and lower limits of the normal range as: 
= 
= (1.4.4) 
Where RA is defined as the moving average of long-term interest rates over a 
prescribed period.of years in the past. Thus , for exampl~, the lower bound 
.~ 
of the range is equal to "the average" RA plus a constant K times 6 the standard 
deviation. Equation (1.4.3) now becomes: 
9. ~' p.84 
I·· 
23. 
= f (R - RA + K 6 
( 2 K 6 
) t ) (1.4.5) 
Under the essumption of a constant 6 , we can derive an equivalent equation 
which takes the form: 
Where f and F are related by linear transformation . 
in linear form , we get : 
If F itself is written 
(1.4.6) 
This forms ~lalkiel ' s basic behavio~ral equation , with the a priori expectation 
that a) o and b < o . 
Despite the fact that the behavi oural mechanism employed by Malkiel is 
essentially different from that of the Hicks- Lutz theory the implications are 
1 
very similar to the traditional theory . Malkiel himself was the first to 
realise this, and he gave it explicit recognition by noting '' .• ~. despite 
these differences the alternative model gives precisely the same implications 
as does the traditional analysis ."2 In addition , Dudley Luckett has pointed 
out that the Malkiel theory contains within it the Meiselman hypothesis : 
"Thus Meiselman ' s •. ..• (theory is) ••.•. equally 
consistent with either the Hicks-Lutz or Malkiel 
theories ."3 
1. The salient differences between Malkiel ' s approach and the t r aditional 
theory can be summed up as follows . Firstly, instead of requiring definite 
and explicit expectations about the course of future rates, the Malkiel 
model substitutes t he less demanding assumption of a normal range of 
interest rates and a short planning period over which alternative strategies 
can be compared . Secondly , the Malkiel version deals with fluctuations in 
the long rate during the short-run rather than . the short rates behaviour 
over the long- run. Thirdly, it deals with bond prices rather than yields . 
Finally, Malkiel ' shows how i~vestors arrive at the normal range while the 
traditional approach takes expectations as given . 
2 . Ibid; p. 74 
3 . Luckett , D. op .cit, p . 77 
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1.5 The Liquidity Preference Hypothesis 
Thus far the theories which we have considered have all been structured on 
the assumption that the majority of investors are not basically risk aversive . 
All bonds , regardless of their term to maturity, are essentially viewed as 
substitutes. The fact that the market exhibited complete shiftability 
between different maturities culminated in an equalisation of holding-period 
yields . Further, even in the case of Meiselman , estimates of future expected 
rates have been unbiased. I n sum , the securities market has been assumed 
to operate in a perfect manner. 
Hicks4 was the first to argue that the basic expectations theory required 
modification. The Liquidity Preference or Risk Premi um Hypothesis postulates 
that investors are primarily risk aversive, and that this aversion introduces 
an institutional weakness into the market for capital: 
"It is not normal to think of the market for long-term 
loans in terms of hedgers and speculators ; but that 
distinction does in fact continue to be relevant here . 
Other things being equal , a person engaging in a long-
term contract puts himself into a more risky position than 
he would be in if he refrained from making it. "5 
Consequently, innate hedging against r isk will cause expectations of ~uture 
interest rates to be biased . 
Using the analogy of the commodity futures market , and making explicit use 
of the Keynesian notion of "normal backwardisation", 6 Hicks argued that the 
basi s of the traditional expectations hypothesis had to be altered . Given 
the existence of strong and domir.ant risk aversion , the demand side of the 
market would be character ised by borrowers who have a propensity to borrow 
long to ensure a steady availability of funds . In contrast, the supply side 
of the market will be dominated by lender s who have exactly the opposite pro-
pensity, i.e. they have a preference f or short- term l~nding. This 
leaves an imbalance or instit utional weakness in the pattern of supply and 
demand for capital. The payment of "r}sk premiums" therefore becomes necessary t o 
counterbalance t he reluctance of lenders to make longer term loans . Hence it 
is through the existence of risk premiums that imperfections are removed from 
the structure of rates. 
4 . 
5. 
6 . 
Hicks , J.R. 
Ibid, p .l46 
Keynes , J . 1,1 . 
expounds this 
op. cit , Chapter XI 
A Treatise on Money. Vol.II , Macmillan, London , 1930, 
concept on pp.l42 to 144. 
25. 
According t:l this analysis , in equilibrium implicit or for·:1ard rates must 
exceed the expected rates by the amount of the r isk premium. It follows 
that the normal relationship prevailing between long and short rates will 
be that where long rates, which are averages of current anc forward short 
rates , exceed short rates . Hi::ks argues : 
"The forward short rate will thus e;<ceed t he expected short rate 
by a risk premium which corresponds exactly to the normal backward-
ation of the commodity markets. If short rates are not expected to 
change in future, the forward rate will exceed the current short rate 
by the exte~t of this premiu~ ; if short rates are expected to rise 
the exce~s will be greater than this normal level; it is only if short 
rates are expected to fall that the forward rate can be below the 
current rate • • •••••• The same rules must apply to long rates them-
selves , which •..... are effectively an average of forward rates . 
If short rates are not expected to c~ange the long-rate wil l exceed 
the short- rate by a normal risk premium ; if the current short rate 
is regarded as abnormally low , the long-rate will be decidedly above 
it ; the short-rate can only exceed the long- rate if the curr8nt short-
rate is regarded as abnormally .high."7 
Naturally , if the payment of liquidity premiums is not necessary to bring 
about equilibrium between the long and short markets, then the same eyuilibrium 
condition will hold as in the case of the traditional expectations hypothesis . 
This can be expressed , as we have seen in s ection 1. 2 , in the algebraic form : 
(1.5 .1) 
If we now introduce the Hicksian liquidity pre~ium, and express it as the 
amount by which the forward rate implied by the term structure is higher than 
the corresponding expected rate, t he equation (1 .5.1) becomes : 
Where L1 = 0, since the liquidity premiym on the current short rate of interest 
must be zero . L2 , L3 , •.••• Ln the Hicksian liquidity premiums for the 
periods 2, 3 , •• . , n , Therefore, the forward short r ates i~plicit in the term/ 
7. Hicks, J .R. op . cit; p.l47 
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structure ~~ll be an upward- biased estimate of expe=ted fu~ure short-term 
rates . 
ing form: 
Hicks himself posited that this relationship would take the follow-
8 Accepting this as generally valid, Kes.:;el argued that "since the risk of 
capital losses attributable to holding securities is directly related to term 
to maturity, security yields ought also to vary directly with maturity ." In 
other words , the risk premiums L2 , L3 ••• • 
with n. 
L must increase monotonically 
n 
If there is a Hicksian- type market in existence what will the implications be 
for the term structure of interest r ates? The theory of normal backwardis-
ation implies, as we have seen, that liquidity premiums will be a monotonically 
increasing function of n . The yield curve will therefore be smoothly ascend-
ing if the short rate is expected to remain unchanged in future . In much the 
same way as the traditional theory, however , the existence of risk premiums 
combined with various patterns of expected future short rates can.explain 
virtually any yield curv.e . But what should be stressed though , is that in 
the Hicksian hypothesis liquidity premiums f orm the primary determinant of 
the term structure of interest rates . 
1 . 6 The Segmented Markets or Institutional Hypothesis 
Throughout this chapter we have gradually progressed further and further away 
from traditional expectations theory . The limit of that progression has now 
been reached , for the theory of segmented capital markets stands in almost 
complete opposition to the traditional· view. J . M. Culbertson, the leading 
modern exponent of Market Segmentation Theory contemptuously dismisses 
Expectations Theory as !'inconsistent with all we know about the way people 
behave in the debt market·.u9 
In a sense , the institutional view can be regarded as an· extreme variant of 
the Liquidity Premium hypothesis since it sees the market as completely 
dominated by risk aversion . Ho~ever;'two crucial differences separate the/ 
8, Kessel, R. A. op . cit ; p.45 
9. Culbertson , J.M. "Discussion: Econometric Studies in Money Markets II11 
a paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Econometric Society, 
Pittsburgh, Dec . 1962 . Unpublished . Cited in Dodds , J.C. and Ford , J .L. 
Expectation; Uncertainty and the Term Structure of I nterest Rates, Martin 
Robertson, London, 1974. 
...... 
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theories . Firstly, seg0entatiJn theory does not a~cept that ris~ aversion 
will necessarily produce normal backwardisation, in contrast to Hicks , and 
secondly , expectations are argued to play only a minor role in the determin-
ation of the rate structure. 1 
Culbertson rejects any expectationally based explanation at the outset of 
his argument ; 
"However , the behaviour of most borrowers is not ordinarily governed 
by such expectations . The effect upon the rate structure of those 
patterns of speculative (i . e . expectationally governed) behavi8ur 
that do exist depends upon the nature of their planning periojs .... 
and other such details •.... . Thus both the relative importance as a 
price deter mining f actor and t he characteristic effect of speculative 
acti vity are matters that finally must be settled by reference to the 
facts regarding the particular mar ket during the particular period. 
In general, however, in debt markets such behaviour is more prominent 
in the market for debt that is more unstable in price, that is , long-
term debt, and is precomi nantly based upon near- term expectations, 
rather than upon those related to the more distant future . These 
c onsiderati ons do not support the view that long- term rates should 
l t h - h t t . 11 2 tend to equa e average 01 s or- erm ra~es • .... 
Culbertson clearly holds the position that expectations at most cen only 
influence the behaviour of relatively few investors in the very short term , 
and then only in a transitory fashion. Therefore , no significant role is 
granted to expectations in the determination of the rate structure. 
The major premise underlying Market Segmentation Theory is that investors , 
and specifically investing institutions , hedge against risk by matching 
their liabilit ies agai nst the matur ity structure of their assets . Thus , 
unl ike the traditional theory, securities of different maturities are not 
presumed to be perfect substitutes for either the indiv~dual investor or in 
aggregate. 
l . The basic exposition of Seg~entation Theory can be fuund in two articles 
by Culbertson, J . M. "The- Term Structure of I nteres t Rates" , Qus.rterly 
Journal of Economics , t'Jov . 1957, p.485 f and "The Interest Rate Structure : 
To·nard a Completion of the Classical Syste:n" in Hahn , F .H . and Brechling , 
F .P. R. The Theory of Interest Rates , Macmillan , London , 1965. 
2. Culbertson , J .M. op.cit; p.490 
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The institutionalists have no trouble producing real world examples in 
support of this allegation . Commercial banks, for instance, may often be in 
search of highly liquid assets in which to invest a temporary excess of re-
sources while life insurance companies , on the other hand, will not consider 
liquidity when investing an inflow of funds from the sale of annuity contracts. 
Rather, the risk aversive insurance company will attempt to match its long-
term annuity finance by purchasing long. paper in the capital market. This 
will , in fact , guarantee a profit regardless of the movement of interest rates 
over the life of the annuity contracts . Growth funds , building societies , 
pension and provident funds , etc . find themselves in an entirely analogous 
situation . 
On the other side of the coin, borrowers will also attempt to link the time span 
of their liabilities with that of their assets, thereby conforming to the 
assumptions of the Segmentation hypothesis . For instance , consu~ers normally 
finance the purchase of houses with long-term mortgages and conversely, use 
short- term hire purchase contracts to purchase less durable consumer goods. 
Similarly , firms purchase i nventories with short- term loans and finance plant 
and equipment by borrowing long , 
It follows from both the assumption of universal risk aversion and its con-
commitant hedging behaviour , and the assumption that the participants on the 
supply and demand sides of the market have distinct preferences for financial 
assets of various maturities, that the total market i s effectively split into 
3 
smaller sub- markets. In the strict version of the theory , Culbertson allows 
for no economic overlap to exist between markets whatsoever , effectively assum-
ing away the im~ortance of expectations . 
Given the existence of a range of sub-markets across the maturity spectrum , 
Culbertson argues that it is the demand and supply conditions within each 
market that determine bo~d prices , and ultimately the structure of yields . ~ 
Expectations of interest rates in one market will not influence interest rates 
in any other market , nor will changes in the supply of debt instruments , im-
plying that actual interest rate determination in any sub- market is virtually 
independent of all other markets . 
./ 
3 . Note that Culbertson proposed the stricter version of the theory not 
so much because of his implicit faith in it , but rather as a distinct 
platform from which to attack the traditional expectations theory 
v1hich he regarded as an "academic curiosium" . 
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A less extreme version of the institutional theory known as Preferred Market 
Habitat Theory has been advancej by Modigliani and Sutch . This hypothesis 
accepts the fundamental notion of a segmented capital market eschewed by 
Culbertson , but in addition introduces an element of mobility into the 
analysis . Participants on bo~h sides of the market are assumed to have 
a range of maturities in which they prefer to operate , but will move outside 
4 their usual bounds if a substantial rate differential is present. Pre-
ferr ed maturity ranges, or habitats , are posited as overlapping to some extent 
so that a continuum of excess demands for funds will exist across the maturity 
spectrum. Despite this, however , supply and demand conditions will still 
predominate in determining the actual yield in any habitat . 5 
The eclectic view of Preferred Habitat Theory, which in essence derives from 
t he more strict Market Segmentati on Theory, would seem more theoretically 
appealing , since while acknowledging the overwhelming strength of hedging 
motives in the market, it nonetheless allows some degree of speculative . 
behaviour to exist . 
1.7 Some Concluding Remarks 
Having concluded our survey of the various theories purporting to explain 
the term structure of interest rates, we are now in a position to make certain 
generalisations concerning these hypotheses . first we will very briefly 
discuss the nature of ex;Jlanations of the rate structure in a general way , 
and then attempt some form of categorisation so as to draw out and highlight 
significant features of the theories in a systematised manner . 
Any theory dealing with human behaviour operates in an extremely complex 
universe and we must make certain simplifying assumptions to reduce this 
complex reality to manageable proportions. Certain variables must be iso-
lated as prime determinants of behavi our in a given situation, and their 
inter- relationships closely scrutinised. 
Theories put forward to explain the ter~ structure of interest rates deal 
With bonds or financial claims which are intrinsically bound up with time . 
4. Modigliani , F. and Sutch , R. " Innovations in Interest Rate Policy", 
American Economic Review, r,lay , 1966, p . l78 following . 
5. Modigliani, F. and Sutch., R. "Debt Management and the Term Structure 
of Interest Rates" Journal of Political Economy, August, 1967, p . 569 
following. 
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Because knowledge and time are inseparable, the questions of expectations 
and uncertainty are central to any explanation of the rate structure •. It 
follows that hypotheses must make certain assumptions as to the behaviour 
of investors when confronted by the uncertain conditions of the financial 
market-place . As we have seen over the preceding sections, each theor y 
has chosen some unique aspect of investor behaviour under these circumstances , 
although clearly there are only marginal differences between some of the 
hypotheses . It is the interaction of these particular conjectures made by 
a theory that pr oduces a specific view of the financial market, and hence a 
particular hypothesis on how any stated relationship between long and short 
bonds can materialise , and can change through time. 
It is our task now to isolate the method adopted by each of the theories to 
tackle the dual problem of time and uncertainty. We shall use the syst em 
suggested by J.A. G. Grant6 to delineate the various theories accor ding to 
their behavioural treatment of these market characteristics. Grant argued : 
11 
'Term structure' theories of interest rate determination can 
conveniently be classified as if they fall into four quadrants in 
a two- dimensional diagram . One axis divides those which describe 
speculative behaviour from those which insist that markets are dam-
inated by ' hedging '. The other axis , independent of the first, 
dich otomises theories with respect to the assumed l i quidity-consciousness 
of the marginal investor or borrower."7 
By employing the scheme outlined above , we can diagrammatic=lly represent the 
theories discussed earlier as follows :-
I Liquidity Consciousness 
* Liquidity 
Premium Theory 
* Market 
Segmentation Theory 
\ II 
l Risk Aversion ~~-----------+----------------\ No Risk Aversion Hedgers I Speculators 
IV 
,/ 
liquidity 
Unconsciousness 
* The Malkiel 
Theory 
III 
* Meiselman Variant 
* Traditional 
Expectations Theory 
6. Grant , J.A . G. "Meiselman on the Structure of Interest Rates" , Economica , 
Feb. 1964 . 
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Quadrant III contains the three theories which are expectationally based. 
By effectively assuming time sway , the traditional theory allows uncertainty 
to vanish and perfect knowledge to replace it . All bones, regardless of 
their maturity , are seen as psrle=t substitutes, relegating liquidity con-
sciousness to be unimportant . The Meiselman hypothesis does much the same , 
Malkiel ' s alternative formulation , by introducing a normal range of interest 
rates , and a probability of a movement of rates within this range , raises 
the importance of liquidity consciousness and explicitly allows for r isk to 
enter into the picture. This places i t above and to the left of the other 
two theories . 
By contr ast , both f.,!arket Segmentation Theory and the Hicksian Liquidity 
Pr emium Hypothesis lie in the fir st quadrant. Since the former is more 
extreme in its belief of the domi nance of risk aversion it is to the left 
of the latter , but will be below it as a result of its rejection of normal 
backwardation . 
A priori very little can be said on the validity of these differing vi ews 
and the behavioural assumptions that they adhere to . In order to make any 
sort of evaluative statement we must examine the available empirical evidence , 
and it is to this task that we shall dedicate the next chap~er . A degree 
of caution should be stressed however , since an empirical refutation of an 
hypothesis is not necessarily a refutation of the unjerlying theory uf 
behaviour as we shall argue in Section 2 .6 • 
. / 
,....... 
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CHAPTER II 
A REVIEW OF THE E~:Pii1ICAL EVIDEI\CE 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
Our aim in this chapter is to review and analyse the empirical evidence 
available on the term structure of interest rates in order to both evaluate 
the competing hypotheses of the previous chapter, and to prepare the ground 
for our own investigation in Chapter IV. To facilitate lucid exposition 
the material will be outlined in much the same order as before. The evidence 
on each theory will first be briefly discussed in historical sequence, and 
then critically examined . In the final section we shall draw upon this 
discussion and arrive at various conclusions about both the evidence under 
review, and the theories to which this evidence is relevant . 
2.1 Evidence on the Traditional Expectations Hypothesis 
The majority of empirical investigationsinto the Hicks-Lutz theory have been 
based on the premise that if expectations do deter~ine the rate structure , 
there must be an observable correspondence between the forward ~ates implicit 
in the yield curve and the actual rates which materialise . In other words , 
unless expectations are fulfilled then the traditional explanation must neces-
sarily be erroneous. 
Among the earliest to research the predictive accuracy of forward interest 
1 
rates was Frederick Macaulay in 1938. Before the establishment of the 
Federal Reserve , there existed a pronounced and well- known annual trend in 
call money rates. Reasoning that the rate on time deposits should be able 
to anticipate this seasonal , Macaulay discovered th~t this did , in fact , 
occur. However, beyond this he was unable to find any further evidence of 
s uccessful f orecasting . He concluded that evidence of successful forecast-
i ng is rare because successful forecasting is also rare . 
Hickman2 , in an unpublished but nonetheless widely cited manuscript , compared 
actual or observed yield curves with those predicted one year or more ahead 
by the term structure of interest rates for the period 1935 to 1942 . 
./ 
If the 
expections hypothesis is valid , he argued, then there should be a high / 
1. Macaulay , F .R. Movements of Interest rates , Bond Yields and Stock Prices 
in the U. S . since 1856, National Bureau of Economic Research , New York , 1938. 
2 . Hickman, W. B. "The Term Structure of Interest Rates: An Exploratory 
Analysis" , National Bureau of Economic Research , New York, 1942 , mimeo-
graphed. 
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correlation between expected and observed yield curves . By simply assuming 
that the yield curve at timet will be equal to that in t + 1, he obtained 
better predictions of subsequently observed yield curves than those provided 
by expectations theory. He inferred that the evidence in no way supported 
the traditional hypothesis. 
3 A survey conducted in 1943 by Donald Woodward for the Muh.:al Life Insurance 
Company of New York , does provide more active support for the theory. A 
population of two hundred active participants in the financial markets were 
questioned on the future rate they expected to prevail on U.S. Treasury 
securities for two decades ahead. While the model forecast was that yields 
would not differ from the then current Treasury long yield of 2 , 5 per cent , 
there was a substantial difference of opinion and the mean expected rate was 
2 , ?8 per cent . Since the 1943 yield curve was rising , the expectations of 
higher rates apparent in the survey suggest a degree of successful foresight. 
In the manr.er of Macaulay and Hickman , Charls Walker ' s4 test of expectati ons 
theozywas based on the assumption that the market could predict accurately. 
Walker ' s study -analyses u.s . interest rate policy curing Worl d War II. Early 
in the war, the Federal Reserve and Treasury pursued a policy of stabilising 
the existing level of rates on government securities vis- a- vis open market 
operations. At that time the yield curve was rising rather sharply . Given 
this, Walker argued that if expectations theory was correct, the pre--stabilis-
ation term structure im~lied that future short rates would be higher than 
existing rates . In contrast, the stabilisation policy implied that future 
short- term rates would be the same as current rates . Therefore, a shift 
should occur from shorts into longs since investors expected long rates to 
fall . Walker found a massive switch and regarded this as supportive of the 
expectations hypothesis. 
The empirical research of Culbertson5 similarly was founded on the noti on 
that forward rates must be accurate predictions of future spot rates. He 
examined the yields on short and l ong government bonds fo~ identical periods 
of time , reasoning that if expectations theory is valid , then given holding-
period yields should equalise regardleis of whether short or long- term/ 
3 . Ibid, p . 23 following , 
4. Walker , C.E . "Federal Reserve Policy and the Structure of Rates on 
Government Securities", Quarterly Journal of Ec~nomics, February , 1954, p . l9 . 
5, Culbertson, J.M. "The Term Structure of Interest Rates", Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, November , 195?, p.502. 
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securities are held. Marked differences in returns were uncovered . 
Since Culbertson found it diffi cult to believe that speculators would operat e 
i n the government secur ities markets and predict as badly as his results 
suggested , he r ejected the expectations hypothesis . 
A test for the diversity of expectations undertaken by Burton Malkiel6 has 
definite signifi cance for the traditional expectations theory. The investi-
gatian invol ved an examination of the advisory letters of fcur prominent 
i nvestment advisor s over the period 1968 to 1965 . Malkiel assumed these 
widely r ead letters to act as a valid aurrogate for the expectations of market 
participants themselves , but conceded that the opinions expressed in these 
letters may often express the trading position of a particular insti tution . 
Usi ng the categor isations "bull ish", " bearish" and "neutral" to classify 
expectations , Malkiel found that even when the various opinions were most 
concurr ent , the bond mar ket was still char acter ised by a consi derable 
dispersion of opinion . 
A dir ect survey by Kane and Malki el7 , r esembling that of Woodward pr ovi des 
a mor e comprehensive test of the opinions of a sample of portfolio managers . 
During 1965 a questi onnair e sur veying interest rate expectations was despatched 
t o t wo hundred financial institutions which wer e important deal ers i n the gilt-
edged market . The results indicated that the expectations of the major inves-
tor s i n the bond market were nat uni form , even when predictions of the Treasury 
bill rate wer e made only three months in advance . 
The most recent evidence on the traditional expectations hypothesis comes 
8 from an investigation undertaken by Reuben Kessel • Kessel argued that 
because spot rates have been positive since World War I I , it would be irr ational 
for the market to hold expectations of negative interest rates . Therefore , if 
negative forward r ates are observed , t his would constitute evidence against the 
expectations hypothesis . Kessel found that the behaviour of the term structure 
of bi ll yields contradicted the expectations hypothesis . For ni ne of t he 
twenty- one trading days in Sept ember , 1960 , negative forward rates for one-
week money were observed . Si nce this was unr easonable , Kessel concluded that 
forward rat~s were not expected spot rates. 
6 . Malkiel , B. J . The Term Str ucture of Interest Rates : Expectations and 
Behaviour Patterns , Princeton University Press , Princeton , 1966, Chapter 6 . 
7 . Kane , E. J . and Malkiel , B. G. "The Term St ructure of Interest Rates : An 
Anal ysis of a Survey of Interest- Rate Expectations" Review of Economics 
and Statistics , 1966, p.343 . 
B. Kessel , A.A. The Cyclical Behaviour of the Term Structure of Inter est Rates 
Prentice- Hall , Englewood Cliffs , 1962 . 
I 
l 
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2.1.1 Analysis of the Evidence 
The interpretation of the evidence on the traditional expectations hypothesis 
has become the centre of a controversy amongst theorists of the term structure. 
Two antithetical positions have been taken in the literature. 
Meiselman9 has argued that, with the exception of Macaulay and Woodward, 
no independent evidence exists on expectations theory. Rejecting the notion 
that expectations must be proved correct , Meiselman accuses all the researchers 
of having examined propositions not implied by expectations theory , and hence 
having rejected the hypothesis on inappropriate grounds. The view that the 
market must be seen to predict accurately is i nvalid . Expectations theory, 
critics posit , deals with ex ante interest rates where~s empirical tests have 
all been applied to ex paste data. 1 Anticipated and realised holding period 
yields will not be equal except in a world of perfect certainty. Meiselman 
categorically states that "anticipations may not be realised yet still determine 
2 the structure of rates in the manner asserted by the theory" • The crux of 
this position seems to be that as long as expectations actually influence the 
term structure, it is immaterial whether they have been optimistic or pessi-
mistic . 
Other writers have been more sympathetic to the approach of the empirical 
investigations. Generally there is agreement with Meiselman, that these tests 
do not necessarily i~ply that the traditional expectations theory is not an 
accurate description of investor behaviour , but argue that they do show that 
investors have done an unbelievably bad job of predicting future rates . 
Given thi~, it is proposed that market participants would hardly continue 
to f orecast and act on their forecasts . The position of this school of thought 
has been aptly summarised by Conard as follows: 11I , for one , would accept 
the view that it is unreasonable to presume the market is so consistently and 
grossly wrong in its expectations that poor foresight could wholly explain these 
observations. "3 
In terms of these two conflicting views, how should we interpret the empirical 
evidence? Clearly, on balance, most studies indicate that accurate forecast-
ing has most definitely not occurred . ··'Even those which do manifest some 
degree of accuracy, such as the work of Macaulay and Walker , show that at/ 
9 . ~~eiselman, 0 . The Term Structure of Interest Rates , Prentice- Hall, Engle-
wood Cliffs, 1962. 
j, Note that Meiselman's work was published before that of Kane and Malkiel 
which he would have to regard as "indepenc!ent evidence11 • 
2. ~~ p.l2 
3. Conard , J.W. An Introduction to the Theory of I nterest , University of 
California Press, Berkeley , 1966, p.339 . 
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best forecasting is hazardous . The independent evidence, in the sense of 
not testing whether expected and observed yields coincide, has come from the 
three opinion surveys. Since we can discount the Malkiel survey on grounds 
of both the sample size and the subjective method of interpretation, we 
are reduced to tl'/o conflicting findings , namely the ~'/oodward Study and that 
of Kane and Malkiel, This , in itself , illustrates the highly unsatisfactory 
nature of opinion surveys as a means of quantitative research . 4 
Given that surveys cannot suffice as evidence for traditional expectations 
theory, the only alternative is to compare actual and expected yields . It 
is here that the crux of the matter lies . Since the expectations hypothesis 
can generate no other testable hypothesis , we must conclude that it has little 
operational content . Only within the framework of more loosely defined 
assumptions , in particular that of uncertainty, do alternative propositions 
arise for testing. 
The controversy surrounding the empirical evidence then see~s to boil down 
to differing views on expectations theory itself. Meiselman et al do not 
believe that the expectations hypothesis need be verified by comparing future 
yields with those predicted , and in so doing they in fact adopt a "softer" 
version of the theory which we distinguished as New Expectations Theory in 
the previous chapter. The other vie\'/ , characterised by Conard , accept" a 
"hard" version of expectations theory , namely that expectations must coincide 
with obs erved data . This is in line with Lutz ' s original formulation of the 
theory, and thus would appear to be the more acceptable view. 
Bearing this in mind we can make some evaluative statements . That expectations 
need not be correct to determine the term structure is, of course , correct . 
But, given free entry and competition in the financial markets , should there 
not be a relationship between expectations implicit in the rate structure and 
subsequently observed ac~ual rates ? There should be some advantage attached 
to the expectations hypothesis as a predictor of future forward rates. If 
not , why would the market expend time and energy , both scarce resources , in 
trying to predict future rates . 
. / 
. 4 . The two most fundamental difficulties normally associated . with oplm.on 
surveys can be summarised , i/ the environmental influences and decision 
criteria which condition one ' s response to a questionnaire may be quite 
different from those which operate in the evaluation of variables at the 
time of investment; ii/ the individuals completing the questionnaires 
may not have been able to report the expectations of those who actually 
manage their firms portfolios . For additional probl~ms see Morgan , E.V . 
Monetary Policy for Stable Growth , Hobart Paper 27 , Institute of Economic 
Affairs, 3rd Edition, 1969, p .48 and 49. 
-- 37 . 
Furt~er, in the sense of producing other testeble hypotheses , the traditional 
variant of expectations theory has proved illusory despite the promise it 
held in section 1.2.1 . 
2,2 Evicence on New Expectations Theory 
To recapitulate section 1 . 3 of the previous chapter, we saw that in an 
attempt to provide operational content to the traditional explanation of the 
term structure , David Meiselman8 placed his analysis within the framework of 
an error- learningmodel and in so doing moved significantly away from the 
original hypothesis . One of the consequences of New Expectations Theory 
has been that in e:.pirical research, observed rates do not any longer have 
to equal expected future interest rates to validate the theory . Instead, 
it merely has to be proved that market participants hold expectations concern-
ing the future course of interest rates , and change these expectations on the 
basis of errors made in prior forecasts . In sum , New Expectations Theory 
does not attempt to explain the l evel of interest rates per se, but rather 
how changes in the level of interest rates come about , 
Not surprisingly , the first empirical investigation i nto the New Expectations 
Hypothesis was undertaken by Meiselman himself . By employing annual Durand 
yield data for the period 1901 to 1954 , and introducing a random error term 
Ut into equation (1 . 3 . 4), he estimated the equation : 
D. t + n = (2.2.1) 
Three princioal results emerged , All regression co-efficients were signifi-
cantly positive . The regression and correlation co-efficients declined as 
the time period spanned by the equation increased , and the constant terms a 
did not differ significantly from zero. Meiselman interpreted these results, 
particularly the positive b co- efficients, as supporting his substantive hypo-
thesis and therefore as indirectly supportive of the traditional expectations 
theory as well . That i nvestors held forecasts of the nearer term with a 
greater degree of confidence than those of the more distant future explained , 
Meiselman believed , the fact that the regression and correlation co-efficients/ 
8 , ~;1eiselman , D. op. cit; Chapter II 
9 , Durand, D. Bc;.s:.c Yields of Corporate Bonds 1900-1942, National Bureau 
of Econo~ic Research , Technical Paper No . 3 , New York, 1942 . 
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fell with time. The small or zero constant terms were, in his view, of 
particular significance since if these were significantly different from 
zero it would mean that even when no forecast error occurred, expectations 
would still be revised. 
in the next section. 
We shall return to this question of interpretation 
In an attempt to duplicate the results of Meiselman, J.A.G . Grant 1 carried 
out an independent test of New Expectations Theory using British data. Grant 
argued that the Durand data applied by Meiselman possessed several highly un-
desirable characteristics, especially the uncertainty concerning the overall 
error involved in their calculation, and could have been responsible to some 
degree for the results obtained . Accordingly, Grant constructed a time-series 
of yields for the U.K. , and tested them for the period 1924 to 1962. First 
he regressed four forward one- year rates against the forecasting error and 
later in non-linear form for the first eight forward rates . He found that 
the New Expectations hypothesis did not achieve a high degree of explanatory 
power in respect of the British data , but cautiously noted that " •...• this 
does not ref ute it as an explanation of investor behaviour. "2 
In t he same year Neil Wallace3 , in an unpublished doctoral dissertation , 
calculated equation (2 . 2 . 1) for U.S . Treasury bond rates using quarterly data 
for the period 1946 to 1962. A novel feature of his analysis was thR inclus-
ion of a dummy variable to account for the alliance between the U.S . Treasury 
and the Federal Reserve in 1951 . Although Wallace found that the error term 
bEt satisfactorily explained the revision of expectations , he discovered thecon-
stant terms a to be positive and significantly different from zero . In 
addition, a large measure of autocorrelation was apparent. 
Chronologically, the next test of New Expectations Theory was performed by 
4 James van Horne • Using publi shed monthly Treasury yield data , Van Horne 
covered the period January 1954 to September 1963. He found that an important 
part of the movement in forward interest rates could be explained by errors in 
past forecasting . In contrast to Meiselman' s res ults, however , the values of 
the constant term were consistently positive and significant. To account for/ 
·" 
1. Grant , J .A.G. op.cit ; 
2. Ibid, p.62 
3 . Wallace, N. "The Term Structure of Interest Rates and . the Maturity Compo-
sition of the Federal Debt". unpublished Ph .d. dissertation , University 
of Chicago, 1964. 
4. Van Horne, J. "Interest- Rate Res t and the Term Structure of Interest 
Rates " Journal of Political Economy , August, 1965, p.344 following , 
this Van Horne argued for the introduction of a risk variable, but Richard 
5 Roll correctly nullified this by pointing out that the presence of a common 
term on both sides would impart a statistical bias into the equation . 
6 Arising out of his 1965 researches into Liquidity Premi um Theory , l<essel 
also provided a test of the Meiselman hypothesis. The data employed by 
Kessel consisted of U.S. Treasury bill yields with less than six months to 
maturity, and. he examined them for the period 1958 to 1961. A peculiarity 
of the study lay in his derivation of forward rates by means of an arithmetic 
average, rather than the more commonly used Hicksian geometric average formula . 
Of the five regressions run by Kessel only one of the multiple correlation 
coefficients was high (around 0 ,85 ). It has subsequently been agreed upon 
i n the literature that this evidence supports Meiselman less strongly than 
l<essel felt it did. 
The apparent deficiencies in the data compiled by Grant prompted Douglas 
Fisher to construct his own set of data f or government bonds in the U.K. on a 
quarterly basis for the period 1951 to 1963. Arguing that Grant had made 
no allowance for the "coupon effect", Fisher was critical of the estimates he 
. ? 
had obtained . After an examination of the estimates obtained using his 
own data, he reported that " these results compare quite favourably with those 
reported by Meiselman ."8 
In a similar investigation on the British experience, Buse9 found evidence 
less favourable to the Meiselman hypothesis . Rejecting Grant ' s results as a 
"statistical artifact", Buse posited that "the source of this divergence can 
easily be traced to the method of estimating the successive maturities which 
make up the term structure" ; In analogous fashion , Buse discounted Fisher's/ 
5, For detail s of this discussion see Roll , R. '' Interest-Rate Risk and the 
Term Structure of Interest Rates : Comment", Journal of Political Economy 
Dec . 19661 p . 629- 32, and Van Horne J. 11Interest- Rate Risk and the Ter m 
Structure of Interest Rates : Reply11 , Journal of Political Economy , March , 
196?, p.633- 34. 
6 . Kessel , R. op .cit; 
?. Fisher, D. "The Structure of Interest Rates : A Comment" Economica , Nov 1 1964 
p . 413-419 and 11A Reply" by Grant , J.A.G. attached to this p . 419- 422. 
8. Fisher, D. "Expectations , the Term Structure of Interest Rates and Recent 
British Experience" Economica, August, 1966, p.310- 329 
9 . Buse , A. "Interest Rates , the Meisel man Model , and Random Numbers", Journal 
of Political Economy, ?5, 196?, p . 49-62 . 
1. ~~ p.53. 
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findings by arguing "that Fisher has failed to provide a suitable theoretical 
basis to justify the claims made for his method of yield observation"2 . 
Using an independent set of British data covering Jan~ary averages of yields 
on government securities for the period 1933 - 1963, Buse reported results 
consistent with the Meiselman model . Suspicious that this could be a feature 
3 
of the data , he randomly ordered two sets of yield curves , and used these 
random orderings as a basis for a test of the Meiselman model , The regressions 
consistently generated Meiselman-type r esults , and Buse concluded that such 
results are implied by any set of smoothed yield curves in which short- term 
interest rates have shown a greater vol atility than long-term rates . 
In 1969 Buse4 re- estimated the Meiselman model with the same data as before , 
but employed the Lutzian rather than Hicksian formula to derive forward rates. 
All prior investigations had utilised the Hicksian formula exclusively . After 
an examination of the properties of both formulae , Buse was able to show via 
sample calculations that the Lutzian method gave the more accurate forward rates. 
After re- estimating the Meiselman hypothesis, it was found that while the c~­
efficients of the model remained basically unchanged,its overall explanatory 
power was substantially reduced . In some cases previously statistically sig-
nificant regressions now became insignificant . 
R.S. Masera5 in his investigation of the Italian bond market, applied the 
Meiselman model to the Italian experience. Using monthly observations cover-
ing the period 1958 to 1967, Masera regressed changes in one-year expected rates 
against the forecasting error. The resultant estimations did not provide 
support for New Expectations Theory , the explanatory power of which was found 
to be very low with the exceotion of the first equation where only one period 
ahead was considered . Masera concluded that the Meiselman model could not 
satisfactorily explain the Italian market , since "given the relative imperfect-
ion of the Italian bond market, expectations do 80t really matter and therefore 
6 do not have an important explanatory power . " 
2 , Buse, A. "The Structure of Interest Rates and Recent British Experience: 
a Comment", Economica, August 1967, p . 298-308 and "Reply" by Fisher , D. 
attached to t his on p . 308 following . 
3 , The two sets of yield curves sa ordered by Buse were·those of Durand (1942) 
and Durand and Winn (1947), and his own series on British securities . 
4. Buse, A. "Hicks, Lutz, Meiselman and the Expectations Theory" Review of 
Economic Studies , 1969, p . 395-406 . 
· 5 , Masera , R.S. The Term Structure of Internal Rates , Clarendon University 
Press, Oxford, 1972. 
6. Ibid, p. 134. 
The most recent and most ccmprehensive investigation of New Expectations 
Theory was undertaken by Dodds and Ford7 working in partnership at Sheffield 
University. Three sets of data were employed in the project; the British 
data compiled by Grant , Masera 's Italian bond yields, and U.K. data con-
structed by Dodds and Ford themselves consisting of weighted , unweighted and 
smoothed annual observations. For each set of data two sets of forward 
expected interest rates ~ere calculated vis-a-vis the Hicksian and Lutzian 
formulas. 
Regressions run on the Grant data provided no evidence favourable to the 
Meiselman hypothesis. Of the two sets of forward rates, the Hicksian rates 
proved slightly more fruitful. Similarly, Masera's Italian data produced 
findings which were meaningless for both the Hicksian and Lutzian formulae. 
Dodds'and Ford's own data gave results only slightly more encouraging. The 
estimates provided by the weighted and unweighted data in no instance indi-
cated systematic or coherent support for New Expectations Theory. However, 
as we would have expected in the light of Buse's findings, the tests involving 
smoothed data produced drarnatically different results. Here the Meiselman 
hypothesis performed relatively well and was satisfactorily able t6 explain 
the market for the period reviewed. 
Dodds and Ford concluded that the Meiselman hypothesis was "highly susceptible11 
to the nature of the data employed, In general, they believed their ~esults to 
indicate that New Expectations Theory may have little to offer as an explanation 
of the term structure of interest rates. 
2.2.1 Analysis of the Evidence 
The preceding review of the empirical evidence indicates that great care 
should be taken in the interpretation of econometric results in studies of the 
term structure based on a_Meiselman-type approach. These results, quite 
apart from any other complications, are subject to the cumulation of at least 
three types of errors. Firstly, some errors are inevitably introduced in the 
process of estimation of the yield curves . Secondly, errors are committed 
. ' 
in deriving forward rates from the yield data, and finally, the interpr etation 
of forward rates as expected rates appears to be the cause of further errors. 
7. Dodds, J,C . and Ford, J.L. Expectations, Uncertainty and the Term 
Structure of Interest Rates, Martin Robertson & Co. Ltd., London, 1974. 
Despite these problems, however, available data and techniques co seem to 
offer the possibility of obtaining discriminating evidence. None~heless , 
the controversy of interpretation plaguing New Expectations Theory has 
revolved in the main around questions concerning these three sources of 
error. 
Meiselman ' s own investigation has been strongly attacked , particularly 
on the first count , We recall that he employed the so-called Durand data 
8 
which has been heavily criticised . Grant argued that the "artificiality" 
of this yield data is suspect as a result of the smoothing technique used 
by Durand. Generally, this contention is well supported in the literature . 
Durand9 himself, writing in 1958, pointed out that " as constructed basic 
yield curves are designed to create a quick and crude impression of the term 
structure of high-grade bond yields at a moment of time and for this they are 
adequate." 
Meiselman's interpretation of his findings per se has been subjected to a 
good deal of criticism as we indicated earlier . Specifically , his reasoning 
that if liquidity premiums were in existence , then the constant terms would be 
1 2 
significantly positive, has been sharply rejected . Both Kessel · and V!ood 
·showed successfully that if liquidity premiums increase as the periods to 
which they are applicable recede into the future, the constant term may still 
be zero. 
Despite the imperfect data used by Meiselman, and some faulty inferencesdr.awn 
by him, there is little doubt that his empirical test does provide some evidence 
for New Expectations Theory . This becomes clearer if we acknowledge the rather 
qualified support stemming from the work of Fisher, van Horne and Wallace . 
However, we cannot accept this evidence as supporting in addition the tradition-
al variant of expectations theory, and must concur with Michaelson3 when he 
posits that ''the tests Meiselman conducted were tests of this error- learning 
mechanism rather than tests of the expectations hypothesis directly." 
8 , Grant , J . A.G . op .cit ; p.58 
9. Durand , D. "Quarterly Series of Corporate Basic Yields, 1952-57 and Some 
Attendant Reservations" Journal of Finance, 1958, ·p . 348-35D. 
1 . Kessel, A.A. op.cit; Chapter 2. 
2. Wood, J.H . "Expectations, Errors and the Term Structure of Interest Rates" 
Journal of Political Economy, 1963, p.l6D- l7l. 
3. Michaelson , J.B. The Term Structure of Interest Rates , Intext Educational 
Publishers , New York, 1973 1 p . 85. 
l 
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By far the r.1ost serious allegation made against the Meiselman-type 
4 
empirical investigation comes from Buse who has the support of both Grant 
and Ford and Dodds. We recall that Buse argued that the processing of 
raw interest data to produce smoothed yield curves by itself gave rise to 
the regression results obtained in empirical tests of New Expectations Theory, 
or put differently, the regressions simply summarise the imposed smooth shape 
of the yield curves. It should be noted though, that the methodology employed 
5 by Buse has been vigorously attacked by Wallace who argued that it was both 
"irrelevant and incorrect11 • 
In sum, Meiselman has produced a highly operational model which is not 
dependent in the manner of the traditional theory on so-called independent 
evidence. To date the empirical investigations , with a few notable exceptions , 
have not produced sufficient evidence to verify the behavioural hypothesis 
underlying New Expectations Theory and some very disturbing features have 
been unearthed. Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that the model represents 
an important and stimulating breakthrough into the empirical researching of the 
term structure of interest rates. 
2.3 Evidence on Malkiel's Reformulation of Expectations Theory 
It was emphasised in the previous chapter that although the mechanics of his 
11alternative reformulation of expectations theory11 are unique, Malkiel nonethe-
less accepts the traditional expectations hypothesis as an accurate description 
of investor behaviour. Furthermore, we saw that contained in his theory are 
all the essential components of New Expectations Theory . As we review the 
empirical evidence below therefore, it should be constantly remembered that 
the Malkiel theory is, in essence, a variant of the traditional explanation 
with fundamentally similar implications for the term structure. 
Unfortunately, only two independent investigations into the Malkiel theory are 
in existence; that of Malkiel himself and a comparative study undertaken by 
7 Dodds and Ford. We shall review initially the work of Malkiel since·this 
was done chronologically before that of Dodds and Ford • 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
. I 
Buse, A. op.cit; p.49- 62 
Wallace , N. "Buse on Meiselman: Comment" Journal of Political Economy , 
1969 p.524- 527. 
Malkiel, B,G. oo .cit; Chapter 3. 
Dodds, J.C. and Ford , J.L. op.cit; Chapter 4. 
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Taking his basic behavioural hypothesis which we examined in Section 1. a·, 
Malkiel estimated this for the United States , initially using annual Durand 
data from 1900 to 1942 and employing the ordinary least SGuares regression 
technique . 
(1.4.6) 
The results were not satisfactory due to the inherent statistical bias 
caused by the existence of the long rate R on both sides of the equation. 
In order to remove this bias, Malkiel transposed R from the left hand side 
and produced an equation which explained the rate when multiplied through 
by minus unity :. 
(2.3.1.1) 
The regression coefficient (1 - b) was held unrestricted. Since fifteen-year 
data was used to calculate RAt ' estimations of (2.3.1.1) were based on twenty-
seven annual observations. The method of calculating RA was varied and the 
historic range of the long rate Rt . The consequent results proved to be 
surprisingly good . The signs of the coefficients met a priori expectations 
and the goodness of fit in every equation was so high as to rule out compari-
sons made between them on this basis. 
Besides employing fifteen-year averages for RAt ' as indicated above , Malkiel 
ran his basic regressions against Durand data by calculating a series of RA , 
t s 
based on ten- year averages , He used the 1900 to 1942 data integrated with 
that for 1951 to 1965. The overall results were similar to those above, 
although marginally inferior. 
To test the sensitivity of his hypothesis to the nature of the data employed , 
Mal kiel ran regressions against data of varying lengths , namely Grant U.K. 
data and U.S. Treasury yields from 1951 to 1965 . The resultant estimates 
signified that as the number of observations inherent in RAt is reduced , so 
the explanatory value of the hypothesis declines . However , no systematic 
. / 
relationship could be discerned here . Malkiel concluded 11 that the data 
does not contradict our hypothesis11 and ventured more postively that 11 t hese 
tests, utilising three different sets of interest-rate time series and several 
alternative time periods, offer independent evidence corroborating the findings/ 
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of Meiselman that expectations play a major r ole in determining the rate 
8 
structure." 
Dodds and Ford, in their study, empirically investigated various forms of 
the Malkiel hypothesis against three different sets of data , i. e. Masera 's 
Italian data , Grant 's U.K. data, and their own British data . They introduced 
a random error term Ut' making (2,3.1.1): 
= - a + ..;. u t (2 . 3 .1.2) 
and then employed a series of distributed lag forms in place of Malkiel ' s 
9 
aver age RAt ' This gave , in effect, predominant influence to the more recent 
values of interest rates . 
The result s obtained from the Italian data were of no significance regardless 
of the part icular distributed lag scheme used. Dodds and Ford attributed 
this mainly to the f act that Masera ' s data contains no true long- term securities 
since the longest available maturity range in the Italian market is only nine 
years . 
For the Grant data from 1953 to 1962, the best estimates were achieved via 
the Koyck lag scheme, and the values here were not significantl y different 
from those of Malkiel although the overall explanatory power of t he eyuation 
was reduced . 
Dodds and Ford ' s own data for the U.K . from 1953 to 1971 produced results of 
the same quality as Mal kiel, except that in this instance reduced-form 
equations were used . The best estimations came from the unweighted data 
and the worst f r om the smoothed yield data. 
The final conclusion provided by Dodds and Ford is somewhat eclectic . While 
acknowledging that on the whole the Malkiel hypothesis had performed reasonably 
well, they suggested that "the question of the choice of the data period and 
possibly the cyclical/trend structure of the data themseives might be important 
·' 1 in influencing the outcome of the lvlalkiel hypothesis ." 
8. lv~lkiel , B.G. op.cit; p.lOl 
9 . Specifically Koyck, Pascal and Almon distributed lag schemes. 
1. · Dodds, J .C. and Ford, J.L. op. cit; p . l56 
2 . 3.1 . Analysis of the Evida~ce 
Despite the relatively small amount of empirical wor~ performed on it, 
the Malkiel hypothesis has accumulated a substantial weight of evidence 
in support of it. 
positive evidence. 
Both his own study , and that of Dodds and Ford , pr ovide 
As an operational theory , the Melkiel hypothesis has some very distinct 
advantages over the other models we have examined up to this point . Above 
all it is a market- view theory , enabling us to look at the term structure 
at any moment t by means of a single equation . By incorporating the Keynesian 
notion of a normal range of interest rates, the whole spread of interest rates 
across the spectrum can be highlighted by concentration on just one yield 
differential . 
Most of the problems congenital to the hypothesis seem to be those in proxying 
the different variables . This is parti cularly true of the normal range , and 
one wonders how correct Malkiel was to employ the difference between the long 
and short rates. Deciding on the width of the normal range per se itself allows 
an important subjective factor to creep into the analysis . The data require-
ments imposed by the model are severe . It is no easy matter to find comparable 
sets of time series data which remain consistent over considerable periods of 
time, and as Dodds .and Ford suggested , the nature of the data itself could have 
considerable influence on the estimates obtained. 
We conclude that despite the problems accompanying it, and the small amount of 
empirical investigations undertaken on it , the Malkiel hypothesis represents 
a highly successful operational model . It is of interest to note, however , 
that t "he bulk of the evidence available indicates that the constant term a 
is significantly different from zero, which , while completely compatible with 
the model , could be construed as denoting the existence of liquditiy premiums. 
2 . 4 Evidence on Liquidity Premium Theory 
Thus far the evidence we have examined has been drawn exclusivel y from theories 
./ 
which propose that expectations , and expectations only, determine the term 
structure of interest rates. In contrast , as we saw in the previous chapter , 
the Hicksian Liquidity Premium hypothesis postulates that investors are funda-
mentally risk- aversive, and therefore must be paid a premium to hold long- term/ 
47. 
securities which are more liable to capital loss than shorts. In other 
words , long bonds can no longer be regarded as perfect substitutes for 
short paper. 
The first attempt to provide an empirical test of the Liquidity Premium 
Theory was made by Meiselman2 in his path-bre~king 1962 Study. We recall 
from Section 2 . 2 ,1 Meiselman ' s argument that since the constant term a was 
statistically equal to zero , liquidity premiums were not present in his 
estimates . We recall further that this notion was strongly and correctly 
rejected by Kessel and Wood , It follows, then, that Meiselman's conclusion 
cannot be accepted as ruling out the e~istence of liquidity premiums . Con-
versely, of course , his results do not "prove" the hypothesis either . 
Therefore , we must reject the investigation as an appropriate test of the 
Hicksian model . 
A more direct analysis of liquidity premiums was undertaken by Neil Wallace3 
in 1964. Wallace related forward rates on U.S. government securities to 
the composition of the Federal debt, arguing that the latter one exogenously 
' determined affecting the term structure of rat es without being in turn affected 
by it. Empirical examination of thi s proposition showed that a shift in the 
maturity composition had only a small effect on the rate structure in the 
direction predicted by the Liquidity Preference hypothesis. 
During 1965 Reuben Kessel4 conducted what is almost certainly the most important 
and widely discussed empirical investigation into the existence of liquidity 
premiums . His aim was to allow for the presence of liquidity premiums in the 
markets forward rates derived from yield data , and hence obtain a " t ruer" 
estimate of the r ate expected by the market. These "pure" expected or forward 
rates cleansed of all influences except the expectations held by i nvestors , 
were then employed in the main test procedure adopted by Kessel. Here he 
attempted to assess the accuracy of these rates, and to see how the resultant 
predictions compared with the predictions made on the basis of forward rates 
per se . A unique feature of Kessel's methodology lay in the fact that he 
used neither the conventional Lutzian nor Hicksian formula to derive forward 
; 
rates, but rather the arithmetic average of the Hicksian version. We shall 
return to this point in Chapter IV. 
2. ~:eiselman , D. op, cit; p.45 to 47 
3 . Wallace, N. op.cit ; 
4. Kessel, A.A. op, cit ; 
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Kessel ran his tests over three business cycles , namely , from October 1949 
to February 1961 which provided 137 monthly observations on 28 day Treasury 
Bills, and for 138 weekly observations on 28 day Treasury Bills and 91 day 
bills for the period January 1959 to February 1961 , Kessel argued that the 
estimates he obtained, supported two interdependent points . Firstly , the 
results indicated c learly that liquidity premiums definitely do exist. 
Secondly , when expected forward rates are cleansed of these premiums, the 
traditional expectations theory performs well . Both co~clusions as well as 
numerous aspects of his methodology have been severely criticised, but we 
will deal with this in the subsequent section . In an exhaustive study for 
5 the National Bureau of Economic Research , J.W. Conard and J. Freudenthal 
replicated Kessel ' s test for the measur ement of liquidity premiums on short-
term government stock with a longer term- to- maturi ty than the Treasury Bills 
used by Kessel . While their results did establish some evidence for the 
existence of liquidity premiums on shorter stock , there was nothing to suggest 
the same for longer securities. Conard concluded : 
" (Our) .... studies raise some questions about the generality 
of the view that risk premi ums ar e positive functions of the 
level of interest r ates , though they do not contradict Kessel's 
findings with ~espect to Treasury Bills. "6 
7 Masera adapted Kessel ' s approach to the Italian bond market , despite a 
theoretical disagreement on the simple relationship between risk premiums and 
the level of interest rates posited by Kessel . After investigating average 
holding-period yields on a monthly basis from 1957 to 1967, Masera concluded 
that the evidence accumulated gave strong support t o the existence of positive 
risk premi ums . He softened this conclusion however , by cautiously noting that 
aversion to capital r i sk did not appear to be the only type of risk aversion 
influencing market behaviour . After indicating additional computational and 
other difficulties involved, Masera summed up hi s feel ings by arguing that 
" the joint presence of all these complicati ons makes it very difficult to 
obtain reliable econometric evidence on the points at issue ."8 
5 , Conard , J.W . The Behaviour of Interest Rates , National Bureau of 
Economic Research, New York , 1966, Chapter 7. 
6 . ,lliE, p . 84 
7 , Masera , R.S . op. cit ; Chapter 5 
8. Ibid , p.l60 
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Disregarding entirely the methodological f r amework developed by Kessel , 
Burman and White9 adopted a completely different approach to the measurement 
of liquidity premiums . Essentiall y , this involved the compilation of an 
index gauging the interest elasticity of bond prices , or the percentage 
change in the price of a security caused by a one per cent change in the yield . 
The Burman ~hite liquidity premium indsx thus represents an attempt to measure , 
or at least proxy, the degree of risk inherent in stock of a given maturi ty . 
However, the index proved unsuccessful in an effort to estimate U. K. yield 
curves that allowed for risk premiums, despite allowances for complications 
such as tax rebates , coupon effects , etc . In assessing their results , Burman 
and White conceded " ..•. that the estimates of expected yi elds and returns over 
the period cannot be considered as wholly reliable."1 
The most recent empirical investigati on into the Hicksian Liquidity Premi um 
Theory was undertaken by Dodds and Ford2 in 1974.. Over all three test methods 
were employed, none of which produced convincing results. 
Kessel ' s liquidity premium equation in conjunction with the three sets of data 
developed by Dodds and Ford themselves for the U. K. covering the period 1953 
to 1971 produced results which were, statistically speaking , zero . Grant's 
data however , revealed rather more respectable evidence. The coefficients 
were fo~nd to be statistically significant from zero at a 95 per cent level 
of confidence. 
For their own data , Dodds and Ford estimated two equations based on forward 
one-year rates set two years ahead. For the unweighted, weighted and smoothed 
data the results were identical , insofar as no support at all was establi shed 
for the exLstence of liquidity premiums. 
The third test met hod involved the use of the so-called Robertsonian notion 
of the long r ate as the r.ate par excellence . Here Grant's quarterly data 
for t he U.K. did proffir some evidence in favour of the Hicksian hypothesis. 
However, Dodds and Ford quali fy this by noting that the .method empl oyed 
intrinsically assumed liquidity premiums to be constant, contrary to Hicks' 
belief . 
9. Burman , J , P. and White, W.R. "Yi eld Curves for Gilf- edged Stocks" Bank of 
England Quarterly Bulletin, December , 1972. 
1 . Ibid, p . 479 
2. Dodds , J.C. and Ford J.L. op cit ; Chapter 5 . 
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In their concluding comments, Dodds and Ford adopt a dismal view not only 
of their own evidence, but also of the validity of the econometric investi-
gation of Liquidity Premium Theory generally . Specificall; they argus 
that 11 •••• these findings , if anything, confirm the doubts we had about the 
t •t t• t f 1. •d•t . rr 3 quan l a lVe assessmen o lqul l y premlums ..... . 
2.4.1 Analysis of the Evidence 
It is often argued that the existence of liquidity premiums is self-evident 
from the observed fact that during this century long rates have consistently 
exceeded short rates. A positive average differential between long and short 
ter m i nterest rates, however , does not necessarily represent a differential 
between realised rates of return, because as Nelson4 has shown , the realised 
increment to capital invested in a sequence of short- term bonds depends on 
the ex paste product of u'ncertain future rates. In any event, the evidence 
we have reviewed here must certainly be taken as casting doubt not only on the 
Hicksian assertion of a "congenital weakness11 in the capital market , but also 
on the operationality of the Liquidity Premium Theory itself . 
The empirical evidence can be conveniently, . though perhaps superficially, 
sorted into three s eparate categories for our purposes . The first such category 
could be classified as 11agnostic". Here we would include the work of Meiselman 
and Burman and White , both of which can be construed as evidence neitt-:er for 
nor against the Liquidity Premium Theory. Meiselman ' s belief that his results 
undermined the hypothesis was, as we have seen, unjustified . But then clearly 
this cannot be taken as positive evidence either . The Burman and White liquid-
ity premium index, while apparently a useful theoretical innovation , seems so 
beset with computationa l difficulties that even they put no great faith in its. 
efficacy . -
The s econd category , numerically by far the largest, is that containing negative 
evidence against Liquidity,Premium Theory . The investigations of Wallace, 
Conard and Freudenthal, Masera, Dodds and Ford, all indicate either no evidence 
at all for the theory, or at best, very weak evidence. While WaJ)ace 
approaches the problem by examining the _~elation between the structure of 
interest rates and the maturity composition of the debt, all the others offer 
evidence suggested by the bias of forward rates as .forecasts of spot rates. 
3. Ibid, p . 205 
4. Nelson , C.R. The Term Structure of Interest Rates , Basic Books, 
New York, 1972 , Chapter 2 . 
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Even the admittedly very weak findings produced by ~allace have been found 
5 by L.G. Telser to be equally consistent with the traditional expectations 
hypothesis . The second approach , employed by the other researchers, has 
been singularly ineffective as a means of revealing the existence of liquidity 
premiums . None of these studies found any significant and coherent support 
for Liquidity Pre~ium Theory. In every case, t he authors acknowledge severe 
and limiting drawbacks i mplicit in the method , 
Kessel ' s work stands suspiciously alone in our t hird category as the only 
finding in favour of the Hicksian theory. However, this should perhaps not 
be too surprising given his rather unique methodology . In particular , as 
Kessel himself admits, his tests rely on the assumption that forecast errors 
are themselves i ndependent of liquidity premiums, and are therefore not tests 
of actual liquidity premiums. The replication of Kessel's work by Conard 
and Freudenthal raises some troublesome questions . Why do they find no 
evidence on longs? A similar query is raised by Dodds and Ford ' s use of 
Kessel's equation with U.K. data. 
We are thus forced to a somewhat reserved conclusion . Clearly , the majority 
view seems to be that liqui dity, or at least some form premium probably does 
exist. The rather limited evidence is neither strong in its denial or asser-
tion of liquidity premiums. What is definite though , is the tremendous 
difficulty in making Liquidity Premium Theory operational. This wi~l be 
emphasised in our own attempts at detecting premiums for South Africa in 
Chapter IV. At present no precise quantitative method exists for the 
measurement of liquidity premiums, and until data sources other than those 
derived from spot rates are uncovered, it seems unlikely that such a method 
is possible. 
2.5 Evidence on Market Segmentation Theory 
Like Liquidity Premium Theory , the hypothesis ofsegmented capital markets is 
based on t he premise of universal risk aversion, the essential difference 
being that here normal backwardisation need not necessarily occur. 
. . I 
While 
the existence of expectations is not denied , it is argued that market partici-
pants are likely to hold s uch diverse opinions of the future that the / 
5 . Telser, L. G. " A Critique of Some Recent Empirical Research on t~~~~ 
Explanation of the Term Structure of Interest Rates" ~J~o~u~r~n~a~l~o~~~~~~ 
Economy , December, 1967, p.546-61 . 
observable term structure of interest rates cannot be meaningfully 
analysed along the lines of an expectational model . Tnerefore , the 
argument runs, the best a~proach is to examine the loan market as if it 
were dominated by hedgers and S8Jmented into compartments according to their 
maturities . The term structure can then be explained with reference to the 
supply and demand ~onditions prevailing in the various sub-markets . 
Chronologically , the earliest empirical investigation into rvlarket Segment-
6 
ation Theory was undertaken in 1957 by its chief proponent J.M . Culbertson . . 
We recall from Section 2 .1. that Culbertson compared yields for identical 
holding periods on short and long gilts, and found marked differences . He 
concluded that this indicated speculation to be unimportant as a determinant 
of the rate structure. However, this conclusion was challenged by Michaelsen7 
who posited that Culbertson had confused ex paste and ex ante interest rates 
in his investigation . In fact, Michaelsen went so far as to express the 
belief that the results supported the uncertainty variant of the traditional 
hypothesis . General consensus in the literature has subsequently r ejected 
this argument, but accepted his argument that the results do not disprove 
8 the importance of expectations despite strong protests from Culbertson . 
In any event , the results cannot be taken as supporting Market Segmentation 
Theory. 
The next study was performed by Meiselman in his 1962 investigations . 9 He 
examined changes in the maturity composition of t he debt to changes in the 
relationship between short and long rates for two separate time intervals, 
namely 1917 to 1956 inclusive and 1930 to 1956 . No statistically significant 
estimates were obtained in either case after first difference form equations 
were applied to eliminate serial correlation. In addition, Meiselman 
attached several important reservations to his findings , particularly regarding 
the inadequacy of the data at his· disposal. 
6 . Culbertson , J .M. op .cit ; p . 502 
7. Michaelsen, J .B. "The Term Structure of Interest Rates : Comment" 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, February, 1963 , p . l66-l?a 
8. Culbertson , J . t;i, "The Term Structure of Interest Rates: Reply" 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, 1963 , p . 691-696 . 
9, Meiselman , D. op~ cit; p.48 to 52 and Appendix 8. 
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The first truly corprehensive inves tigation into Market Segmentation Theory 
came in 1963 in the form of Arthur Okun 's 1 study for the Commission on Money 
and Credit . Okun tried to measure the alternative effects of changes i n 
the supply of long and short gilts on long and short gover nment yields . 
Using quarterly'observations for the 19~6 to 1959 period , he estimated an 
equation for the shor t rate a~d c~e for the long rate. In both equations the 
debt supply variables had positive signs , and all coefficients were significant-
ly different from zero . Nonetheless, Okun concluded that a shift in the 
maturity structure would have little effect on the term structure . 
A different approach to testi ng the influence of supply variables on the 
. 2 
r ate structure was adopted by Wallace . Wallace broke down each long bond 
into i ts component shor t - period parts, so that all bonds maturing in over one 
year were translated i nto one- period loans and interpreted in par t as a supply 
of one year securities. Hypothesising that if relative supplies influence t he 
rate structure, Wallace r easoned that an exogenous increase in the quantity of 
one- period forward loans begi nning at time t + j should affect orily the forward 
r ate t + j r1 . For quarterly o~servations from 1946 to 1962, his r esults 
indicated the term structure of inter est rates is only slightly affected even 
by substantial changes in t he maturity composition of the debt . 
3 John Wood constructed a si~ultaneous equation model aimed at isolating the 
effects of relative supplies of securities on the rate structur e . \'f·.Jod 
postulated that the differentials between inter est rates of various maturities 
would be dependent upon two factors . Firstly , variables related to expecta-
tions of future interest rate changes , and secondly , the quantities of secur-
ities in the various maturity sub- mar kets . A first difference form of the 
model revealed that variables centering on expectations performed far better 
in explaining r elati ve interest rates than those incorporating secur ity 
supplies . Wood concluded that an analysis of the supply of debt instruments 
could not satisfactorily explain the term structure. 
1 . Okun , A.M . ''Monetary Policy , Debt Management , and Interest Rates : A 
Quantitative Appraisal" in Stabilisation Policies, a series of research 
studies prepared for the Commission on Money and Credit , Prentice- Hall , 
Englewood Cliffs, 1963 p.33l-JBO • . / 
2 . Wallace , N. op.cit; Chapter 3 . 
3 . Wood, J . "An Econometric Model of the Term Structure of Interest Rates" , 
a paper presented to the Econometric Society , Pittsburgh , December, 1962 
and r evi s ed in March 1964 . Unpublished . Cited in Dodds, J .C. and Ford , 
J . L. Expectations , Uncertainty , and the Term Structure of Interest Rates , 
Martin Robert son & Co. ltd ., London , 1974. 
Criticising the Okun stucy for aggregating the semi- onnual and 1-to-5 year 
. 4 . 
maturity categories ,· Robert Scott lncluded an average maturity variable in 
his investigation . He tested two equations against monthly data for 
1952 to 1959, the latter being unique in containing the "average length of 
5 
time to maturity of the marketable federal debt " variable, The resultant 
regression coefficients were significant, but the gain from adding the maturity 
variable was only marginal. Scott concluded that the relative supplies do have 
an important influence on the rate structure . This conclusion has, however , 
6 
been heavily criticised in the literature , and his methodology has been 
exposed as suspect in several areas. 
A ver y substantial investigation into Market Segmentation Theory was under-
? 
taken by Oe Leeuw · in 1965 . De Leeuw employed a reduced form equation as 
part of a model of the U.S . financial structure, which aggregated over all 
maturity segments . Using quarterly data for the period 1952 to 1960, he 
found that while changes in the ~aturity composition do influence interest 
r ates , i n the long run this effect is almost impercepti ble . 
Modigliani and Sutcn8 performed a comprehensive test of Market Segmentation 
Theory as a consequence of their attempt to determine the efficacy of "operation 
twist"~ . Briefly , the i~plementation of this policy by the New York Federal 
Reserve Bank represented an attempt t o "twist" the yield curve by raising the 
short r ate relative to the long rate. Initially Modigliani and Sutch estimated 
the yield gap for 1952 to 1961 on a quarterly basis by regressing it solely on 
the short rat e. The values predicted by this equation were then compared with 
the actual values for the period of "operation twist", and a close relationship 
was uncovered . Modigliani and Sutch did not , however, regard this as denying 
the efficiency of "twist" but rather as an indication of the existence of strong 
expectational forces. By allowing for these within a behavioural context , or 
the so- called Preferred Habitat Theory we looked at earlier , they concluded 
that. the supply side of the financial market was not sufficient to explain 
t he long- short interest differential . 
4. Scott, R.H. "Liquidity and the Term Structure of Interest Rates" Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, February, 1965, p.l35- to 145. 
5. Ibid , p . l36 
6. See Dodds, J.C. and Ford, J . L. op.cit ; p.242 to 244 for detai l s of the 
criticism ·aimed at Scott . 
7. DeLeeuw, F . "A Model of Financial Behaviour" in Duesenberry, J.S . ; 
Fromm , G; Klein , L.R. and Kuh , E. (eds) The Brookings Quar.terly Econometri: 
~bdel of the United States , Chicago, Rand McNally , 1965. 
B. Modigliani, F. and Sutch, R "Innovations in Interest Rate Policy" 
American Economic Association, Papers and Proceedings , May , 1966, p . l?B-197 . 
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A study by L.S. ~ehrle 1 provided an entirely different perspective on the 
hypothesis of seg~ented capital markets. In contrast to all previous 
investigations, Wehrle conducted a very detailed micro-s~udy of the financial 
behaviour of life insurance coffipanies for the period 1947 to 1957 . Using a 
standard portfolio choice model which explicitly accounted for the size and 
nature of the liabilities of life insurance companies, Wehrle attempted to 
explain their portfolio composition. After an intensive examination of the 
security trading of four companies, he found little evidence of perfect 
matching, but noted that in aggregate claims were set against assets . 
A more comprehensive but essentially similar study was conducted by Terrel 
and Frazer2 in 1972 . Drawing their data from the U.S. Treasury ' s Survey of 
Ownership of government debt, they dealt with the period March , 1960 to June , 
1969 on a quarterly basis. The portfolios of a broad range of investing 
institutions were examined and broken into eight distinct categories , provid-
ing both greater depth and meaning than the Wehrle study . On the basis of 
their evidence , Terrel and Frazer put forward two conclusions; IJ (1 ) in-
stitutions are not indifferent about their maturity profiles, and (2) changes 
appear in the term structure without concommitant adjustments in the quantity 
3 
of short- term relative to long-term ones . 11 
The only evidence gathered on the operation of capital markets outside t he 
U. S . comes from a study by Dodds and Ford4 on the British experience . They 
employed an approach fundamentally synonomous with t hat of Terrel and Frazer 
despite distinguishing between only fo ur types of financial institutions. 
Heavily constrained by limited data resources, they analysed the period 
March 1963 to March 1972 using annual observations. While concluding that 
the resultant evidence was only weakly suggestive of the existence of seg-
mented capital markets , Dodds and Ford stressed that 11 the limited division 
of government debt by maturity (which they were forced to use) is a serious 
5 drawback. 11 
1 . Wehrle, L.S. 11Life Insurance Investment: The Experience of Four Companies11 
in Studies of Portfolio Behaviour , ·~owles Foundation Monograph 20 , John 
Wiley, New York, 1967 . 
2. Terrel , W.T. and Frazer, W. J . "Interest Rates , Portfolio Behaviour and 
Marketable Government Securities" Journal of Finance, ~!arch, 1972 p . l-35. 
3 . Ibid; p . ll 
4 . Dodds, J.C . and Ford , J .L. op .cit ; Chapter 6 . 
5 . Ibid ; p . 255 
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2.5.1 Analysis of the Evider.~e 
Before we analyse the implicat~ons of the weight of the evidence reviewed 
above, it would seem useful t8 briefly clarify the obstacles which appear to 
6 have consistently hindered empirical research into Market Segmentation Theory. 
The nature and availability of data has undoubtedly represented the most 
serious problem faced by researchers. Closely allied to this has been the 
difficulty experienced in classifying the various maturities of the total 
debt. The existence of call features and other institutional peculiarities 
embedded in the data have resulted in confusion and inconsistency in many of 
the investigations. The aggreJate studies, such as those of Okun, Oe Leeuw, 
etc. which employed simultaneous equations, faced a rather different problem. 
Because the supply of debt is endogenous , and not exogenous as commonly 
assumed, the question of causation arises. A parallel can perhaps be drawn 
between this and the well-known "identification problem" in the demand for 
money. Even if the supply and demand schedules of the various sub-markets 
are identifiable, a more funda~ental problem remains to be solved; should a 
flow, a stock, or a stock-flow approach be adopted?". 7 
The evidence, as it stands, can be subdivided into partial and aggregate 
studies. Significantly , different results have emerged from the two 
approaches. 
The aggregate view studies, while perhaps more satisfactory form a theoretical 
viewpoint, have generally produced findings to the effect that changes in the 
the maturity composition of the debt do not sufficiently explain the term 
structure of interest rates. Meiselman and Wood both believe their results 
to indicate no explanatory power at all on behalf of Market Segmentation 
Theory. More realistically, the evidence produced by Okun, Wallace, De Leeuw, 
and Modigliani and Sutch , shows that definite maturity preferences do exist, 
but account only margin~lly for changes in the rate structure. The only 
exception to this apparent consensus, is the work of Scott whose conclusions 
are open to considerable doubt as we have indicated . 
... 
On the other hand, the partial studies have provided sharply coAtrasting 
evidence . Wehrle, Terrel and Frazer, as well as Dodds and Ford, have all/ 
6 . For an excellent discussion of the probl ems confronting empirical investi-
gators see Mal~iel, B.G. op.cit; Chapter B, p . 221 to 226 
7 . Klein, L.R. "Stocks and Flows in the Theory of Interest" in Hahn, F .H. 
and Brechling, F .P.R . The Theory of Interest Rates , Wacmillan and Co., 
London, 1965, Chapter 7, p .l36-151 . 
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found evic:nce t~ indicate tha~ the capital ~arket is se;~ented according 
to maturity. In every case, though, it has been stressed that segmentation 
is not complete insofar as some degree of mobility from "preferred habitats" 
has been evident. 
Once again, we must conclude by adopting a somewhat eclectic stance. The 
problems involved in making Market SeJmentation Theory empirically operational 
are, as we have indicated above, enormous and extremely difficult to overcome. 
Unfortunately, no standardised procedure has been devised to overcome these 
obstacles, and consequently the many different methods employed preclude com-
parability between the various studies. Because, on balance, most of the 
evidence indicates that maturity preferences do exist, we must accept that 
Market Segmentation Theory has some validity as an explanation of financial 
behaviour. However, the rather indifferent evidence when coupled with the 
inherent operational problems does not inspire a great deal of confidence in 
the hypothesis. 
2.6 Some Implications of the Evidence : A Conclusion 
The most obvious point emerging from the preceding discussion is that the 
theoretical issues raised in Chapter I have by no means been settled by 
recourse to the e~pirical data. On the positi0e side ,however ,the review of 
research has highlighted certain salient features of the theories and, albeit 
very slightly, has narrowed the field down. 
For each of the theories we examined, it became apparent that when subjected 
to empirical research, four essential aspects emerged. The assumptions of 
a theory and their full implications become very clear, and more importantly, 
the hypothesis which they produce for verification or falsification. It may 
happen, as we saw in the case of the traditional t heory, that no direct tests 
of the hypotheses are possible, or that alternative hypotheses may not be 
equivalent to the origi~al theory. The third and fourth elements spotlighted 
in the studies we analysed, involve the data requirements of the theories. 
The methods that have been employed to quantify expected interest rates have 
been shown to make a significant impact on the estimates obtained. Nowhere 
was this more obvious than in investigations of the Meiselman model, when 
smoothed and unsmoothed data were used. The nature of the procedures by 
which the underlying data had been derived also emerged as meaningful , though/ 
. ! 
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it appears that either the Hicksian or Lutzian formulae for deriving forward 
rates may be employed without noticeable consequences. 
On the basis of its operationality and its performance in empirical inve~ti­
gation , we shall now abandon the traditional explanation as a useful explan-
ation of the term structure of interest rates but not necessarily an incorrect 
explanation. To take up the discussion of Section 1.7, it is widely acknow-
ledged in the economics profession, as in the social sciences generally, that 
the empirical refutation of a behavioural hypothesis is not equivalent of 
a refutation of the underlying behavioural principles themselves. Even 
exponents of the so- called "black box" technique such as Milton Friedman 
adhere to this standpoint. Therefore, we cannot dismiss the traditional 
hypothesis per se , but rather reject it as a meaningful avenue of research. 
Of the other theories whose evidence we have .reviewed, we can expect the 
Malkiel hypothesis to perform the most satisfactorily in the South African 
context for two fundamental reasons. Firstly, in both previous studies 
undertaken on it, as we saw , it performed successfully if not outstandingly . 
Secondly, the data requirements of the model can be readily fulfilled by 
existing published statistics. No manipulations of any kind are needed. 
To distinguish amongst the remaining three hypotheses on the basis of their 
previous empirical performances is very difficult. All are dogged by 
severe operational problems, although the Hicksian Liquidity Premium Theory is 
probably-the worst off in this regard. Therefore , a priori we can say very 
little about them except for holding a rather pessimistic view of their 
explanatory power in the South African context. How they perform in 
actuality remains to be seen in Chapter IV • 
. ·' 
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CHAPTER III 
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGD.:Ef'·JTS AND INTEREST RATE DETERMINATTON 
IN SOLffH AFRICA 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter I outlined in some detail the various theories attempting to 
explain the term structure of interest rates , and the evidence accumulated 
in support of these theories was comprehensively reviewed in Chapter II. 
Since our primary concern lies in ex~mining the rat e structure in South 
Africa, we turn now to the institutional context withi n which interest 
rates are determined in this countr x . 
. -
.... . 
For the purposes of clarity, the discussion in this chapter will be divided 
into two main areas. Secti on 3.1 will deal with the institutional arrange-
ments per se. Here the nature and functions of the major participants in 
the financial sector as well as the relevant legislation covering their 
activities will be examined as systematically as possible . I n Section 3 . 2 
the process of interest rate determination will be discussed in order to 
distinguish between those rates which are governed by market forces and those 
that are wholly or partly controlled by the authorities. 
3.1 INSTITlffiOi'JAL ARRANGEMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
3.1.1 The Raison D'Etre of the System 
Notwithstanding the dualistic nature of the South African economy, at its 
centre exists a relatively developed financial system characterised by a 
wide variety of financial assets and liabilities. This system has evolved 
in the market economy of South Africa primarily due to competition between 
various financial instit~tions as well as some degree of State intervention. 
At present the system consists of an increasing range of specialist insti-
tutions whose functions often overlap to a considerable extent • 
./ 
While different kinds of financial institutions may provi de financial services 
of a more or less di stinctive character, all have in common that they are 
1 largely financial intermediaries. This view, put forward by Gurley and Shaw , 
implies a mechanism linking the so-called surplus units in the economy, / 
1 . Gurley, J.G. and Shaw , E.S. Money in a Theory of Finance , t he Brooki ngs 
Institute, V/ashington , 1960. 
-.. 
- - ---r 
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normally individuals with a propensity to save, and deficit units , typically 
firms and the government sector . Therefore, while it is possible to distinguish 
between banks and non-ban~ financial intermediaries , in this sense both possess a 
common characteristic , and despite exterior peculiarities all are fundamentally 
and inextricably part of the same process . In essence , financial intermediaries 
must be able to reconcile the conflicting portfolio requirements of both surplus 
and deficit units by means of adjusting primary and indirect securities under 
conditions of economies of scale . 
3 .1. 2 The Monetary Authorities 
3.1.2. 1 The South African Reserve Bank 
The South African Reserve bank came into existence in 1920 as a consequence of 
the Currency and Banking Act promulgated that year . Through time a long series 
of legislation has bestowed more and more responsibility on the Reserve Bank, 
and currently it undertakes all the functions associated with central banking2 , 
3 
with the notable exception of administering the South African government debt • 
Viewed broadly, the functions of the Reserv~ Bank can be classified under three 
1 general headings. Firstly, its operation as bankers' bank and ba8ker to the 
State , the management of the country's gold and foreign reserves , the issue of 
bank notes and coin , and the arrangement of ancillary services to the banking 
sector generally. The second field of the bank ' s activities lies in the area 
of monetary policy . Policy objectives must be identified and pursued via 
specific monetary instruments. Finally, the bank also concerns itself with long-
term structural developments in the financial sector. The development of new 
institutions should be encouraged and appropriate adjustments in financial legis-
lation initiated whenever necessary . Since it operates at the apex of the 
South African financial structure , the Reserve Bank obviously represents a 
significant variable in every area of the monetary sector . 
2 . After the 1920 Act , the Reser ve Bank's powers have been successively enlarged 
by the following legislation; Currency and Banking Amendment Acts of 1923 , 
1930 and 1942, the Reserve Bank Act of 1944 amended in 1956 and 1961, the Banks 
Act of 1965 amended in 1969, and the Financial Institutions Amendment Act of 
1972. The specific impact of this legislation is comprehensively dealt with 
in Kantor, B. 11The Evolution of Monetary Policy in S.A , 11 South African 
Journal of Economics, ~.larch , 1971. 
3 , Jhis is done by the Public Debt Commissioners. 
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3.1.2.2 The National Finance Corporction4 
While the National Finance Corporation cannot be regarded cS an integral part 
of the monetary authority, it would nonetheless seem appropriate to list it 
here in the sens~ that it is dependent on the guidelines drawn up by the 
Reserve Bank and co- operates closely with the Treasury. The ~ational Finance 
Corporation was established as a statutory body with the purpose of pursuing 
three broad objectives. Firstly, to reduce the direct dependence of the Treasury 
on the Reserve Bank for its funding operations. Secondly, to foster a market 
in short money and investments so as to facilitate the efficient employment of 
temporarily inactive funds, and finally, to expedite the participation of overseas 
investors in the development of South Africa. 
Although the National Finance Corporation operates functionally in the public 
sector , its share capital is drawn from a variety of sources , both public and 
private. Principally, the National Finance Corporation was designed to accept 
call money and invest it into Treasury Bills safeguarded in this operation by 
t he lender of last resort facilities provided by the Reserve Bank. 
The National Finance Corporation co-operates with the Treasury by accepting 
both call deposits and short notice funds at a fixed rate of 0,15 below the current 
Treasury Bill rate. The rationale underlying this process was to allow other 
money market institutions to offer slightly higher rates, and to limit ·che overall 
number of participants so as to promote a thriving market . Virtually all the 
resultant funds are channelled into the public sector, and are invested chiefly 
in Treasury Bills , government stock, and Land Bank Bills. Since it has become 
the largest purchaser of Treasury bill s , the National Finance Corporation acts 
as a price-setter and thus determines both its lending rate, by way of the 
Treasury Bill tender price, and its borrowing rate at the fixed margin below 
the Treasury Bill rate, with very little reference to competitive forces. This 
has given rise to the term "captive market". 
While the National Finance Corporation was originally intended to disappear 
with the emergence of merchant banks and discount houses, it has in fact become 
a very i mportant institution occupying a .central role in the money market. 
4. Kantor, B. "The Evolution of Monetary Policy in South Africa" 
South African Journal of Economics, March , 1971 , p.42. 
I 
'. 
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3.1.2.3 The Treasury 
The second major institution of St9te Policy is the Treasury, supposedly designed 
to operate in close co-operation with the Reserve Bank. Since its creation in 
1910, the Treesury has been responsible for budget administration in South 
Africa and South West Africa. 
The functions of the Treasury are many and varied , and we will list only the 
most prominent. In essence , the Treasury is obliged to prepare budgetary 
policy sanctioned by Parliament in order to finance the activities of government 
departments , as well as provincial and sometimes local authorities. In addition, 
the Treasury must regulate capital expenoiture on behalf of the public sector as 
a whole . Several financial institutions fall under Treasury control and su~er-
vision. 
The most important aspect of the Treasury resides in its short and long-term 
financing of state expenditure. One of the relevant instruments here i s the 
Treasury Bill. Briefly, these bills are issued weekly by tender with a term 
to maturity of 91 days. Each tender must be in multiples of RlO 000 for a 
minimum amount of RlOO 000. 5 While purchases of Treasury Bills are open to 
both private and public financial institutions, the Treasury Bill rate cannot 
be regarded as market determined since it is biased by both the supply offered 
by the Treasury, and the size of the tenders submitted by the National Finance 
Corporation being the largest purchaser of bills , and the Reserve Bank . 
Invariably the outcome of this process forces the Treasury Bill rate below 
competitive rates to enable the public sector to borrow cheaply. This has 
important and far-reaching i mplications for interest rate determination which 
we shall deal with later in this chapter. 
3 . 1.3 Quasi-Government Financial Institutions 
3.1.3.1 Provincial Administrations and Local Authorities 
It is customary to link provincial administrations and local authorities in the 
sense that they control various administrative activities normally associated 
with the State. 
, / 
The importance of these institutions in the overall financial system resides 
primarily in the fund-raising and capital expenditure programmes . 
5. A detailed discussion on this can be found in Barnett, M.J. 
African Money Market: Financial Assets and Institutions" 
M. Com. Thesis , UNISA, 1975. 
Both/ 
"The South 
Unpublished 
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operations fall under Parliamentary control and hence Treasury supervision. 
Consequent to the nature of their cperations, provincial and local adminis-
trations are usually concerned with long- term finance for infra- structural 
projects, and therefore reside primarily in the long end of the so-called 
11semi--gilt- edged" market. Taken as a financial sub-sector, these bodies 
are usually a deficit unit in the economy despite recent concerted efforts 
at becoming self- financing. 
3.1.3.2 Public Corporations 
Publi c corporations currently operating in South Africa can be classified 
according to four basic sub-divisions. Firstly, commercial or industrial 
corporations like the South African Iron & Steel Industrial Corporation 
(ISCOR). Secondly, regulatory or supervisory corporations usually the various 
agric ultural marketing boards. Third , commercial or industrial service corpor-
ations which operate non-competitively, for example, the Council for Scienti fic 
and Industrial Research (CSIR). Finally, a few social service corporations 
such as the National Housing Commission . 
1 Public corporations are generally very widely constituted and may be self-
financing in the sense of issuing loan stock , or they may be dependent on the 
State for funds. In this dissertation we are primarily concerned with the 
former , and more specifically in the amount and type of their debt . 
For our purposes the most important public institutions are the Land and 
Agricultural Bank , and the Public Debt Commissioners (PDC) because they act 
directly as financial intermediaries and administer a very large volume of funds . 
Since the scope of their activities differs widely , we shall examine them 
independently. 
3 .1.3 . 3 The Land and Agricultural Bank of South Afri ca 
The Land Bank was founded on the premise that agriculture required a unique 
finance pattern to satisfy ~ts distinctive demand for funds. Consequent l y 
three independent colonial banks were combined by an Act of Parliament8 to 
provide financial assistance to farmers and their organisations . Essentially, 
. ~ 
such assistance was to be based solely on commercial viability. 
6. See Kahn , E. "Public Corporations in South Africa : A Survey" 
South African Journal of Economics , 1959. 
?. ALSO, Steyn , D.H. (ed.) Inleiding tot die Suid- Afrikaanse Staatsfinansies , 
J.J. van Schaik Bpk . Pretoria , 1961. 
B. Act No.lB of 1912. 
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The Land Bank Act has subsequently been amended, and the present Act authorises 
advances to farmers, co-operative societies and companies, marketing boards, 
and statutory institutions aimed at promoting agriculture. Different kinds of 
loans secured by various forms of collateral are defined and permitted by the 
Act. Despite its relative autonomy , the Land Bank is exempt from the provisions 
of the Banks Act . 
The Bank is funded primarily by deposits from farmers and their institutions, 
and by issuing debentures (some of which qualify as liquid assets) on the capital 
markets from 1959 onwards . A crucial aspect of the financial behavi our of the 
Land Bank lies in its stated aim of keeping interest rates to the agricultural 
sector as low as possible, usually far lower than commercial rates. 9 A high 
level of i nterest rates on the capital market predictably creates problems, 
which recently have been solved by government assistance in the form of interest-
adjusted funds. As a consequence of its policy , the Land Bank has become by 
far the largest supplier of long-term loans although its share of short-term 
financing is small. 
3.1.3.4 The Public Debt Commissioners 
The question of viewing the Public Debt Commissioners (PDC) as a separate entity 
in the South African financial structure i s not clear-cut since they do not 
possess investment funds per se . However, as Steenkemp and De Swardt1 have 
argued, if we emphasise their role as decision-makers rather than as asset- owners 
then the PDC can justifiably be regarded as a distinct financial body , 
The PDC was initially created by the Public Debt Commissioners Act of 1911 to 
be an independent body responsible for the custody and investment of certain 
funds of the government sector. At present there are three members constituted 
in terms of the Act as amended in 1969, namely the Minister of Finance, a State 
President nominee, and a Rail way Commissioner • 
. / 
9. See van der Merwe , C. "Agricultural Policy11 Chapter 5 in Lombard , J.A. 
Economic Policy in South Africa (Selected Essays), Citadel Press , Cape 
Town , 1959. 
1 De Swardt, G.J. and Steenkamp, G. "The Public Debt Commissioners - Their 
Operations and role in the financial str ucture of South Africa11 , S.A. R.B . 
Quarterly Bui'letin, June, 1969. 
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The funds administered by the P.D.C. are drawn from five basic sources , 
These are, broadly, the general funds of the government and provincial 
administrations , the funds of the South African Railways and Harbours 
Administration, social security and otner funds stipulated by the Act , the 
General Sinking Fund , and the Local Loans Fund . Most of this finance is 
long- term, although the short- term flow of funds·is not insignificant . 
Given that its primary objective is to earn a high rate of interest on its 
investments, the P. D.C. pursues two distinctive investment policies. Short-
term funds are "pooled" and invested mainly in Treasury Bills . In contrast, 
long term finance is invested in long-term securities, primarily public sector 
debt , on the basis of the statutory investment requirements of the Act . 
Essentially the P. D.C's function is that of a public sector fi~ancial inter-
mediary , for it recycles State funds within the public sector from surplus 
to deficit units . It is, therefore , not surprisingly, the largest single 
buyer of government debt , illustrating its important role in financing the 
Exchequer. 
3 . 1.4 Private Financial Institutions 
3.l.l1.1 The Commercial Banks 
In the literature i t has become customary to define a bank in terms of its 
functions rather than from .a formal viewpoint. In the broadest sense a 
bank can be described as an institution whose principal operations are con-
cerned with attracting funds from surplus units in the economy for the purpose 
of advancing these funds to deficit units . A commercial bank may be disting-
uished from other financial intermediaries because "a substantial part of its 
2 business consists of the acceptance of deposits of money wit hdrawable by cheque". 
2 . As defined in the Banks Act No.23 of 1965 , as amended. 
r · ' . 
co. 
Since they act as financ ial intermediaries ~hich accept de~and de~osits, 
commercial banks perform two basic functions. First, they act as the 
primary payments mechanism for the transfer of f unds. Secondly, they 
possess the ability to create money through t he extension of bank credit, 
3 
or advances, It is the latter aspect which is closely followed and 
controlled by the Reserve Sank. 
The structure of commercial banking in South Africa, as in many other 
countries, has recently developed two distinctive features. 4 The existence 
of large economies of scale has led to a high degree of concentration in the 
industry to the extent that the resultant oligopolistic structure has limited 
competition exclusively to deposit attraction. The second characteristic 
trend has been a rapid diversification of activities since the 1950s. 
Rising interest rates have led depositors to reduce their demand deposits 
in favour of time deposits, terminating in severe competition between com-
mercial banks and other financial institutions for interest-bearing deposits. 
Commercial banks were therefore forced to offer a range of financial services 
to compete successfully. 
Control of the commercial banks by the monetary authorities in South Africa 
has rather a mixed record in terms of its efficacy, and is manifest in three 
major forms. The 1965 Sanks Act, as amended, constitutes the chief con-
trolling legislation by prescribing certain liquid asset and cash res2rve 
requirements. In addition, the Reserve Bank can i mpose quantitative credit 
ceilings in terms of the Currency and Exchange Act of 1933, and interest rate 
5 
ceilings through the Limitation on Disclosure and Finance Act of 1968. 
While the commercial banking sector remains a crucial institution in the 
money market, it is important to recognise that its role has nonetheless 
been a relatively declining one since the 1950s. The total assets of 
commercial banks expressed as a percentage of the assets of all financial 
intermediaries, for instance, fell from aa,31o in 1964 to 32,91o at the end of 
1974. 
3. For a complete explanation of this ·~recess , see Newlyn, W.T. Theory of 
Money , Clarendon Press , Oxford, 1971. 
a. See Barker, H.A.F. The Principles and Practice of Banking in South Africa, 
(3rd Ed.), Juta , Cape Town, 1952. 
5. For an analysis of the efficacy of these controls see Strydom, P.D.F. and 
Koopmans, A,J.G. "Monetary Policy in South Africa" , Fi nance and Trade 
Review, June, 1974 or Strydom, P.D.F. ''Monetary Legislation in South 
Africa", South African Journal of Economics, March, 1974. 
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3.1.4. 2 The Merchant Banks 
Essentially two main features distinguish merchant banks from commercial 
banks , Firstly, merchant banks do not provide current and transfer pay-
ment facilities. Secondly, merchant banks are "wholesale'' banks dealing 
mostly with institutions and large corporate clients. 
In terms of the Banks Act a merchant bank is defined as "a person who 
carries on the business of which the acceptance of bills which are eligible 
for discount forms a substantial part, and who accepts deposits"6 • However, 
while it is difficult to provide a precise definition, perhaps a more com-
prehensive description would be "a bank which specialises in financial advice 
d t d th t th th th . . f ~. 117 an managemen an e arrangemen ra er an e prov1s1on o r1nance, 
Broadly, the basic functions of merchant banking in South Africa, like its 
British parent, can be separated into three chief areas. Merchant banks are 
primarily concerned with the lending of money by means of so- called acceptance 
credits. A second area involves the planning and raising of finance for 
clients and often the underwriting of new securities. Thirdly , merchant 
banks provide financial expertise in the form of investment advice and port-
folio management services to their customers. 
As a growth sector in the money market, the ra~id development of merchant 
banking can be mostly attributed to the relative freedom from control it 
enjoyed in its formative years. Only with the 1965 Banks Act were they 
brought under statutory regulations in respect of capital and liquidity 
ratios . 
Given that the demand for acceptance credit as a low- cost and sophisticated 
instr ument is growing , merchant banking will probably continue to expand 
relative to the commercial banking sector. This is l ikely to increase the 
compl exity of monetary.co~trol since the merchant banking system has proved 
to be highly adaptable to both direct and indirect policy measures. 
6. Banks Act of 1965, as amended, 
7 . As defined in "Merchant Banking in South Africa" by the Company 
Finance Department of the Standard Merchant Bank Limited, Standard 
Bank Review Supplement , September, 1973, p.l4. 
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3.1.4.3 The Discount Houses 
The money market is customarily delineated as the market within which 
short-term assets are bought and sold, in contrast to the capital market 
where long- term assets are traded. Amongst the various participants in 
the former, only the discount houses and money brokers are exclusively 
limited to the money market in their activities . 8 
The basic function of the discount houses consists in accepting short- term 
deposits from certain institutions9 defined by the Banks Act, and in invest-
ing these funds in short-term financial assets . The purpose of restricting 
the range of depositors to these institutions is to confine the discount 
houses entirely within the financial sector , thus making them an efficient 
transmission mechanism for Reserve Bank policy instruments. Since deposits 
are at call, investing institutions may earn interest on their excess reserves 
while still remaining highly liquid . It is worthwhile to add that since the 
discount houses do not accept monies from the public , they do not fall under 
the provisions of the Banks Act relating to liquid assets etc . 
Because the discount houses hold call money, their investment function lies 
in the purchasing of short-term securities , primarily Treasury Bills, 
negotiable certificates of deposit, bank acceptances, and other bills , and 
acting as " jobbers11 , The latter term refers to the holding by the rliscount 
houses of "gilt-edged" or government stock and "semi-gilts" or other public 
sector paper, both as an investment and stock-in-trade. In terms of the 
Banks Act , however, their portfolio is restricted to stock with a life of 
three years or less . 
3 . 1.4. 4 The Grex Market 
Paral lel to the banking system there exists a conceptually separate category 
of the money market which-deals in money braking. Money braking firms may 
be defined as financial intermediaries which do not accept deposits but r ather 
interpose between company lending and borrowing,1 Funds. ranging from call 
deposits to medium- term are funnelled between industrial and commercial companies 
as well as semi-government institutions. This intermediation takes the form/ 
8 , See Goedhuys, D.W. "Discount houses in the Money Market" Supplement to the 
Standard Bank Review, June, 1974, p .3 
9, Commercial banks, merchant banks , other banks, building societies , the 
Treasury, and the Public Debt Commissioners are the most significant of 
these. 
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of braking in com0ercial paper, primarily promissory notes issued by the 
borrowers, whose acceptability is dependent on the reputations of both the 
broker and the borrowing institution. 1 
The economic function of money braking firms is essentially similar to that 
of the discount houses. Temporarily idle funds are mobilised to provide a 
new form of credit for borrowers. Clearly though, money brokers do not 
create money since they do not possess the liabilities which would allow 
for this. 
The use of money braking should be viewed as a consequence of the inter-
action of three forces. Firstly, the composition of quantitative credit 
controls resulted in a largely unsatisfied demand for finance by firms. 
Second, the lending potential of firms was increased by the application 
of modern portfolio management techniques, and finally the persistent gap 
between the borrowing and lending rates of financial institutions has 
provided the necessary scope for the successful operation of money brokers. 
2 The growth of the grey market as a parallel market to the money market has 
led to a degree of unease on the behalf of the monetary authorities, because 
it falls beyond the direct reach of policy instruments and hence may frustrate 
their successful implementation. 
3.1.4.5 Hire-Purchase, Savings and General Ban~s 
Consequent to the high degree of similarity in the nature of their economic 
functions, we can logically categorise hire-purchase, savings and general 
banks together. Fundamentally, all three groups operate to provide credit 
in the form of merchandise leasing, hire-purchase and other loans. They 
are subject to the same statutory requirements regarding both prescribed 
asset holdings as well as interest and credit controls. 
The most significant sources of funds for the group . lie predominantly in 
fixed deposits, and more recently, savings deposits, although two of the 
./ 
general banks do offer cheque account facilities. Capital and reserves/ 
1 • See. Goedhuys, 0. W. "Money on the Wing or the Rise of r\on-Bank Lenders" 
South African Journal of Economics, March, 1966. 
2. Apart from firms which specialise in money braking, discount houses, r· 
finance houses , trust companies, general banks and other financial in-
stitutions have added money braking to the range of services they offer. 
form only a relatively small proportion of available resources . 
The l ending activities of the grouc are very widespread and constitute 
a complex mix of advances. Ho1·•ever, the single most important form of 
credit is hire-purchase discounts and advances on consumer durables. 
Other loans, particularly customers liability on acceptances outstanding , 
are becoming relatively less important . After 1965 the discounting of 
merchandise leases emerged as a major new source of credit . Bill dis-
counting itself, on the other hand, has remained at a low level . 
After the passage of the 1965 Be.nks Act the growth of these three classes 
of banks has been very rapid , mainly at the expense of the building 
societies and commercial banks. Diversification~ particularly on the part 
of the general banks , seems to have set the pace for this expansion . Among 
the financial services offered we even find such "exotic11 features as rent 
collection and the payment of accounts . 
3.1.4. 6 The Building Societies 
Building societies may be defined as institutions which accept interest-
bearing deposits for the purpose of granting loans for house purchase 
secured by mortgages . Being mutual institutions without a dominant 
profit motive , t hey attempt to provide housing finance at the lowest cost 
compatible with the cost of that finance. 
Permanent, as opposed to "terminating" building societ ies, hence perform 
two distinct functions . Firstly , interest-bearing deposit facilities with 
varying time horizons are offered to investors wishing to save . Secondly , 
the building society behaves as an investor by providing finance for con-
struction, mostly private domestic housing.· 
The most important legislation governing this group of financial inter-
mediaries is contained in the 1965 Building Societies Act, which placed 
certain curbs on their ability to attract funds. 4 However, as a conse-
quence of the resultant liquidity crisis in the industry , the Financial / 
3. See Fiscal and Monetary Policy . Third Report of the Commission of Inquiry 
into Fiscal and Monetary Policy in South Africa. (the Franszen Commission), 
Pretoria, Government Printer, 1970 , RP 87/1970 . 
4 . Specifically by means of imposing certain ratios in respect of share 
capital and liquid assets . 
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5 Institutions Amenc~8nt Act of 1973 relaxed so~e restrictions. 
Despite ranking second only to ca~mercial banks as financial intermediaries, 
it is probable thct the future of the group is limited, due to t he interplay 
of severe statutor y restrictions and the heightened competition in attacting 
deposits, as well cs the rising cost of housing. 
3.1.4.7 The Insurance Sector and Private Pension 
end Provident Funds 
A primary distinction may be drawn in the South African insurance sector 
between short and long-term insurance companies . While short-term insur-
ance intrinsically embraces risk assessment, long-term insurance and pension 
and provident funds concentrate mainly .on investment results . 
The latter group c~t as a very important financial intermediary. As 
deposit acceptors they have become the largest channel for personal savings, 
and as investors the chief private source of long-term funds for the public 
6 
sector. The latter function has arisen as a result of legislation 
designed to force the group to place a proportion of the funds in government 
stock . Recently, however , there has been a marked trend away from fixed 
interest-bearing securities towards growth assets, such as equities and 
property , to improve the competitive position of the industry in attracting 
savings . Despite this structural change in the composition of their assets , 
their investment a~tivities remain closely regulated by legislation , namely 
the Insurance Act of 1943, as amended, and the Pension Funds Act of 1956, 
as amended. 
The importance of insurance companies, private pension and provident funds 
as financial intermediaries is likely to increase as a consequence of two 
factors . First, the application of more modern management techniques as 
the outcome of accelerating concentration, and secondly, t he trend of diver-
sification into the entr~neurial field will widen the scope and size of 
their business. 
3.1.4.8 
. I 
Mutual Funds and Unit Trusts 
While mutual funds and unit trusts differ in respect of their liability 
structures, for our purposes we may link them since they perform an essent ially/ 
5. The most important of which are ~) they could again accept savings deposits 
from public and private companies ; (ii) increased the mortgage repayment 
period to 30 years. 
6. Ibid, p.l88 
' · 
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. '1 1 . t 7 s1m1 ar ro e as 1nves ors . 
In their function as financial intermediaries, mutual funds and unit trusts 
receive personal savings and channel these into a very large range of assets 
granting the individual investor a hedge against loss. The spread of the 
investment portfolio is assured since investment in any one asset is limited 
by the Unit Trusts Control Act to 5 per cent of the total assets . 
The importance of the mutual fund industry as an investment sector in the 
economy has declined considerably since the "collapse" of the stock market in 
1969. Furthermore , it is unlikely that they will regain their former stature 
given the continuing lack of public confidence in their viability . 
3. 1.4.9 The Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
The central role of a stock exchange in a capitalist economy is usually 
argued to provi de a market where shares and securities can be freely traded 
8 
under a regulated procedure, in South Africa this being the Stock Exchange 
Control Act of 1947 as amended , and the internal regulations of the Johannes-
burg Stock Exchange itself. Theoretically, the stock exchange allows for 
the rapid allocation of capital towards efficient and expanding industries 
and away from inefficient industries . 
Essentially then, the stock exchange should be viewed as performing three 
inter- related economic functions. First, it is a mechanism whereby savings 
may be converted into productive investment . Secondly, allied to this pro-
cess is the means by which investment may be transformed into cash, i . e . the 
provision of investment liquidity . Finally , the stock market provides a 
method of publicly evaluating both securities and management by means of the 
prices of securities . 
3.2 THE DETERMINATION OF INTEREST RATES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Having dealt briefly with the major participants within the institutional 
framework of the South African financial system, we turn now to the determin-
ation of interest rates within that system. We begin our analysis by/ 
7 . Unit holders provide the funds for investment by mutual funds, while unit-
trusts are "closed-end" trusts who receive their funds from specific share-
holders. Their economic functions do not, however, differ apart from this . 
8. Baumol, W.J . The Stock Market and Economic Efficiency, New York , Fordham 
University Press, 1965. 
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outlining tne theoretical underpinnings of interest rate determination, 
before examining the relevant rates making up the short and long markets 
respectively. 
3.2.1 The General Theory of Interest Rate Determination 
Essentially four main theories have been expounded to explain the nature 
and determination of interest rates; the classical theory, the loanable 
funds theory, the liquidity preference theory, and the neo-keynesian or 
"modern" theory . Our interest lies only with the widely accepted nee-
keynesian theory. 
Hansen9 , arguing the case for the modern theory, which effectively amounts 
to a synthesis of the classical and Keynesian theories , listed four funda-
mental determinants of the rate of interest; namely the investment demand 
schedule or the productivity of capital, the consumption function represen-
tative of thrift , the liquidity preference schedule or the demand for money, 
and the money supply . The equilibrium condition of these four variables , 
together simultaneously determines a rate of interest ,· which Hansen sketches 
as follows :-
"An equilibrium condition is reached when the desired 
volume of cash balances equals the quantity of money, 
when the marginal efficiency of capital is equal to the 
rate of interest , and finally, when the volume of invest-
ment is equal to the normal or desired volume of saving ."1 
In essence, this represents a synthesis of the loanable funds formulation 
and liquidity preference theory by removing the dichotomy between the real 
and monetary sectors vis-a-vis the well-known IS and LM schedule analysis. 
The IS schedule r epresents equilibrium in the real sector and similarly the 
LM ill ustrates equilibrium for the monetary sector of the economy. The 
intersection of these curves yields the equilibrium rate of interest prevalent 
at a specific l ·evel of income. A change i n any of the variables under lying 
either schedule will , of course , result in a shift of that schedule and conse-
·' 
quently a change in the equilibrium .rate of interest. 
9 . Hansen, A.H . ~/onetary Theory and Fiscal Policy , fvlcGr aw-Hill , New York, 
1949. 
1. Ibid , p.l7l 
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In sum , therefore , the neo-keynesian analysis postulaLes that if productivity , 
thrift , liquidity preference , and the supply of money are combined , they will 
produce a determinate theory of interest rate determination, However, because 
of the very complex interplay of these variables with institutional, legal and 
cultural factors, this general theory is of little assistance in explaining the 
determination of particular rates of interest in a specific real-world situation. 
Given this, in the subsequent analysis we shall employ established economic 
principles within the South African institutional and legal system , outlined in 
the previous discussion, rather than examine interest rate determination ~sing 
the very general theoretical framework of the neo-keynesian analysis . 
3 .2.2 The Market for Short-Term Interest Rates 
A distinction between the short and long markets, while drawn rather arbitrarily 
to facilitate methodical discussion, can be justified on various grounds. The 
short market is primarily a money market whereas the market for longs is a market 
for investment capital. Legislation has tended to reinforce this difference. 
In addition , as we saw in Section 1.4, by their nature short rates are the more 
volatile of the two. This is immediately apparent from a comparison of Graphs 
l and 2 . 
In the following sections we shall analyse the bank rate, the Treasury Bill rate, 
the National Finance Corporation deposit rate, the yield on short- term government 
stock, the rate on negotiable certificates of deposit , and the rate on bankers' 
acceptances, in that order. In each case we are concerned with the ownership 
distribution, any legislative peculiarities, rate fluctuations , and most import-
antly, the extent to which the rate is freely determined . 
3.2 . 2 .1 The Bank or Discount Rate 
The bank rate represents the most traditional weap~n of monetary control 
wielded by a central bank. Essentially the bank rate is the rate at which 
the Reserve Bank, in order to perform its function as lender of last resort , 
will discount Treasury Bills , Short-dated government stock, Land Banks Bills 
and debentures, bank acceptances, self-liquidating commercial bills and 
certain types of promissory notes, or offer advances with these as surety . 
A relatively fixed relationship normally,prevails between the discount rate 
and other market rates, which arises from two conditions . First , recognit ion 
on behalf of the private banking sector of the leadership of the Reserve Bank. 
TABLE 3 .1 OWNERSHIP DISTRIBUTION OF MARK[TABLE TREASURY BILLS FROM 1964 to 1974 
-
.E PUBLIC DEBT T . li e B a n k i n g s e c t 0 r 
COMMISSIONERS RESERVE COMMERCIAL NATI ONAL DISCOUNT MERCHANT OTHER MOI\EY OTHER TOTAL 
BANK BANKS FINANCE HOUSES BANKS MARKET TOTAL HOLDERS 
CORPORATION INSTITUTIONS 
AMT. % AMT. o/o AMT. o/o AMT. o/o AMT. o/o AMT. o/o AMT . o/o AMT • o/o .. 
;a 26 ,0 18, 0 3 , 7 2 ,6 14 , 9 10,4 53 ,1 36, 9 33 , 7 23 , 4 3 ,0 2 , 0 6 , 0 4 ,1 . 114,5 3,3 2,3 143, 9 
).5 10 ,5 5 , 2 7 , 5 3,7 82 , 8 40 , 8 19 , 6 9 , 7 59 , 9 29 , 5 0, 5 0 , 2 1 , 0 0 , 5 171,4 20 , 9 10 , 3 202 , 8 
)G 5 ,0 1 , 9 13 ,0 5,0 125 , 3 48 , 5 16, 3 6 , 3 47, 2 18 , 3 - 0 11,3 4 , 4 213 , 1 39,5 15 , 3 257 , 6 
)7 6 , 5 3 , 4 1,7 0 , 9 83 , 9 44 , 4 24 ,2 12 , 8 42 , 8 22 , 7 1,6 0 , 8 4 , 3 2 , 3 158,5 23 , 9 12,7 188,9 
B - 0 2 , 7 ·1,5 00 , 8 44 , 0 30 , 9 16 , 8 30 , 9 16,8 5 , 2 2 ,8 7 ,5 4 , 1 157,9 25 , 7 13,9 183 ,6 
id' 
)9 - 0 - 0 39,9 27 , 5 51 ,5 35 ,5 35 , 3 24, 3 - 0 4 , 0 2, 8 130, 8 14, 4 9 , 9 145,2 
70 3 , 0 3 , 9 8 , 9 11 , 7 ' 4 , 0 5, 3 48,3 63 , 6 . 0 ,6 0 , 9 - 0 0 , 8 1, 0 62 , 6 10 , 5 13 , 8 7G , O 
: 
71 
- 0 2,0· 2,6 - 0 65 , 0 84 , 4 ' - 0 - 0 - 0 67,0 10 , 0 12 , 9 . 77,0 
12 
- 0 2 , 0 1,7 - 0 5G ,O 46 , 7 49 , 0 40 , 8 - 0 - 0 107 , 0 13 , 0 10 , 0 120 , 0 
IJ 
- 0 .152 , 0 54 ,5 - 0 80 , 0 28 , 8 42 , 0 15, 1 - 0 - 0 273 , 0 6,0 2 , 2 279 , 0 
14 
- 0 - 0 - 0 231 ,0 59 , 5 154,0 39 , 7 - 0 - 0 385 , 0 3 ,0 0 ,8 388,0 
1/\L 51 , 0 ~ , G 193 , 5 9 , 4 431 , 6 20 , 9 67G , O 32 , 0 495, 4 24 , 0 10 ,3 0 , 5 311 , 9 1, 7 - 170, 2 0 ,2 2DG2 ,0 
=== '======-========= ======== ====== ==============~========-======~========-===d===~======~=======-======= ====== ====== =====-====S==;==: 
Data Source : South Afr ican Reser ve Bank Quarterly Bulletin , 1964 to 1974. 
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Second, the accommodation provided to this sector in times of credit 
stringencies and heavy seasonal strain, 
The modus operandi of the bank rate is based on the principle underlying 
the theory of interest rate policy, that changes in the discount rate are 
2 generally accompanied by corresponding changes in money market rates . 
The discount policy of th~ Reserve Bank relies on three inter-related 
instruments~ Firstly, the bank rate itself which affects both the cost 
and availability of credit and is linked directly to the overdraft rate and 
less directly to other rates. However , as graph l confirms, the bank rate 
is not often varied because it has social and political implications with 
regard to the cost of housing finance. Interestingly, the Reserve Bank 
has occasionally discounted at a rate different from its published rate 
so as to avoid periodic crises. 
Secondly, the Reserve Bank may determine those financial assets that it will 
accept for discounting depending on whether i t pursues a restrictive or 
expansionary policy. The net outcome is that the asset no longer discount-
able becomes more costly. 
Finally, the Reserve Bank's judgement in regard to which financial institutions 
it will accommodate. Because of the extreme nature of this instrume.nt , how-
ever , a penal rate above the discount rate is normally applied. 
It is no easy matter to determine whether the Bank rate follows or precedes 
the fluctuations i n money market rates . Recently though, the discount rate 
seems to have lagged slightly behind developments in the market. What is 
clear, however , is that the correspondence between the discount rate and the 
rates on Treasury Bills, National Finance Corporation call deposits and 
short stock is a good deal closer than that on negotiable certificates of 
deposit and acceptances, e·,g. See Graph I. 
.I 
3.2.2.2 The Treasury Bill Rate 
The Treasury Bill mus t be regarqed as one of the mos t important forms of 
paper in the money market. Several factors account for this. As a govern-
ment security there is no default risk, it is eligible for rediscount at the/ 
2. For a sophisticated analysis of this process s ee De Kock, M.H. Central 
Banking, Staples Press, London. 
3. Goedhuys , D.W. op . cit; p.l63 following. 
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Reserve Bank or readily negotiable elsewhere , and it comes in r egular 
weekly issues. 
Significantly, the rate on Treasury Bills cannot be regarded as "indicating 
at all accurately the state of liquidity of the banking sector"~ despite the 
fact that it fluctuates widely i . e. see graph I . As we pointed out earlier 
in Section 3 . 1.2 . 3 , t he supply of bills is determined by the Treasury, and 
the largest tenderers are the N. F .C. and Reserve Bank . Table 3.1 confirms 
this, for over the period 1964 to 1974 they purchased 42, 2 per cent of all 
bills on offer . The net result has been to depress the Treasury Bill Rate 
to below that on comparable N.C.Ds and acceptances, even if the greater risk 
of default · on the latter is taken into consideration . Graph I indicates 
this to be the case. 
Because Treasury Bills qualify as liquid assets in terms of the 1965 Banks 
Act obliging the banking sector to purchase them , it is probable that the 
Treasury made use of this "captive" market whose rates it could manipulate 
in order to facilitate cheap short-term finance for the government , The 
extent to which this was done was apparently dependent on both the need for 
such finance and the capacity of the market to provide it . What is clear , 
however, is that cognisance was taken of conditions gene~ally in the money 
market s ince the Treasury Bill Rate follows the more freely determined rates 
i . e . N.C.Ds and bankers acceptances . 
must be regarded as a controlled rate . 
Nonetheless , the Treasury Bill Rate 
3 . 2.2.3 Jhe N.F .C, Deposit Rate 
In Section 3.1. 2.2 outlining the operation of the N.F.C., we indicated that 
demand deposits of not less than RlD 000 were accepted at a rate of o,l5 
percentage points below the Treasury Bill Rate . It follows , therefore, 
that the N.F .C. rate mus~ consistently fall below the Treasury Bill Rate 
by that margin even though it need not be subject to the same economic and 
institutional determinants. Indeed, a comparison of Tables 3.1 and 3 .2 
s hows that the annual trends in holdings of the two differ markedly . 
. / 
Since N.F.C, deposits are liquid assets for the monetary banking sector as 
well as for building societies not unexpectedly both groups possessed 
substantial deposits over the period 1964 to 1974. A further comparison 
of Tables 3.1 and 3 . 2 indicates that the private financial sector held 
greater quantities of N.F .C. deposits than Treasury Bills despite the lower/ 
4. Ibid, p .56 
. 
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DATE 
l9C4 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
l9G9 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1'774 
lfOTAL 
COMMERCIAL 
BANKS 
AMT o/o 
31 , 4 27 , 37 
22 , 6 20 , 61 
44 , 1 34, 67 
34 , 1 21 , 22 
42,7 30 , 16 
95 ,0 4LI , 48 
111 ,2 59,88 
134, 3 56, 96 
178 , 3 53, 94 
155 , 0 52 , 78 
239,6 5LI , 25 
1 ,000 , 3 46, 22 
TABLE 3 . 2 
DISCOUNT MERCHANT 
HJUSES BANKS 
AMT o/o AMT o/o 
0,07 0 , 06 1,23 1 , 07 
- 0 - 0 
0 , 08 0,06 0 , 07 0 , 05 
- 0 1 , 23 0 , 77 
0 , 04 o,o 3 3 , 03 2 , 14 
0 , 99 0,46 ll , O 5 , 15 
0 , 15 0 , 08 6 , 26 3 , 37 
0 ,08 0,03 6 , 19 2 . 63 
- 0 14, 31 4 , 33 
-
0 14 , 80 5 , 03 
3 , 6 0 , 82 23 , 79 5 , 39 
5 , 01 0 ,21 81 , 91 3 , 58 
OWNERSHIP DISTRIBUTION OF CALL DEPOSITS AT THE NATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION 
-
HIRE PURCH- OTHER CENTRAL S .A. LOCAL OTHER TOTAL 
ASE , SAVING FINAI\CIAL GOVERN- RAI LWAYS AUThGR-
AND GENERAL INSTI TU- MENT I TIES 
BANKS TIONS 
AMT o/o AMT o/o AMT o/o AMT o/o AMT % . AMT o/o 
3,00 2,G1 2 , 0 1 , 74 - 0 20 , 0 17 , 43 12, 0 10 , 46 45,0 39 , 23 114,7 
17, 07 15 , 56 4 , 0 3, 65 - 0 19, 0 17 , 32 13, 0 11, 85 34, 0 31 , 00 109 , 67 
10,94 8 , 60 1 , 0 0 , 79 - 0 18 ,0 14, 15 22 , 0 17 ,'29 31 , 0 24,37 127 , 19 
14, 37 8 , 94 3 , 0 1 , 87 46,0 28,62 25,0 15 , 57 23 , 0 14, 31 14 , D . 8 , 71 160,70 
17, 82 12 , 59 9 , 0 6 , 36 4 , 0 2,83 18 , 0 12 , 71 17 , 0 12 , 01 30 , 0 21,19 141 ,59 
I 
22 ,57 10,57 5 , 0 2 , 34 4 , 0 1 , 87 33 , 0 15 , 45 11 , 0 5 , 15 31,0 14,52 213 , 56 
9 , 10 4 , 9 5 , 0 2 , 69 4 , 0 2 , 15 29 ,0 15 ,~ 5 , 0 2 , 69 16, 0 8 , 62 185 , 71 
9 , 19 3 , 89 4 ,0 1 , 69 10 , 0 4 , 24 39, 0 16 ,54 5,0 2 , 12 28,0 11.88 235 , 76 
31 , 97 9 , 67 7 , 0 2 ,12 9 ,0 2 , 72 38 , 0 11 , 49 10 , 0 3 , 02 42 , 0 12,70 330 ,58 
27 , 89 9 , 49 5 , 0 1 ,70 3,0 1 , 02 53 , 0 18 , 05 11 , 0 3,75 24, 0 8 , 17 293 ,69 
36 , 69 8 , 31 17 , 0 3 , 05 3 , 0 0 , 68 62 ,0 14 ,04 7 , 0 1,58 49 ,0 11 , 09 441 , 68 
200, 61 8 , 52 62 , 0 2 , 63 83 , 0 3 , 52 354 , 0 15,03 136, 0 5,78 344,0 14 , 61 2 , 354 , 03 
======-==============-=====-=====-=====-=====-============================= =====-=========== ======~=====~=======-=======-========== 
Data Source: Registrar of Bunks Annual Reports , 1964 to 1974. 
. 
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[' 
DATE 
1964 
19G5 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
l~T/0 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
nJTALS 
====== 
TAOLE J .J OWNERSHIP DISTniBUTION OF MARKETABLE SHORT-TERM GOVERNMENT STOCK FROM 1964 TO 1974 
PUBLIC T h e B a n I< i n g S e c t o r - I NSURAI\CE 
DEBT RESERVE COMMERC- NATIONAL DISCOUNT MERCHANT OTHER OTHER BUILDII\G COMPANIES OTHER TOTAL 
COMMIS- BANK IAL BANKS FINANCE HOUSES BANKS MONEY BANKING SOCIETIES & PRIVATE HOLDERS 
STONER CORP. MARKET INSTI- PENSI ON & 
I NSTI- TUTIONS PROVI DENT 
TUTIONS · FUNDS 
AMT o/o AMT o/o AMT ojo AMT oja_ AMT o/o AMT o/o AMT o/o AMT ojo AMT o}o AMT o/o AMT o/o 
169 , 4 30 , 5 29 , 6 5 , 2 119,0 21 , 4 58 ,2 10 , 5 57 ,0 10, 3 23 , 3 4 , 2 13, 2 2 , 4 1 , 7 0 , 3 33 ,3 6 , 0 14,~ 2 , 1? 36 , 0 6 , 5 554,9 
148,1 24 , 4 30,1 4,S 188,3 31 , 1 49 , 9 8 , 2 55 , 0 9 , 1 19 ,7 3 , 2 29,0 5 , 0 B, 2 1 , 3 48 ,0 7 , 9 7 ,0 1 ,2 24 ,2 4, 1 607,5 
123 , 9 15,5 21 , 5 2 , 7 279 , 9 35 , 0 64 , 3 8 , 1 62 ,0 7 , 8 25 , 8 3 , 2 96, 9 12 ,2 16, 3 2 , 0 75 , 6 9 , 5 8,5 1 , 1 22,5 2,8 797 , 1 
135,0 15, 0 45 , 0 5 , 0 316,0 35,1 64 , 5 7 , 2 62 ,0 6 , 9 24 , 1 2 , 7 115,5 12 , e 21,1 2 , 3 80 ,0 8 , 9 11 , 5 1 , 3 24 , 7 2 , 7 899 , 4 
103 , 8 10, 5 41 , 6 4,2 362,2 36 , 7 53 , 5 5 , 4 100 , 0 10 , 1 32 , 7 3 , 3 157 , 0 15 , 5 16, 6 1 , 7 83 ,3 8 , 4 8 , 3 O,B 28 , 6 2,9 987,7 
6 , 2 0 , 7 42, 8 4 , 8 338 ,8 38 ,0 104, 8 11,E 90 ,0 10, 1 20 , 0 2 , 2 163, 9 18,4 12,4 1 , 4 84, 9 9 , 5 3 , 7 0 ,4 24 , 1 2 , 7 891,4 
17 ,1 1 , 0 50 , 2 G, 2 334 , 8 35 , 9 79 , 4 0 , 5 144,0 15 , 4 6,8 0,7 162 ,3 17,4 10 , 5 1 , 1 94 , 6 10 , ~ 4 , 0 0 ,4 20 , 4 2,2 932 , :.2 I 
:.. 
29, 0 2 , 8 64,0 6 , 2 362,0 35 , 0 84,0 8 , 1 147 , 0 14,2 6 , 0 0 , 6 182 , 0 17 , 6 9 , 0 0. 9 98 ,0 9 , 5 6 , 0 0 , 6 45 ,0 4 , 4 1,033, 0 
24 , 0 2 , 0 38 , 0 3 , 2 469 , 0 39 , 6 89 ,0 7 , 5 154,0 13 , 0 62 , 0 5 , 2 150 , 0 12 , 7 36, 0 3 , 0 124,0 10 ,!: 4 , 0 0,3 34,0 2 , 9 1,185 , 0 
18,0 1 , 3 302 ,0 21 , 9 446 , 0 32,3 117,0 8 , 5 136, 0 9 , 9 61 , 0 4 , 4 151 , 0 10 , 9 43 , 0 3 , 0 99 , 0 7 , 0 6 , 0 0 , 4 - 0 1 , 379 , 0 
9 , 0 0 , 7 321,0 24 , 5 385 , 0 29 , 4 119, 0 9 ,1 150 , 0 11 , 5 69 , 0 5 , 3 155 , 0 ll.B 57 , 0 4,4 48 , 0 3 ,7 8 , 0 0,6 - 0 1 , 310 ,0 
783 , S 7 , 4 993 , 8 9 , 4 PJ3Cll ,O 34 , 0 883 ,5 8 ,4 Jl57 ,o 10, 9 35q4 3 , 3 1375 , 8 13,0 231 , 8 2 , 2 868 , 7 8 , 2 81 , 2 0 , 8 259 , 5 2 , 6 10 ,577,2 
~======-==== ·=====-==========-===== =====b============== ========-=====-=========-=========-============== =====-====-========== 
Data Source : South A-Frican Reserve Bani< Quarter ly Bulletin , 1964 to 1974 . 
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rate . This would seem to be the conse~uence of two factors . F~r-~ly N F Cs 
- , . ~... ' . . .' 
are call deposits whereas Treasury Bills are time paper , and secondly, since 
May 1968 the Reserve Bank has instructed the monetary banks to hold special 
deposits with the ~ .F .C . Th'is increase i n holdings of N.F .C. deposits from 
1968 onwards is clearly visible in Table 3 . 2 . 
3 . 2.2 . 4 The Yield on Short-Term Government Stock 
Short term gilt- edged government stock is customarily defined as having a term-
to- maturity of not more than three years . The yield on this stock has been 
described as "freely determined in the meu'ket ."5 
Short stock would seem to reflect market conditions primarily because of its 
6 legal status . Both the 1965 Banks Act and the Building Society Act include 
it as a liquid asset, while in the Pension Funds Act and Uni t Trust Control 
Act it is an approved investment . This has ensured that the holding a nd 
volume of trade i n short government paper is extensi ve . Table 3 . 3 indicates 
that the private financial s ector held 83 , 2 per cent of the total issue of 
RlO 577 , 2 mill ion over the period 164 to 1974 , with commercial banks as the 
1 single largest holders at 34 , 0 per cent . In contrast to the market for 
Tr easury Bills , the P.D .C. and Reserve Bank together held only the remaini ng 
16, 8 per cent. 
Fluctuations i n the yield for short gilts show some correspondence with N.C.Ds 
and acceptances , although it almost always lies below them , illustrating that 
their greater security has outweighed their longer term- to- maturity. 
Obviously as the maturity of gilt- edged paper decreases , so its price must 
rise to reduce yield . 
the yield cur ve". 
Hence the popul ar i nvestment expression of "r i ding 
3 , 2 . 2.5 Negoti able Certifi cates of Deposit 
An N.C .D. or cash deposit is "a document i ssued by a bank certifying that a 
deposi t has been made wi th it , repayable to the holder upon surrender of the 
certificate at maturi ty"? and which is negotiable by simpl e delivery . As 
distinct from Treasury Bills and N.F .C. deposit s , N.C. Ds are issued solely by 
the private banking sector and therefore ·involve a switch from demand to time 
8 deposi ts i n the system . For the issuing banks , N.C.Ds represent a val uable/ 
5 . Ibid , p . 58 
6. See De s~·,ardt ' c I J I and Steenkamp I G. II An Analysis of the South Afr ican 
Gover nment Debt" S . A ~ R . B . Quarterly Bulletin, September , 1969. 
7. Wall , J . P. "Aspects of the Short-term Money Market in South Africa" The 
Investment Analysts Journal , No . 3 , Nov . 1973, p.l2 . 
8 . Rosseas , S 1W1 Monetary Theory , Alan A. Knopf, New York , 1972 , p . 213 following . 
. 
r-i 
en 
TABLE 3.4 OWNERSHIP DISTRIBUTION OF NEGOTIABLE CERTI FICATES OF DEPOSIT FROM 1964 TO 1974 
DATE COMMERCIAL MERCHANT DI SCOUNT GENERAL HIRE- PURCHASE SAVINGS TOTAL 
BANKS BANKS HOUSES BANKS BANKS BANKS 
AMT . % AMT . % AMT . % AMT . % AMT. % AMT . ojo 
1964 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
1965 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 -
1966 1 , 72 10,95 4 , 85 30 , 85 1 , 15 7 , 32 6 , 62 42 , 14 1 , 37 8 ,72 - 0 15, 71 
1967 4 , 45 21,99 3 , 50 17 , 30 5 , 03 24, 86 2 , 55 12 , 61 4 , 56 22 , 54 0,14 0,69 20 ,23 
1968 27 , 71 26 , 19 24 , 42 23 , 08 9 , 72 9 , 19 28 , 05 26 ,51 14,91 14, 09 1 , 01 0 , 95 105 , 82 
' 
l 9G9 57 , 49 38 , 80 26, 61 17, 96 12 , 28 8 , 29 30 , 53 20 , 60 20 , 05 13 , 53 1,21 0 , 82 148, 17 
I 
1970 49 , 14 36, 40 25 , 26 18 ,71 23 , 25 17 , 22 25 , 26 10 , 71 9 , 39 6 , 97 2 , 69 1 , 99 134, 99 
1971 54 , 45 37 , 15 29 , 28 19, 98 25 , 00 17 , 06 29 , 28 19, 98 6 ,16 4 , 20 2 , 41 1 , 64 146, 58 
1972 77,78 41 , 63 26, 18 lLJ , 01 19, 3() 10 , 35 57 , 38 30 , 71 3 , 14 1 , 68 3 , 01 1 , 61 186, 83 
1973 47 , 69 31 , 78 36 , 24 24 , 12 18, 34 12 , 22 46, 04 30 , 68 - 0 1 , 75 1 , 17 150 , 06 
197Ll 5 , 97 9 , 88 16, 71 27 , 64 27 , 11 44 ,85 9 , 57 15 , 83 - 0 1 , 09 1 , 80 60 , 45 
TOTAL 325 , 54 33 , 60 193,05 19, 93 141 , 22 lll , 58 235 , 28 24 , 28 59 ,50 6 , 15 13, 31 1 , 37 968 , 84 
=========== ========================-=======b===============b=============== ~=======-===============b=================== 
Data Source : RGoistrar of Fi nancial Ins titut ions Annual RGports, 196Ll t o 197Ll . 
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means of raising finance enabling them to adjust their liquidity position 
without having to unload other assets on depressed markets, and rather 
disturbingly for the authorities, facilitate mutual liquidity arrangements 
among banks themselves. N.C.Ds, however, do not qualify as liquid assets. 
The yield on N.C.Ds depends, of course , on the current rate on time deposits , 
but it definitely can be regarded as market determined and therefore reflective 
of the liquidity position in the money market . Graph I shows the rate on 
N.C .Ds to be far above that on equivalent Treasury Bills and N. F.C. deposits 
further vindicating this . Table 3 . 4 illustrates the rapid growth of N.C.Ds 
until 1973 when they declined drastically due mainly to the fall in holdings 
of commercial and merchant banks. 
3 . 2 . 2.6 Banker ' s Acceptances 
A banker ' s acceptance may be defined as "a bill or promissory note which 
must be self- liquidating, and linked directly with and immediately preceded 
by a specific merchandise transaction •.• • and the bill or promissory note 
must be so enclaused (to the satisfaction of the Reserve Bank) that it is 
possible to identify the transaction concerned . "9 . 
Banker ' s acceptances are readily discountable on the market , allowing the 
drawer to acquire use of the funds until the due date when the bill must be 
honoured . Despite the various transactions costs , acceptance credit has 
become preferable to overdrafts because it is the cheaper of the two and 
cannot be recalled . 
The growth of banker ' s acceptances as a credit instrument has been prolifi c. 
A glance at Table 3 . 5 will confirm this. The volume of acceptances more than 
quadrupled between 1964 and 1974, despite restrictions imposed on the discount 
houses holdings of them . Not unexpectedl y given the nature of their business 
outlined _in Section 3 . 1 . 4 . 2, merchant banks were responsible for a massive 
71,36 per cent of total issues during the period. 
·' 
The rate on acceptances can be regarded as relatively market determined , 
although the so-called quota system (no more than forty percent of total 
assets may be bank acceptances) has prevented the rate from reflecting supply 
and demand conditions in the markets to the extent of the N.C.D. rate . Recently 
not all institutions have adhered to this informal agreement , however . 
9. Government Gazette No . 3683 of 20th October, 1972. 
. 
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TABLE 3 . 5 
DATE COMMERCIAL 
BANKS 
1\MT. "/o 
1964 2 , 70 2 , 27 
1965 4 , 17 2,54 
1966 2 , 78 1 , 83 
1967 7 , 13 4 , 49 
1968 17 , 54 10, 99 
1969 45,27 21 , 44 
1970 72,75 25 , 64 
1971 87 , 23 28 , 20 
1972 129, 39 35 , 74 
1973 1S3, 38 33 , 31 
1974 172 , 02 31 , 46 
TOTAL 694 , 36 23, 73 
OWNERSHIP DISTRIBUTION BY ISSUING INSTITUTIONS OF BANKERS ACCEPTANCES 
FROM 1964 TO 1974. 
MERCHANT GENERAL HIRE- PURCHASE SAVINGS TOTAL 
BANKS BANKS BANKS BANKS 
AMT. "/o AMT. "/o AMT. "/o AMT. "/o 
116, 16 97 , 73 - 0 - 0 - 0 118 ,86 
159, 91 97 , 43 0,05 0,03 - 0 - 0 164 , 13 
148, 53 98 , 00 0 , 25 0 ,16 - 0 - 0 151 ,56 
151 , 30 95 , 39 0,18 0 , 11 - 0 - 0 158, 61 
' 141 , 74 88 ,86 0 , 23 0 , 14 - 0 - 0 159,51 
151,85 71,90 7 , 68 3 , 64 6 , 39 3 , 02 - 0 211,19 
191 , 27 67 ,40 13 , 21 4 , 66 6 , 54 2 , 30 - 0 283 ,77 
197, 08 63 , 72 19, 02 6 , 15 5 , 85 1 ,89 0 ,11 0 , 04 309 , 29 
208 , 05 57 , 47 21,63 5 , 97 2 , 84 0 , 78 b , 11 0 ,03 362 , 02 
285 , 06 61 , 91 21, 88 4 , 75 - 0 0 , 11 0 , 02 460 , 43 
336, 71 61,58 37 , 91 6 , 93 - 0 0 , 11 0 , 02 546, 75 
2087 , 66 71 , 35 122, 04 4 , 17 21 , 53 0 , 74 0 , 44 0 , 015 2926, 03 
================= ======-=============== ========-====== =======~======== =======-=================== 
Data Source: Registrar of Banks Annual Reports , 1964 to 1974. 
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3 .. 2 . 3. The ~.1a.rket for Long-Term Interest Rates 
In contrast to the market for short- term securities, which reflect cyclical 
and random influences, the market for long-term paper manifests the long-run 
growth conditions in the economy and is closely related to the state of t he 
international capital markets . This , together with the i mpact of Malkiel ' s 
Theorem, causes long rates to be more stable over time than their short 
counterparts. 
Because our primary objecti ve is to investigate the yield curve , we are inter-
ested only in fixed interest- bearing securities. Due to the paucity of 
relevant statistics , we shall examine only two rates , namely those on long-
term government stock and company debentures . 
3 . 2.3.1 The Yield on Lonq- Term . .G.overnment Stock 
Long-term government stock is customarily demarcated as that with a term-
to-maturity exceeding 20 years . The rate on these long gilts must be regarded 
as a controlled rate since new issues are governed by the so- called pattern 
of rates by the Reserve Bank. 
The rationale behind this procedure , according to the Governor of the Reserve 
Bank is" ••• not the maintenance of stability in the sense of rigid pegging of 
rates and prices , but rather of ensuring an orderly upward adjustment of market 
rates .. 1 The historical antecedents of this policy lie in the depressed 
state of post- war yields on long bonds, which tended to restrict the borrowing 
capacity of the state. The pattern of rates was established to give invest-
ors a clear indication of the terms of new issues and hence reduce the element 
of uncertainty. 
The most important factors influencing the choice of the rate pattern seem t o 
be the supply and demand situation in t he market , the effect of developments 
in the capital and current accounts on the balance of payments , and the 
related behaviour of l ong rates over seas . 2 The rates on long stock nonethe-
less tend to follow in close relati on , ·other rates in the capital market i.e . 
see Graph 2, and thus can be regarded to a certain extent anyway , as indicative 
of conditions in this market. 
1. Address by the Governor , S .A.R.B. Quarterly Bulletin, 1950. 
2. Franszen , D. G. Economic Growth and Stability in a Developing Economy : 
Some Aspects of the Union ' s Post- War Experience , G. L. von Schack Ltd., 
Pretoria, 1960. 
TABLE 3.6 OWNERSHIP DISTRIBUTION OF MARKETABLE LONG- TERM GOVERNMENT STOCK FROM 1964 TO 1974 
DATE PUBLIC T h e B a n k i n g S e c t o r MUTUAL BUILDING I NSURAN::::E OTHER TOTAL 
DEBT FUNDS & SOCIETIES COMPANIES & HOLDERS 
COMMISSION RESERVE COMMERCIAL OTHER MONEY UNIT PRIVATE BANK BANKS MARKET INSTI- TRUSTS PENSION & 
TUTIDNS PROVIDENT 
FUNDS 
AMT . o/o AMT. o/o AMT. o/o AMT. ofo AMT . o/o AMT, ojo AMT. o/o ·AMT, 0/o 
l~JG4 . 1 ,42G, O 79,0 30 , 1 1 , 7 76 , 4 4 , 3 21,5 1 , 2 
- 0 53,4 2 , 9 84 ,1 4,7 92 , 4 5 , 2 1 , 783,9 
1965 1 , 621,7 83 , 4 36, 2 1 , 9 43 , 2 2,2 37 , 1 1 , 9 - 0 28,1 1,4 90 , 4 4 , 6 88 , 6 4 , 6 1 , 945,3 
1966 1 ,755 , 6 79, 8 60 , 8 2 , 8 57 ,5 2 , 6 26, 5 1,2 2 , 1 0,1 22 , 6 1,0 154, 2 7,0 118, 4 5 , 3 2,197,6 
1967 1 , 968 , 5 81,6 56 , 9 2 ,4 36,1 1 ,5 14, 1 0 , 6 4 , 1 0 , 2 18, 5 0 , 8 214, 7 8 , 9 99 , 5 4 , 1 2 , 412 ,3 
! 2. 968 2,223 , 8 78 , 5 49,8 1 ,8 66,6 2,4 29 , 5 1,0 20 , 4 0 , 7 24 , 4 0.9 292 , 9 10,3 125,4 4 , 4 2 , 832,7 
1969 2 , 547 , 3 78,1 52 , 3 1,6 55 , 3 1 ,7 13, 9 0 , 4 8D , 5 2 , 5 21 , 1 0 , 6 369 , 8 11, 3 119, 6 3 ,7 3,260,0 
1970 2 ,722 , 3 79,4 73 , 9 2,2 22 , 9 0,7 8 ,1 0 , 2 54 ,7 1,6 17,9 0 , 5 417 , 6 12,2 109, 4 3 , 2 3,426,7 
1971 2,844 , 0 77 , 9 80 ,0 2 , 2 20 ,0 0 ,5 7 , 0 0 , 2 49 , 0 1, 3 18, 0 0 , 5 519,0 14, 2 111,D 3 , 0 3 , 648 , 0 
1972 2 , 899 , 0 67 , 9 86, 0 2 , 0 92 , 0 2 , 1 90,0 2 , 1 48 , 0 1 , 1 48,0 1, 1 757 , 0 17 , 8 243 , 0 5 , 7 4 , 2G4,0 
1973 3 ,012 , 0 66, 4 63 , 0 1 , 4 114,0 2 , 5 82 ,0 1,8 41 , 0 0 , 9 60 , 0 1 , 3 904 , 0 19, 9 262 , 0 5 , 8 4 ,538 , D 
EJ711 3 , 242 , 0 67,1 70 , 0 1,4 79 , 0 1,6 97,0 2 , D 34 , 0 0 , 7 49,.0 1 , 0 1 , 045 ,0 21 , 6 218 , 0 4 , 5 4 , 835 , 0 
-
TOTAL 26, 262 , 2 74 , 7 659 ,0 1 , 9 663,0 1 , 9 426, 7 1,2 333 , 8' 0 , 9 361 ,0 1,0 4 , 848 , 7 13,8 1 , 587 , 3 4 , 5 35 ,142 , 60 
======b========b==================b=======-=====b====== ===================-=============-========-=====c=======-==========~===== 
Data Source : South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin, 1964 to 1974. 
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Yields, as distinct from rates, are controlled so as to approximate rates. 
The authorities are able to ensure this since they are by far the largest 
purchasers of stock, with the PDC alone holding 74,7 per cent of the total 
over the period 1964 to 1974 as shown in Table 3.6. 
3.2. 3.2 Company Stock, Debentures and Notes 
The private sector counterpart of the long-term gilt- edged stock consists in 
company stock, debentures and notes . The yield on debentures may be viewed 
as freely determined in the capital market and hence reflective to some extent 
of the real rate of return on investment. 
No marked imperfections in the trading of debentures are apparent, which 
generally are in line with the rates prevailing in London and New York . 
Direct government intervention in the market is non- existent except for the 
normal impact of macro-economic policy instruments on the economy of South 
Africa as a whole. 
3 . 3 CONCLUSION 
3 A Gurley and Shaw-Type approach classifying financial institutions· as inter-
mediaries between deficit and surplus units in the economy was adopted to 
analyse the South African financial structure. Essentially this structure 
emerged as a relatively well- developed system consisting of a number of 
specialist institutions which, despite powerful legislative constraints, 
nonetheless possesses a not insignificant degree of flexibility . 
Interest rates generally are affected by a variety of institutional, legislative 
and other factors. The market as a whole must be regarded as rather rigidly 
controlled by the monetary authorities. In the money market only NCDs and short 
term stock are freely determined, although acceptances are also to a great degree 
indicative of market forces . On the other hand, wh~le rates on Treasury Bills 
and NFC call deposits are manipulated, they do approximate the other rates, 
though at lower levels . A similar situation prevails in the long market, with 
debentures being entirely competitively determined and the yield on long- term 
stock controlled but nonetheless approximate to it. 
, / 
3. Gurley, J.G. and Shaw~ E.S. op.cit; 
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CHAPTER IV 
A SOUTH AFRICAN TEST OF THE THEORIES 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter III \'Jas concerned with the determination of interest rates within 
the South African institutional context, The present Chapter will draw 
heavily on this analysis in evaluating empirical tests of the theories 
introduced in Chapter I . 
The discussion here will be organised in our usual manner. The traditional 
theory will be considered and the rationale for not submitting it to empirical 
verification will be examined in the light of our conclusions i n Section 2 . 1 .1. 
In the subsequent three sections, the results of econometric tests of New 
Expectations Theory, the Malkiel hypothesis, and Liquidity Premium Theory 
will be analysed, In each case we will draw heavily on the discussion of 
Chapter II. Finally, a statistical examination of the validity of Culbert-
son ' s Market Segmentation Theory will be conducted in Section 4 ,5 , The Chapter 
terminates with an overall evaluation of the performances of the competing 
theories , 
In every instance the a priori expectations emerging from the deliberations 
of the empirical review of Chapter I I will be extracted , the data req~irements 
will be contrasted against the data vailability and any manipulations discussed , 
the estimations will be presented and analysed with special emphasis on any 
institutional peculiarities affecting them, and lastly, a brief examination of 
t he policy implications will be provided where this is relevant. 
4 .1 The Traditional Expectations Hypothesis 
In Chapter II, Secti ons 2.1 and 2 . 1.1, we saw that the empirical evidence 
available on the traditional variant of expectations theory was , to say the 
least, conflicting, We argued that it i s not sufficient to compare expected 
rates implicit in the yield curve and actual observed rates since expectations 
··' 
can still be the prime determinant of the .term structure without having to be 
an accurate reflection of the future. 
In Section 2 . 1 .1 , we accepted the so-called "hard" version of the t heory, but 
argued that the only acceptable method of empirical inves tigation lay i n the/ 
,. 
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exa~ination of independent evidence, that is, evidence other than that 
derived solely from the yield-to-maturity curve . We noted that the only 
known means of obtaining independent empirical evidence was by way of 
questionnaire surveys , but indicated that at best this method possessed 
certain undesirable characteristics. 
Given this, and the inconclusiveness of prior tests of the traditional 
theory , we shall not attempt an empirical study of the traditional theory. 
While a . questionnaire survey, despite its flaws, may have been a relevant 
exercise , such an endeavour would lie beyond the scope of a project of this 
nature. 
4.2 New Expectations Theory 
Our review of the empirical evidence accumulated on the Meiselman model in 
Sections 2.2 and 2.2.1 revealed a number of notable features . Firstly, the 
estimations obtained did not seem to be dependent on the length of the data 
period employed, nor on whether quarterly or annual data was used. Secondly, 
however, the regressions were highly susceptible to the manipulations per-
formed on the yield data, but even when the data had been smoothed the hypo-
thesis did not consistently perform well . Finally, there was no indication 
as to whether the Lutzian or Hicksian formulae proffered better forward rates . 
Overall the empirical evidence on New Expectations Theory forced us to an 
eclectic conclusi~n . 
The Durand data used by Meiselman has no equivalent in Soutr Africa . While 
published observations on gilt-edged securities are available from three years 
through to twenty-five years to maturity, no commensurate off-icial statistics 
exist on bonds of less than . three years to maturity. Therefore, it is not 
possible to regress changes in one- year forward rates against the forecasting 
error as in the original Meiselman Study. That smoothed data is not attain-
able in South Africa need not necessarily be considered a disadvantage, for 
if we recall Buse ' s 1 argument in Chapter II '· smoothed c urves are likely to 
produce results which in any event are little more than· statistical artifacts • 
. / 
Although due to data limitations then , we cannot estimate the equation dealing 
in the short end of the market, we can investigate an equivalent hypothesis 
put forward ·by Meiselman : 
1 . Buss, A. "Interest Rates, the Meiselman f..bdel and Random Numbers" , 
Journal of Political Economy , 75, 1967, p . 49 . 
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"Since unanticipated changes in marginal interest rates 
are highly correlated with the forecasting error , it must 
follow that unanticipated changes in the long-term rate, 
an average of the marginals, are also highly correlated 
with the forecasting error."2 
Meiselman3 himself did not test directly this hypothesis since "unfortunately, 
data limitations precl ude giving precise empi rical content to this hypothesis 
Durand ' s basic yields at one-year intervals are not available beyond 
ten years to maturity" . However, instead of calculating the appr opriate 
forward long-term rates he decided to proxy unanticipated interest rate changes 
with act ual changes . 
for 30 year bonds . 
Generally, the results obtained were good , particularly 
A priori we cannot expect acceptable estimates for South Afr ica by employing 
the long- rate hypothesis . In the first instance, we will not be using 
smoothed data , but rather actual observed market rates. Previous investi-
4 5 6 gations based on s imilar data , such as those of Grant , van Horne and Buse 
outlined in Chapter II, did not establish evidence supportive of the Meiselman 
model . Secondly, we have in some instances due to data constraints been 
forced to commit what Masera7 has termed "err ors of the first kind" or " the 
attribution to term to maturity of bond-yield differentials which are in fact 
due to other determinants". Finally, the errors in forecasting short rates 
used to re-assess expectations of future long rates are generally based on 
r ates which are both more freely determined and more volatile than the rate 
on · long-term stock . In the previous chapter , we noted that although long 
gilts are not market determined per se , they do closely follow market trends , 
but fluctuate less than the shorter r ates . Even corporat e bonds, which must 
be regarded as freely determined, are greatly more stable over time than their 
short counterparts . 
Our first estimation of equation ( 2.2 . 1 ) considered the difference between 
actual and observed yields on 3- year government stock as the error -on which/ 
2. ~~iselman , D. The Term Structure bf Interest Rates , Prentice-Hall , 
Englewood Cliffs, 1962, p . 22. 
3 . Ibid, p.23 
4. Grant , J .A. G. " Meiselman on the Structure of Interest Rates : A Bri tish 
Test" Economica, February 1964 , p . 51. 
5. Van Horne , J. " Interest- Rate Risk and the Term Structure of Interest Rates" 
Journal of Political Economy, August , 1965 , p.344 
6. Buse , A. op.cit . 
7 . Masera , R. S . The Term Structure of Interest Rates , Clarendon University 
Press , Oxford, 1972, p.91 . 
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expectations of future yields on long gilt- edged stock were revised. We 
used quarterly data for the peri od l964(I) to l974(IV), although three years 
were lost as a consequence of cal culating forward rates on short stock, 
Since the more complex Lutzian formula could offer no observable advantage over 
the Hicksian formula , we employed the latter method to calculate forward rates 
implicit in the yield curve from 1964 onwards : 
+ r == 
n 
(1 + R t n (4.2.1) 
We recall that for the Meiselman hypothesis to be upheld the constant term 
must be zero, and the regression coefficient b must be positive and signifi-
cantly di fferent from 0 . For the equation 
6 t + n == ( 2.2 . 1.) 
8 
we obtained the estimates given below , We quote these rather meaningless 
results only as an indication of the type of results obtained in identical 
regressions using the error on 3 year stock to revise expe~tations on 5 year , 
12 year and 15 year bond yields respectively • 
.6.t+ n == 7,2835188 - 0 , 2887387 Et 
(28,50) (1,26) 
2 
r = 0,225 
D. W. o, 1096 
Obviously, these results provide absolutely no support at all for the hypo-
thesis with the a term positive and significantly different from zero, and the 
b term negative and not significantly different from · zero. In addition , the 
r 2 indicates that the model has no" explanatory power, and the· l ow Durbin-Watson 
shows strong serial correlation, · 
Given that t he results for government stock were so discouraging , we estimated 
the same equation using the forecasting error on three-month bankers acceptances 
against the expectations on corporate bonds for the period 1964 to 1974 employing 
quarterly observations. Because the term- to- maturity of acceptances is three 
months, only one set of observations was lost. The two rates, as we saw in/ 
8. All calculations were done at the Rhodes University Computer Centre, except 
as indicated later. The regression results are given in the usual manner, 
i 2e . ben2ath the coefficients in parentheses are the Studen~s t - statistic. 
r and R are the simple and multiple coefficients of determination respec-
tively. D.W. denotes the Durbin-Watson statistic, 
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Chapter III can be regarded as market determined and hence compatible . 
The results were: 
6 t + n r 20 , t = 8, 692E.S44 + 0 , 000093 Et 
(41 , 15) (0 , 62) 
2 
r = 0 , 096 
o.w = 0 , 1656 
Several other attempts using the forecast error on N.C.Ds, Treasury Bills 
and N.F .C. deposit rates respectively , regressed against the expected rate 
on corporate bonds pr oduced equal ly poor estimates. 
We made a final attempt using the expected yield on three-year government 
paper as the dependent variable, and prediction errors on forecasts of 
bankers' acceptances as the independent variable . Again quarterly obser-
vations ·for the period 1964 to 1974 were employed. Once more the estimates 
obtained were meaningless . 
6 t + n = 5 , 1923762 + 0,2206995 Et 
(47 , 17) (0 . 84) 
2 
r = 0,129 
o.w = 0 , 2867 
Similar regressions with short-term government stock were run using N.C .Ds , 
Treasury Bills and N. F.C. deposit rates. 
r elevant results occur . 
In no instance did anything like 
From our investigation of the equivalent Meiselman long rate hypothesis , 
we are forced to conclude that the results provided no support for the model 
whatsoever . I n every case the a ' s were high and significantl y different from 
zero whereas the b coefficients were not statistically different from 0 . All 
unconnected multiple correlation coef ficients showed that the model was in-
capable of explaining more than 30 per cent of the variations in expected 
long rates, which can be taken to inditate severe mis- specification. In 
addition , strong serial correlation was evidenced by the extremely low values 
produced vis- a- vis the Durbin-Watson test. 
9c:1 . 
Since the South African data compares favourably with that used in other 
comparable tests of the long rate hypothesis, we cannot ascribe the very 
poor performance of New Expectations Theory to deficiencies in this regard. 
A more probable explanation would lie in the greater volatility of short 
rates relative to the long rates. However , the estimation of short stock 
and acceptances would tend to diminish the weight we could attach to this 
argument. We must conclude that the Meiselman l ong-rate model is not at 
all successful in explaining the market for securities in this country . 
Given the performance of the hypothesis, therefore, it would be spurious 
to attempt to draw policy conclusions from it . 
4.3 Malkiel 's Alternative Reformulation of Expectations Theory 
In Chapter II, Sections 2.3 and 2 . 3.1 , we examined and analysed the results 
of quantitative tests on the Malkiel hypothesis . We saw that although only 
two investigations had been undertaken, by Malkiel himself and Dodds and 
Ford respectively , the resultant evidence provided relatively strong support 
for the hypothesis . 
We recall that Malkiel used the l ong- short yield differential to proxy the 
normal range of interest rates , a factor that has been subjected to some 
criticism . In addition , he assumed that investors formed their exp8ctations 
of the limits of the normal range by ta~ing an historical average of interest 
rates and adding a certain number of standard deviations to either side of 
it . Clearly , the time period used to calculate the historic average is 
dependent on subjective criteria and it is by no means assured that Malkiel 
was correct in s electing 15 years as a suitable length of time . For this 
reason , we decided to vary this time span between 15 years and one year in 
order to see how this affected the overall results. 
In contrast to the Meiselman hypothesis nf the previous sec~ion , the South 
African data .are fairly well suited to testing the Malkiel theory, for both 
the yields on ·long and short stock are amongst the most GOnsistent time- series 
data available in this country. A note of caution should be sounded , however, 
··' . 
over the fact that short gilts are more freely determined than l ongs . As we 
argued before though, this need not necessarily imply that an error of the 
first kind is committed since long rates do appear t o follow the market fairly 
closely . 
95. 
In our tests of the theory, we followed very closely the test procedure of 
Malkiel , and estimated both equations of Section 2 . 3 . 
to be investigated is given below: 
The first equation 
(1.4 .6 ) 
A priori we cannot expect equation (1 . 4 .6) to perform well , even if we do 
not consider the poor results obtained by Malkiel . The reason for this is 
that A, or the long rate, appears on both sides of the equation. In essence 
this implies that as R increases so (R - s) and (R - RA) must rise . Conse-
quently , a strong statistical bias is imparted to the estimates obtained . 
Equation (1.4.6) was estimated using quarterly yield data on short and long 
government securities as defined by the Reserve Bank, from 1966 (I) to 1974 (IV) . 
The results are given below in tabular form RA' or the moving average of past 
long rates, was raised by using 15 years, 10 years , 5 years, 3 years and one 
year respectively calculated on a quarterly basis. 
TABLE 4 . 3 . 1 
Equation 
Number 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
REGRESSION RESULTS USING DIFFERING PERIODS FOR MOVING 
AVERAGE RA QUARTERLY DATA , 1966 TO 1974. 
(R - S)t = ·a + b (R - RA)t 
Length Intercept Regression Degrees Uncor-
of Coefficient of re2ted 
RA a b Freedom R 
15 0,7950654 0 , 6242858 34 0,5~;L 
(2,58) (3 ,85) 
10 1, 1603341 0,5113576 34 0 , 431 
(3,97) (2,79) 
5 1,8698497 0,476109. 34 0,311 
(6, 89) (1 ,80) 
3 1,9935714 -0,1334225 34 0,109 
(11,53) (0,64) 
1 1,8565950 0 , 2393771 34 0 , 151 
(13,59) .I (0 ,89) 
Durbin-
Watson 
0,3250 
0,3078 
0 , 2134 
0,2195 
0 , 2194 
- 36 . 
The esti~a~es co~~sined in Tab!e d. ' . 1 are not encouragi~~ to say the least . 
For ~he ~~lkiel hipothesis to bs at all vindicateo the b c~efficients ~ust 
be less then zero , and this is true only for equation 4 ~here it is not 
significant in any case . However , we would have expected this since the 
statistical bias ~nherent in equation (1 . 4 . 6) is one of p~sitive correlation , 
and therefore acts against the Malkiel hypothesis . For all equations the 
R2 is low and dec~ines as the length of the period used to calculate RA is 
shortened, indicating mis- specification in the model . After applying the 
Durbin- Watson test , we found strong evidence of serial correlation since all 
d's fell below their critical lower values . 
Following the methodology of Malkiel9 , who removed the statistical bias by 
transposing R to the left- hand side of the equality sign and multiplied 
through by minus unity , we estimated equation (2 . 3 . 1 . 1) below. Once again, 
the long average rate RA was varied by using 15, 10 , 5 , 3 and l year behind 
moving averages calculated quarterly . 
(2 . 3 .1. 1) 
A priori we would expect (2 . 3 . 1.1) to perform more satisfactorily than (1 .4.6) 
since the bias has been removed . The short rate now becomes th~ dependent 
variable , and the regr ession cosfficient (1 - b) is left unrestricted as in 
the original Malkiel investigation . For the estimations to support t he 
hypothesis, b must again be negative and significantly di fferent from zero. 
The results obtained are given in Table 4 . 3 . 2 below: 
TABLE 4 . 3 . 2 REGRESSION RESULTS USI~G DIFFERENT PERIODS FOR THE 
r,D\fiNG AVERAGE. RA QUARTERLY DATA ; 1966 TO 1974 
St = -a+ (1 - b) Rt +bRAt 
Equation Length Intercept Regression Regression Degrees Uncor- OurbinJ 
Watson I Nur.1ber of Coefficient Coefficient of rec~ed 
RA - a (1 - b) b Freedom r d l 
! 
11 15 - 5 , 4608742 1,0423858 - 1 , 3762867 33 0 , 855 o, 72181 
(6,93) (8,33) (5 , 23) 
21 10 -4, 0818568 0, 9166719 - 0 , 9114167 33 0 , 836 o, 9451 1 
(6 ,35) (7 , 87) (4 ,59) i 
. 1 
5 - 2 , 7E00740 1, 0642724 - 0 , 799192 33 0,860 o, 76251 3 
(6, 11} (8 ,52) (5 , 42) 
41 3 - 2 , 4899938 0,8790149 - 0,5174789 33 0 , 831 0 , 62781 
(5,1R) (7 ,79) (4 , 43) 
I 
51 1 -2,4350546 0, 7409607 -0,3lll5769 33 0 ,743 0 , 4934 1 
(4 , 00) l4 34) [1_1 80) I I 
9 . }.1a1kiel , B. G. The Ter r.1 Structure of Interest Rates : Expectations and 
Behaviour Patte:ns , Princeton University Press, Princeton , 1966, Chapter 4 . 
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The estimates in the ta~le above compare favourably with those of Malkiel , 
particularly equ~tion 11 which employed a similar time period to calculate 
RA . All equations have coefficients statistically significant at a 95 per 
cent level of confidence and higher . In every case the signs of these 
terms are in conformity with those predicted by the hypothesis . The multiple 
correlation coeffi~ient R2 indicates the explanatory power of the hypothesis 
is in excess of 60 per cent with the except i on of equation 5 1• Corresponding 
to the results of :-..:alkiel , however, the Durbin-Watson statistic d is disturb-
ingly low in every instance , re9istering a severe degree of s erial correlation, 
and making it difficult to draw any firm overall conclusicns . 
It is interesting to note in regard to the results of Table 4 . 3 . 2 , that as 
the length of the period in which RA is calculated is decreased, so the per-
formance of t he equation is diminished . As we would have expected , so too 
does the d statistic fall as RA approaches the present observation . 
In order to remove this serial correlation and raise the Durbin- Watson 
statistic, we estinated the first difference form of equation (2 , 3. 1 . 1) and 
performed a separate multiple regression using the ordinary least· squares 
method1• Table a.3 .3 below gives the outcome of this process . 
TABLE 4.3 . 3 
Equation 
Number 
i~ 
2* 
3* 
a* 
5-:1( 
RC:GRESSIDN RESULTS FOR Tf-E FIRST DIFFEREI\CE FORivl OF 
(2 . 3. 1.1) USING DIFFERENT PERIODS FOR THE :.lOVING AVEI:iAGE 
RA QUARTERLY DATA 1966 TO 1974. 
6 \ = - a + ( 1 - b) .6. Rt + b 
Length Intercept Re;Jression Regression Degrees Uncor- Durbin-
of Coefficient Coefficient of rected Watson 
RA -a ( 1 - b) b Freejom R2 d 
15 - 0 , 0177 0(9308 - 0 . 5230 32 0,6659 l ,5D2l 
5 , 01) (·-0 , 12) 
10 -q , 0468 0(9327 0(0857 32 0 , 6657 1,5086 
5,04) o,oa) 
5 - q , l201 0(9462 1(0196 32 0,6694 1,5163 
5, 10) 0 ,54) 
.. 
3 - 0,023 0 , 9148 (a , 34) ./ - 0,1795 32 (-0,18) 
0,661 1,5049 
1 - 0,0694 0 , 8739 0 , <1060 32 0 , 6838 1,5385 
(<1,66) (1,19) 
1. In contrast to ell previous calculations , this regression was run at the 
Computing Laboretory of the University of South Africa . 
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2 As we would anticipate 1 the R ' s fell by approximately 0 1 2 ·;;hereas the 
Durbin- Watson statistic r ose dramatically, but in every case l ay between 
the cri tical upper and lower values at a 95 per cent level of confidence . 
While this prohibits us from concluding that serial correlation has been 
removed, it nonetheless indicates that no serious degree of inter-relationship 
exists between the residuals of the time series employed . In any event, the 
first difference equations are a considerable improvement in terms of d r ela-
tive to the origi nal estimations . 
The values of the constant term a lie close t o zer o and thus accord closely 
with those of Malkiel in his first difference estimations . Similarly with 
the regression coefficients of~Rt , which are positive and statistically sig-
nificant. However, the b coefficients are very disappointing and exhibit 
no apparent trend. This is understandable in view of the fact that because 
they are based on the difference between averages of Rt ' each calculation 
et -\_1 ; Vt must necessarily produce a very low absol ute value . 
Overall , we will argue that the Malkiel hypothesis via equat ion (2 , 3 . 1.1) 
has per formed relatively well. The results in Table 4 . 3 .2 in p~rticular can 
be regarded as satisfactory . Despite the low Durbi n- Watson values obtained 
here , it can be demonstrated that the estimati ons of the ordinary least squares 
method may still be efficient since Rt and RA increase regularly for every 
observation. 2 If we accept this then -a~ (1 - b) and b remain l'nbiased 
estimates , and the multiple correlation coefficient R2 is not overstated . 
Because the Malkiel hypothesis has performed satisfactorily in the South 
African context it would not be out of place to briefly discuss t he policy 
implications of the model . Clearly , expectations are a significant factor 
influencing the term structure of interest r ates . Therefore it follows that 
the most rational means of altering the term structure must lie in those policy 
instruments which directly affect expectations per se . Consequently , we would 
ar gue for ·the vigorous application of the so- called announcement effect by way 
of strong and frequent statements by the authorities of the direction in which 
they wish .the rate str ucture to move, in other words , the introduction of what 
Malkiel has termed an "open- mouth" policy, rather than the use of traditional 
debt ·management policy . Open market operations , in this country at least , 
are all too f requently severely r estricted by the financing constraints of the 
Treasury which hamper their effectiveness . This being so, it would appear that 
the former instrument is both more effective and far simpler to implement . 
2. See Wonnacott , R.J. and Wonnacott, T.H. Econometrics , John Wiley and Sons , 
New York 1969 p.l36 following and Chapter 16 for the principles underlying 
thls aro•~ment . 
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4.4 The Liquidity Prefere>.~e Hypothesis 
In our review of the empirical investigations conducted into the Hicksian 
Liquidity Premium Theory in Chapter II , it was apparent that the only study 
to find any really positive evidence for the existence of liquidity premiums 
was that of Kessel? At best the other investigations revealed only 
weak evidence in support of the hypothesis. 
We recall f r om Sections 2.4 and 2 . 4 .1 , Kessel ' s argument that if the average 
of forward expected r ates do not equal subsequently observed actual rates, 
then the forward rates must portray not merely expected rates , but must also 
i ncorporate some other variable , namely liquidity premiums . Given this, 
Kessel then designed a study which would "cleanse" the market's forward r ates 
of liquidity premiums in order to measure the "true11 expectations of the 
market . These 11true" expectations could t hen be used to test the predictive 
power of the market , or how accurately the market predicted future interest 
rates . One of Kessel ' s central problems , therefore , lay in the assessment 
of the ability of 11 true" expectations to be an accurate forecast of actual 
·observed future rates , 
In our own investigation of the Hicksian Liquidity Preference Hypothesis , 
we followed one of the many procedures developed by Kessel very closely . 
As in our work inta the Meiselman hypothesis , we could not derive expected 
rates for the short end of the market since data constraints did not allow 
this . Therefore, unlike Kessel, we did not investigate liquidity premiums 
for LP=1 , but rather for longer rates . But because Kessel did not investi-
gate further than LP=1, and thus did not enquire into the Hicksian assumption 
LP , or the assumption of normal backwardisation , 
n 
this departure i s not significant in a general sense except as we shall 
indicate below. It is permissible, therefore , to use the liquidity premium 
on any forward rate as data to test his basic hypothesis . 
As his fundamental premise , Kessel assumed LP1 to be dependent on present, 
observed one-year spot rates . We make a similar assumption , and for example, 
can then regard the liquidity premium .pn a six- year loan to be dependent on 
the ·present observed value of six-year loans. That the level of liquidity 
premiums bears a positive relationship to the level of interest rates is well 
supported in the literature. In other words , Kessel was able to write , 
3. Kessel, A.A. The Cyclical Behaviour of the Term Structure of Interest 
Rates , National Bureau of Economic Research , Quassional Paper 91 , New 
York, 1965 . 
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LP t n, F (R t) n, (4.4.1) = 
By assuming, as we pointed out above, that if forward expected rates do not 
equal subsequently observed spot rates then the difference must be taken as 
indicative of liquidity premiu~s, Kessel is able to measure the latter. 
This, together with his behavioural postulate of equation (4.4.1), enables 
Kessel to propose his basic operational hypothesis: 
LP t n, (4.4.2) = 
Where Z is the error in prediction contained in the original derived forward 
rates. Hypothesing that the relationship explicit in (4.4.2) is linear, 
Kessel posited the testable equation to be: 
LP 
n,t = a+bRt+ Z n, (4.4.3) 
This equation has been criticised in the literature for containing a number 
of possible flaws. Firstly, equation (4.4.3) clearly contains within 
itself a test of (4.4.1) which was arrived at by assumption rather than 
explicit theorizing. Secondly, even granted the correctness of such an 
hypothesis, what is also being tested is the view that (4,4.3) is a linear 
r elationship, also fundamentally arrived at by assumption rather than on 
a priori grounds, Finally, Kessel's belief that Z should be statistically 
no different from zero regardless of the time period to which (4.4.3) is 
applied, has· been subjected to criticism. If Z ~ O, it is likely to be 
correlated with the value of L.P, and hence affect the coefficients a and b. 
Kessel, aware of this difficulty, did not deal at all convincingly with it. 
"The validity of these tests depends upon the absence 
of positive correlation between forecasting errors and 
spot rates. Unfortunately it is difficult to dis-
entangle forecasting errors from liquidity premiums."4 
In the light of these problems it is by no means cert~in that (4.4.3) 
provides a suitable framework from which to investigate the existence of 
./ 
liquidity premiums. Therefore, on a priori grounds we should not be too 
optimistic regarding the performance of the equation in the South African 
context. It is with this note of caution still ringing in our ears that 
we approached the matter of actually estimating (4.4.3). 
4. Ibid; footnote p.26 
' . 
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We recall from Section 2 . 4 . 1, that in contrast to almost all other studies , 
Kessel did not e~ploy either the Hicksian or Lutzian formulae to generate 
forward expected ratf7lS 1 but rather the arithmet'ic average of the Hicksian 
formula, For example, to calculate one- year ahead one-year expected rates , 
the formula would be ; 
While this formula performs very well in relation to the other , two for short 
periods ahead, as the maturity of the data is i ncreased , so a downward bias 
in the derived expected rates will become more and more apparent . It is here 
that we encounter the problem that our data have a minimum term- to- maturity 
of six years . For this reason ~e decided to employ the standard Hicksian 
geometric average formula , Having thus derived forward expected rates, 
we calculated liquidity premi ums in exactly the same way as Kessel , i . e . 
by taking the difference between expected and observed r ates as embodying 
liquidity premiums. 
In our tests of Liquidity Pr emium Theory a la ' Kessel , we employed five sets 
of data namely , six , nine, twelve , fifteen, and twenty year yields on South 
African government stock . Although we saw in Chapter III that stock with 
a maturity of over three years is controlled via the so- called pattern of 
rates , it nonetheless still corresponds with other freely determined rates , 
The estimates obtained with equation (4 . 4.3) are given i n table 4.4 . 1 below: 
TABLE 4 . 4 .1 
Equation 
Number 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR LIQUIDITY PREMIUMS AGAINST RATES 
ON 6 , 9 ,12 , 15 and 20 YEAR GOVERNMENT STOCK RESPECTIVELY 
QU.ARTERLY DATA , LP t = a + b A t + Z n, n, 
Length Intercept Regression Degrees Uncor- Durbin-
of data Coefficient of rected Watson 
used a b Freedom R2 d 
6 -0,2620891 0 ,1615683 22 0,317 0 , 4822 
(0 , 40) (1,57) 
9 3 , 6052554 - 0 , 4815308 22 0,615 0, 5850 
(3,40) 
. / 
(3,31) 
12 1 ,5904204 -0 ,1884951 22 0 , 294 1,2877 
(1 , 68) (1 , 37) 
15 2 , 3494052 - 0 , 3101755 22 0,447 0,2867 
(2 ,19) (2,18) 
20 0 , 0070D52 0 , 1033389 30 0 , 130 0,2650 
(D ,Ol) (0,72) ~ 
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While it is not clear from his analysis whether Kessel assumes the a 
intercept to exist or not , there are good grounds for arguing that it 
should not . Since liquidity premiums have already theoretically been 
removed fror.~ forward rates, we would posit that a should be equal to zero . 
The a priori expectations of the sign of the regression coefficient b is 
implicit in the foregoing discussion in that because Kessel (and others) 
postul ate a positive correlation between the l evel of rates and liquidity 
premiums , we must anticipate a positive sign . 
From Table 4.4 . 1 it is immediately clear that no obviously discernible 
pattern exists between the length to maturity of the bond rate used and the 
estimates obtained . Generally , the results are not favourable to Liquidity 
Premium Theory bearing out our earlier forecasts . All but one of the multiple 
correlation coefficients are below 0,50 indicating a low goodness of fit. 
In addition , the Durbin- Watson test reveals evidence of strong 
serial correlation with the exception of equation 3 where d lies above the 
critical upper limit . The values of a do not entirely conform to a priori 
expectations, with equations 2 and 4 having values significantly different 
from zero at a 95 per cent level of confidence. More disturbing , 
ar e the estimates obtained for the regression coefficient of R t ' 
n , 
however, 
In no 
instance was a statistically significant positive relationship in evidence , 
and equations 2 , 3 and 4 and even gave a .negative relationship ! 
We are brought to the conclusion, not surprisingly given the numerous 
theoretical and practical problems inherent i n the approach , that our estimates 
of the South African data provide absolutely no support at all for the Hicksian 
Liquidity Premium Theory . Clearly , while this does not di minish the value of 
the hypothesis , it does show that f or this particular method in conjunction 
.with the particular data employed, no positive proof exists . As in the case 
of Meiselman , we will not attempt any discussion on the policy implications 
of the theory, since given the results obtai ned this would be meaningless. 
4 . 5 Market Segmentation Theory 
. / 
Our ·review of the evidence amassed on the Institutional or Segmented Markets 
hypothesis in Chapter II indicated that while the majority of studies did 
reveal at least some degree of segmentation .in the capital market , all were/ 
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plagued by proble~s i n making the model operational . I n the main the 
researchers found themselves hampered by data constraints, and even with 
the limited infornation available, difficulties were encountered in the 
classification of cebt according to maturity. The aggregate view studies , 
while perha~s more theoretically appealing , suffered from an identification 
problsm arising out of the endogenous nature of the supply of government 
securities. In contrast, the so-called partial studies adopting a more 
micro- level of analysis were able to avoid this problem and found rather 
more convincing evidence for the existence of maturity preferences in the 
market for financial paper . 
5 Consequent to this we shall follow the latter approach or that of Wehrle , 
Terrel and Frazer6 and Dodds and Ford? However , in common with all the 
other investigations, and possibly more so , we are severly hampered by the 
paucity of data on the supply and holdings of government debt . Given this , 
a ll we can hope to establish is evidence only weakly suggestive of the exist-
ence of maturity preferences in South Af ric& on the part of investing i nsti-
tutions . \'ihile obviously this cannot "prove" the hypothesis of segmented 
capital markets , it may perhaps be able to indicate some degree of insti-
tutional imperfection in the market. 
suitable alternative to this approach . 
In any event , there appears to be no 
Before we attempt our analysis it is important to stress the signifi~ance 
of legislation in the asset- holding of financia l instituti ons in this country, 
a point which we touched on in Chapter III . While Market Segmentation Theory 
posits that firms ~ill attempt to match their assets with their liabilities, 
it may be in the South Afric'an context at least 1 that rather than this being 
an inherent characteristic of their financial behaviour , current legislation 
forces this upon them . Commercial banks , for example , may not hold a pre-
ponderance of short- term assets so as to match the overwhelming shor t nature 
of their liabilities, but ~o comply wi th their mandatory requirements in respect 
of liquid assets and prescribed investments . This could prove a very strong 
drawback in our analysis . However , we will return to this at a later stage . 
5. Wehrle, L.S. "Life Insurance Inve£tment: The Experience of Four Companies" 
in Studies of Portfolio Behaviour, Cowles Foundation Monagraph 20, Wiley , 
~!ew York , 1967. 
6 . Terrel, W.T . and Frazer , W.J . "Interest Rates , Portfolio .Behaviour, and 
~.'arketable Government Sec uri ties" Journal of Finance , March, 1972, p .l-36. 
7, Dodds , J,C. and Ford , J.L. Expectations , Uncertainty , and the Term 
Structure of Interest Rates , Martin Robertson and Co·, Ltd., London, 1974~ 
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The existence of risk aversion in the behaviour of financial institutions 
will, if we accept Market Segmentation Theory as valid , result in a matching 
of their .assets with their liabilities, It follows, therefore , that for the 
hypothesis to be substantiated an examination of actual holdings must reveal 
this to be the case . 
term gilts . 
We turn now to Table 4.5 . 1 below, dealing with long-
TABLE 4.5.1 THE OWNERSHIP DISTRIBUTION OF MARKETABLE LONG-TERM 
GOVERNMENT STOCK FROM 1964 TO 1974, 
PERCENTAGES 
INSTITUTION 0 A T E 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Reserve Bank 1 , 7 1,9 2 ,8 2 , 4 1 , 8 1 , 6 2 , 2 2 , 2 
Commercial Banks 4, 3 2 , 2 2,6 1 , 5 2,4 1 , 7 0 , 7 0 , 5 
Other Banking Insti- 1 , 2 1 , 9 1 , 2 0 , 6 1 , 0 0 , 4 0 , 2 0 , 2 tutions 
TOTAL 7 , 2 6 , 0 6 , 6 4,5 5 , 2 3 , 7 3 , 1 2 , 9 
F= ===== 
---- ---- F==== ==== ==== --- - F===.= 
Building Societies 2,9 1, 4 1 , 0 0 , 8 0 , 9 0,6 0 ,5 0 , 5 
Insurance , Private 
Pension and Provident 4 , 7 4 , 6 7 , 0 8 . 9 10, 3 11 , 3 12,2 14, 2 
Funds 
Public Debt 79,9 83,4 79,8 81 , 6 78 , 5 78 , 1 79,4 77,9 Commissioners 
Other Holders 5 , 2 4 , 6 5 , 4 4,3 5,1 6,2 4 ,8 4 , 3 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1972 1973 
2,0 1 , 4 
2,1 2,5 
2,1 1,8 
6 , 2 5 , 7 
----
=:----
- - - -
1,1 1,3 
17,8 19, 9 
6/,9 66 ,4 
6,8 6,7 
100 100 
1974 
1 ,4 
1,6 
2 , 0 
5,0 
I====== 
1 ,0 
21,6 
67,1 
5,2 
100 
-========================-===== ---- e====-====-====-==== == =-====-==== 1:====--===== 
Data source: South African Reser ve Bank Quarterly Bulletin 
1964 to 1975 
The monetary banking ··se.ctor has liabilities principally short- term consisting 
mostly of demand deposi ts by the public . For the institutional hypothesis 
to hold we would therefore expect their holdings of long paper to be low, 
and Table 4 . 5 . 1 indeed validifies this. From 1964 to 1974 the average total 
holdings of this sector was 3,8 per cent , and it never rose above the 7,2 peak 
recorded in 1964. 
Commercial banks in particular had an average of only 1,45 ~er cent over the 
same time span. In contrast, insurance and pension provided funds , whose 
liabilities are in general long- term , held an average of 10, 6 ·per cent , which/ 
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is high given the enormous holdings of the Public Debt Commissioners. 
We would expect the opposite to be true for short gilts , illustrated in 
Table 4 .5.2 below , 
TABLE 4 .5 . 2 THE OWNERSHIP DISTRIBUTION OF MARKETABLE SHORT-TERM 
GOVERNMENT STOCK FROM 1964 TO 1974, 
PERCENTAGES 
INSTITUTION D AT E 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 
Reserve Bank 5 , 3 4 , 9 2 , 7 5 , 0 4,2 4,8 6 , 2 6 , 2 3 , 2 
Commercial Banks 21 , 4 31 , 1 35 ,0 35,2 36, 7 38 , 0 35 , 9 35 , 0 39 , 6 
Other Banking 27,7 26, 4 33,4 31 , 9 36,4 43,9 43,1 41 , 4 41 , 4 Institutions 
TOTAL 54 , 4 62,4 71,1 72 , 1 77 , 3 86,7 B5 , 2 82 , 6 84 , 2 
----- F===== ::----- - -- F===== F===== I===== ---- ---- ==-----
Building Societies 6 ,0 7 ,9 9 ,5 8,9 B,4 9 ,5 10,3 9,5 ·10,5 
Insurance, Private 
Pension and 2 , 6 1 , 2 1 , 1 1 , 3 0 , 8 0 , 4 0 , 4 0 , 6 0 , 3 
Provident Funds 
Public Debt 30 , 5 24, 4 15 ,5 15,0 10,5 0 , 7 1 , 8 2,8 2 , 0 Commissioners 
Other Holders 6,5 4 ,1 2,8 2 , 7 · 2,9 2,7 2 , 2 4 , 4 2,9 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 ioo 100 
1973 
21 , 9 
32 , 3 
37,1 
91,3 
----
7 , 0 
0 , 4 
1 , 3 
0 
100 
1974 
24,5 
29 , 4 
41,1 
·95,0 
======= 
3,7 
0 , 6 
0,7 
0 
100 
~===================== ==========-====b==============-========================== 
Data Source : South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin 
1964 to 1975 
In contrast to the previous table, here we find the monetary banking sector 
holding an average of 79,1 per cent, with the commercial banks al one holding 
an average 34 , 0 per cent. Further, i~ accordance with the predictions of 
Market Segmentation Theory, the composite of insurance companies, pension and 
provident funds held only an average of 0,77 per cent aver the period in 
question . 
In order to see what extent the holdings of government bonds by the commercial 
./ 
banks are reflective of their total asset holdings, let us examine Table 
4.5.3 below. 
TABLE .:1 .5 . 3 
t.IATURITY OF 
ASSET 
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Tf-£ CDrv~~ERCIAL BANKS HOLDINGS OF SHORT-TER\1 MD 
LONG-TERM STOCK AS A PERCENtAGE OF THEIR TOTAL ASSETS 
PERCENTAGE 
0 A T E 
1964 1965 1956 1967 l96B,l969
1
1970 1971 197211973 1974 
Short- term stock 5 , 6 8 ,1 11 , 0 11,5 11,2 9 , 1 8,7 8 , 8 10 , 1 7 , 9 5,7 
Long- term stock 3,6 1,7 2,1 1 , 3 2,0 1 ,5 0 , 6 0 , 5 
Data source : South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin 
1964 to 1975 
1 , 5 0 ,6 l , l 
I 
Holdings of short-term stock as a percentage of total assets is consistently 
higher than that of long gilts, and averages 7,2 per cent as opposed to 
1 , 6 per cent for the period under consideration . Unfort~nately, no similar 
data exist for insurance , private pension and provident funds. 
The fact that the monetary banking sector in general , and the commercial 
banks in particular, have greater holdings of short government paper is 
probably primarily a consequence of the financial legislation specifically 
the 1965 Sanks Act and the 1972 Financial Institutions Amendment Act . 
Therefore , the results presented here in no \'lay form evidence for the hypo-
thesis of segmented capital markets. But since no extensive breakdown of 
the holdings of gilt- edged securities by maturity is available in South Africa, 
we can do nq more than present that in the above tables. The aggregation 
across maturities clearly represents as large a flaw as the existence of 
the legislation in this respect. 
Given that this evidence c an at best be regarded only as suggestive of 
the existence of matur ity preferences in the market due to the legislative 
imperfections and data constraints, we cannot regard the analysis as consti-
tuti[lg a test of Market Segmentation Theory per se . What it does indicate , 
though, is that a degree of segmentation does exist between the maturity 
ranges albeit owing mainly to legislative factors . That such segmentation 
is in existence is, in a limited sense , a vindication of the prediction of 
the hypothesis although the underlying causal relationships may be quite/ 
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different. Nonetheless , we must again stress that this cannot be regarded 
as a suitable empirical evaluation of the theory in the South African context , 
and consequently we cannot evaluate the efficacy of the model as an explana-
tion of the local financial market . 
4 , 6 C01\CLUDir\G REMARKS 
The first and most obvious deduction that can be made from the application of 
the theories to the South African market is that no single hypothesis was 
completely able to explain the behaviour of the term structure of interest 
rates in the period 1964 to 1974, One theory could not be tested at all 
because of the lack of "independent" evidence, and two of the four which 
were applied produced results which were not significant in any way. A 
third was so severely constrained by data requirements as to be virtually 
inoperative, and only one was able to give fairly satisfactory results. 
The traditional Expectations Theory as an explanation of the rate structure 
could not be applied to the South African context because no independent 
evidence, a necessary prerequisite for an adequate test as we argued in 
Chapter II, was available . The only satisfactory means of obtaining such 
evidence would lie in an extensive questionnaire survey such as that under-
taken by Kane and ~1alkiel8 . No test of this hypothesis was therefore 
conducted . 
In contrast, a number of tests were carried out on the Meiselman hypothesis 
although not on the standard equation but rather on the alternative long-
rate equation . In no case did the estimates produce statistically valid 
evidence , and generally the model performed very poorly. The two most 
important reasons advanced to explain this were firstly, that actual obser-
vations as opposed to artificially smoothed data were employed , and secondly, 
the greater volatility of short rates caused erroneous predictions to be made 
in the sense of expected forward rates . 
The tests performed on the Malkiel hypothesis produced relatively good 
./ 
estimates for one equation at l east . For his original equation no statis-
tically acceptable evidence was accumulated , but for the second equivalent 
equation, good results were obtained . To remove serial correlation a / 
.I 
8. Kane, E. J. and Malkiel , B.G. "The Term Structure of Interest Rates : 
An Analysis of a Survey of Interest-Rate Expectations " Review of Economics 
and Statistics , 1966 , p . 343 . 
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first difference form was estimated , but it was argued on the basis of 
the analysis of Wonnacot and Vlonnacot9 that a low d value need not neces-
sarily imply biased estimates. By varying RA between 15 years and 1 year, 
we found evidence to suggest that the explanatory power of the hypothesis 
was reduced by decreasing RA . Overall we argued that the Malkiel model 
had performed relatively well , end therefore briefly postulated that this 
provided at least some grounds for the increased use of the announcement 
effect as a policy instrument to modify expectations . 
The Liquidity Premium Hypothesis , in the form of the operational model 
advanced by Kessel , was not able to explain the movements of the term 
structure of rates in this country. As a consequence of the number of flaws 
in the model , which are well documented in the literature, this was not too 
surprising . In addition , due to data constraints we were not abl e to 
examine the very short end of the market , a l though in principle this should 
not have made a substantial difference . 
The "test'' carried out on Market Segmentation Theory was not conclusive . 
It was r epeatedly stressed that owing to data constraints and the imperfec-
tions caused by the highly restrictive financial legislation , it was not 
possible to test the hypothesis per se . However , the analysis of the 
holdings of government stock which was carried out revealed that some degree 
of matching between assets and liabilities did indeed take place, ~1d that 
·this could have been indicative of the existence of maturity pr eferences on 
behalf of the financial institutions. It was posited that even if such 
matching was forced on the institutions by the authorities , this nonethe-
less indicated that segmentation between sub- markets did exist even if 
artifically. Despite this though, the analysis clearly does not uphold 
the instituti onal hypothesis as an explanation of investor behaviour , but 
rather that the authorities may have some belief in it . 
A second deduction we can draw from the application of the hypothesis to 
the South Afr ican experience is that neither the institutional framework nor 
the published data are favourable . Interest rates, particularly those on 
..' 
government stock , are perhaps too rigidly controlled causing a distorti on 
of the natural market forces . However , we should not forget the very 
mixed performances of these theories on other , less restricted , financial 
markets. Therefore , while only the Malkiel hypothesis produced results 
which were meaningful , t his does not imply that the other theories are / 
9 . Wonnacot , R.J. and Wonnacot , T.H. op.cit ; 
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invalid as behavioural hypotheses but rather that they are not helpful 
as explanations of the movements of r ates in the South African market , 
·' 
llO . 
C 0 N C L U S I 0 N 
=================== 
In terms of the objectives set out in the introduction to this dissertation , 
we have now completed our analysis of the term structure of interest rates in 
South Africa . In this section we shall summarise the =hief findings of the 
study, chapter by chapter, and then briefly indicate so~e additional relevant 
observations as well as further avenues in this area which could usefully be 
explored in future . 
Chapter I was concerned with the theoretical evaluation of the various competing 
hypotheses on the rate structure. After an initial overview of the historical 
development of term structure theory , the traditional expectations hypothesis 
was examined at some length , and criticisms of this explanation were taken as 
the points of departure for the discussion of other , more recent hypotheses 
(specifically , New Expectations Theory, the Malkiel Theory, Liquidity Premium 
Theory , and Market Segmentation Theory). It was shown that a systematic 
analysis could be undertaken by classifying the theories with regard to the degree 
1 of risk aversion they assumed on behalf of the individual investor . Finally , the 
different theories were placed in the analytical framework suggested by J .A.G. 
Grant1• It was argued that no a priori deductions could be drawn from the 
discussion without careful examination of all the available empirical evidence . 
As a logical consequence of this , Chapter II concerned itself with a comprehen-
sive evaluation of the evidence amassed on the five major theories of the term 
structure . The traditional expectations hypothesis did not have a great deal 
of positive supporting evidence, although some controversy was found to exist 
on the interpretation of this evidence . With no satisfactory 11 independent" 
evidence available , we argued that the so- called "hard" version of the theory 
2 · 
espoused by Conard et al be accepted , but noted that since no readily testable 
hypotheses emerged from the theory it should be regarded as virtually inoperable . 
The empirical evidence on three of the hypotheses (New Expectations Theory, 
Liquidity Premium Theory , and Segmentation Theory) was such that no firm con-
clusions could be drawn as to their merit as explanations of the term structure . 
·" 
While all were found to be theoretically appealing , excessive data requirements 
and methodological problems plagued most of the studies. 
1. Grant , J . A. G. 11 Meiselman on the Structure of Interest Rates", Eeonomica , 
February, 1964. 
2 . Conard , J.W . I ntr oduction to the Theory of Interest, University of California 
Press , Berkeley, 1969. 
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The only model to have distinct positive backing from the empirical r esearch 
performed on it was that of Malkiel . Unfortunately, however , the evidence was 
limited since only two studies had been undertaken. Both encountered the not 
insignificant problem of proxying some of the variables employed , particularly 
that of the normal range of interest rates. 
Overall we argued that recourse to the empirical evidence had not satisfactorily 
settled the theoretical issues of Chapter I, but did highlight certain salient 
features of the theories, and in particular showed the enormous problems inherent 
in making the theories operational. 
The focus of the analysis was narrowed down in Chapter III which concentrated 
its attention on the financial markets in South Africa. The discussion was sub-
divided into two sections. Firstly, institutional arrangements were carefully 
examined , and after a theoretical explanation of the reasons for the existence of 
3 different financial insti~utions, a Gurley and Shaw approach was adopted to 
analyse the whole range of institutions. It was shown that the South African 
financial sector was fairly highly developed both in terms of the number of 
assets traded , and the degree of flexibility it possessed despite powerful 
legislative constraints. 
The second subdivision concerned itself with the determination of specific 
interest rates within the financial structure. It was argued that the widely 
accepted neo-Keynesian theory was unable to satisfactorily explain the level . qod 
movement of particular rates due to the complex interplay of economic, institut-
ional and legal factors. The financial market was conceptually broken down into 
the money market or market for short- term investments, and that for longs or the 
capital market. In the short market it was shown that the only rates truly 
reflective of competitive forces were the rates on negotiable certificates of 
deposit and short government stock, although bankers' acceptances were to a 
large degree freely determined. While the rate on call deposits at the National 
Finance Corporation and the Treasury Bil l rate were controlled by the monetary 
authorities, they nonetheless seemed to approximate closely the other rates. 
The examination of the market for long-term securities considered only the rate 
, / 
on long gilts, controlled by the so-called pattern of rates but also approxim-
ating supply and demand conditions in the market, and the rate on company debentures 
which was demonstrated as being. determined free of imperfections . 
3. Gurley, J.G . and Shaw, E.S. Money in a Theory of Finance , The Brookings 
Institution, 1960. 
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Chapter IV dealt with the actual empirical application of the hypotheses 
to the South Afric.an financial market. The traditional expectations 
hypothesis was not tested due to the lack of independent evidence , a necessary 
prerequisite for a satisfactory test . Meiselman's New Expectations model was 
comprehensively applied to various categories of data although only the long 
rate version of the model was employed owing to data constraints . The result-
ant estimates in no v:ay supported the theory. The Malkiel model was tested 
using government stock time series data, and for the second equation used gave 
4 
reasonably good results given the Wonnacot and VJonnacot argument that the 
estimates need not necessarily be biased by low Durbin- Watson values. The 
5 
methodology of Kessel was adopted in the empirical testing of Liquidity Premium 
Theory. No positive evidence emerged in support of the hypothesis, and it 
was argued that this was primarily a consequence of the severe operational 
problems inherent in implementing the model. Finally, a "test" of the Market 
Segmentation Theory was undertaken, although it was stress ed that due to data 
constraints and the existence of legislative imperfections in the market , thi s. 
approach could only provide evidence at best weakly suggestive of a segmented 
market. This , in fact , proved to be the outcome. It was concluded that although 
no theory was completely able to explain the South African experience, the Malkiel 
hypothesis had nonetheless performed relatively well in the circumstances . Given 
this , it was posited that perhaps an "open- mouth" policy on behalf of the author-
ities might be more effective than the traditional open market approach . 
Essentially , what has emerged from this s t udy confirms the experience of researchers 
in the United States and Britain; no single theory can wholly explain the finan-
cial situation in South Africa, and the theoretical issues of Chapter I remain un-
settled. However, the results obtained from the Malkiel model do seem to indi-
cate that expectations play an important r ole in determining the differentials 
between the various interest rates . Nonetheless, it remains difficult to estimate 
to what degree risk aversive behaviour dominates the securities market . Further-
more it is by no means obvious that expectations are either uniform or even 
normally distributed, 
What has become clear, however, are the enormous difficult"ies inherent in testing 
. ~ 
t he v~ious models against real-world experience . Firstly, empirical verification 
is severely constrained by the paucity of data in South Africa, both in the sense/ 
4 . Wonnacott , R.J . and Wonnacott, T.A. Econome~rics , John Wiley and Sons , 
New York, 1969. 
5. Kessel, R.A. The Cyclical Behaviour of the Term Structure of Interest Rates, 
Nati onal Bureau of Economic Research, New York , 1965. 
I 
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of the amount and consistenc y of the time series data avai lable. Secondly , 
with the possible excepti on of the Malkie l hypothesis, none of the models can 
be considered sufficiently operational and this places f urther demands on their 
data requirements . Thirdly, the existence of a complex i nstitutional and 
legal framework in South Africa makes it difficult t o r efute a specific hypothesis 
on the basi s of its empirical performance since many hidden factors exist to 
distort the operation of normal market forces . 
It is evident , therefore, that much interesting and challenging work remains 
to be done . In the theoretical field of the term structure it would seem 
cruciol that progress be made toward the integration of term structure theory 
with macro-economic theory. In particular , the objective should be a general 
equilibrium framework in which short and long- term rates are determined simul-
taneously with other endogenous variables in the system. It is also likel y , 
and recent developments s eem to reinforce this , that an important area lies in 
finding more sophisticated methods for simulating market forecasts than the 
conventional linear process model s . 
In the South African context there is undoubtedly scope for a great deal of 
res earch on the term of interes t rates . Much more needs to be known about 
institutional arrangements gener ally , and in particular about the precise· 
nature of the inter- relationships between various financial institutions . 
There is an urgent demand for micro-l evel studies of investor behaviour , and 
here large scale questionnaire surveys would appear to have much potent i al . 
Progress must be made towards transforming the available raw data into a system-
atic equivalent of the Durand series for the United States to facilitate further 
econometric work on the rate structure . 
·' 
tl1 
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